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The study sets out to uncover reasons behind the Lao PDR’s long-term 
low health indicators and poorly rated health system. It examines the 
development of the biomedical health services in Laos, within the academic 
frameworks of the history of medicine and international development. 
Combining archival research and interviews with health workers and technical 
advisors in five countries, the study reconstructs a history of efforts to provide 
healthcare over the period 1893-2000. 
The study argues that a series of obstacles have limited consolidation 
and improvements within the Lao health sector: distance from the colonial 
metropole, decades of conflict, the promotion of doctrine in a trade-off with 
technical and management skills, and high levels of donor diversification. The 
cumulative impact of marginality and long-term dependence on diverse 
sources of external assistance has been the under-funded, under-developed and 
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Transliteration 
 There is no standard method for transliteration of Lao into English. My 
transliteration relies closely on an unofficial but relatively predictable system 
used by the Lao Ministry of Foreign Affairs for rendering Lao names into 
Latin script in Lao passports. 
Citation of authors with Lao names 
 I list the given name and surname of all Lao authors each time they are 
cited. This addresses the international custom of listing by surname, and the 
Lao custom of listing by given name. Lao names are listed in the bibliography 










WHY STUDY THE HISTORY OF HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT  
IN LAOS? 
 
Our experience of the present very largely depends upon  
our knowledge of the past.1 
 
Introduction 
‘Am’ was short and tanned, with dark longish hair, a wispy beard, 
shining black eyes, and a smile that flashed across his face and left a lingering 
impression.2 He was 25 years old when I met him in 2009, married, and from 
the ethnic group that lends its name to the district and town of Ta-Oy in 
Salavan province in southern Lao PDR.3  He was a health volunteer, working 
at the lowest level of the government health network that cascades from the 
central-level Ministry of Health, down through provincial, district, sub-district 
levels to village communities. His basic literacy skills in Lao language, gained 
from a few years of rudimentary primary schooling, all but guaranteed his 
selection. There were few other ‘educated’ adults in his village. His role was 
to provide information to families in his village and three or four neighbouring 
villages about family planning methods, to supply contraceptives and refer 
                                                 
1 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
p.2. 
2 I met ‘Am’ while conducting a project evaluation in 2009, before commencing my PhD 
studies. ‘Am’ is a pseudonym, but also a common prefix for men’s names in Salavan province. 
3 I use the specific terms ‘Lao People’s Democratic Republic’ or ‘Lao PDR’ only when 
referring to the government administration established on 2 December 1975. I use the term 
‘Laos’ to refer to the country or nation prior to 1975, or in general references that span the pre- 
and post-1975 periods. 
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couples to the district health office when needed. He received a small stipend 
in return for his work and work-related travel. 
Health volunteers like ‘Am’ are required to report to the district health 
office every month at their own expense. There was no bus service, and ‘Am’ 
may have baulked at the steep fare if one had existed. He had hitched a ride on 
the back of an old motorbike to reach the local district town, saving him a 
day’s walk of thirty or so kilometres along a rough, unpaved road which 
wound among forested mountains and through, not across, rivers – there were 
no bridges. 
I met ‘Am’ in the course of my work as a development practitioner. I 
worked as a program manager in the fields of health, social and rural 
development for bilateral donors (ie: governments), multilateral development 
agencies, and occasionally, non-government organisations (NGOs) in the late 
1990s and throughout the 2000s. While based predominantly in the capital, 
Vientiane, I had worked and travelled extensively throughout rural Laos. 
Speaking and reading Lao language had exposed me not only to the policies of 
international development agencies towards Laos, but also to the work of Lao 
government and party organisations, and enabled me to interact closely with 
officials and citizens, including health volunteers such as ‘Am.’ 
That day, ‘Am’ had submitted his monthly report on contraceptive use 
in the villages he served, as well as his regular request for re-supply of 
contraceptives. He had also submitted a short demographic report on the 
annual birth and death statistics in the cluster of villages, as Lao government 
workers do not collect such information themselves. Tragically, the statistics 
included the death of his own child, his third child to die in infancy in almost 
3 
 
as many years. He calmly assured me that his experience was not unusual, and 
that it was quite normal for babies to die in his village and the surrounding 
villages. My heart went out to him. Not one, but three children dead before 
their first birthday. My encounter highlighted a tragic irony within the Lao 
health system. While he walked from village to village, helping the district 
health service to extend its reach in remote, ethnic villages not otherwise 
served by the government’s health network, that very network had failed him 
and his family on at least three occasions. 
 
The current state of the Lao health sector 
 ‘Am’s experience is not isolated. The Ministry of Health struggles to 
deliver basic healthcare services to much of the Lao PDR’s rural population, 
which in 2014 comprised an estimated 65 percent of the nation’s total 
population.4 The rural population, made up of 49 officially recognised ethnic 
groups speaking different languages and adhering to diverse customs, live in 
small villages scattered in often remote mountainous areas, many of which 
have only seasonal road access, little or no public transport, and no connection 
to the national electricity grid.5 Education and income levels are low. As such, 
Laos’ rural population inhabits a marginal space within Laos and within the 
region which provides geographic, technical and cultural challenges for the 
provision of effective healthcare services. 
 Results of the most recent Lao Social Indicator Survey (LSIS) 
conducted in 2011-2012 show significant improvements in health indicators 
                                                 
4 Information retrieved on 10 September 2014 from http://www.wpro.who.int/countries/lao/en/ 
5 Successive Lao governments have attempted to entice the rural population into larger 
settlements. The Lao government has been implementing the most recent version of this 
policy, the ‘Three builds’ (sam-sang) policy, since 2010. 
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nationwide. Life expectancy at birth has risen from an estimated 42 years in 
19776 to 64 years for men and 67 for women in recent years.7 The infant 
mortality rate has decreased to 68/1,000;8 and the maternal mortality rate is 
currently estimated to be around 357/100,000.9 Moreover, 69.9 percent of the 
population are reported to have access to improved water sources in 2012. 
 
Figure 1.1: Health indicators by country, 201210 
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Other health indicators are proving harder to shift, such as the high rate 
of stunting in children (44.2 percent), linked to their nutritional intake and 
                                                 
6 World Bank, World Development Report 1979, (New York: World Bank and Oxford 
University Press, 1979), p.126. 
7 Statistics for 2012 retrieved on 10 September 2014 from 
http://www.who.int/countries/lao/en/  
8 Ministry of Health et al, Lao PDR Lao Social Indicator Survey (LSIS) 2011-12 (Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey/Demographic and Health Survey), (Vientiane: Ministry of Health 
and Lao Statistics Bureau, December 2012), p.III. 
9 Ibid., p.124. 
10 I include statistics from neighbouring low-income countries, and two other land-locked 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in Asia and Africa for comparison. Statistics for 2012 
retrieved on 10 September 2014 from World Health Organization (WHO) country health 
profiles for Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Lao PDR and Myanmar, listed at 
http://www.who.int/countries/en/ 
11 Stunting (height for age) is one of three key measurements used in WHO’s international 
child growth standards, along with wasting (weight for height) and malnutrition (weight for 
age). Stunting is defined as “having a height (or length)-for-age more than 2 SD [standard 
deviations] below the [Committee for Disease Control’s] NCHS [National Centre for Health 




retention. However, the caveat remains that there are vast differences in the 
urban and rural statistics, which can mask the experience of families such as 
‘Am’s’ who live in remote and ethnically diverse localities. 
 Despite these improvements, international agencies such as the World 
Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO) frequently state that the Lao 
PDR has some of the lowest health indicators in the Western Pacific region 
and in Asia more generally.12 The only other countries in Southeast and East 
Asia with similar health indicators are Cambodia and Myanmar. 
 In the light of such statistics, narratives concerning the Lao health 
sector are mixed. The Ministry of Health oscillates between bland assertions 
of continual progress for its domestic audience,13 and pleas to the international 
community for assistance to plug the sector’s ongoing shortages and short-
comings by employing what Vatthana Pholsena has described as a “discourse 
of lack”.14 The narrative employed by international development assistance 
agencies is more consistent, centring on the short-comings within what 
emerges as a seemingly perpetual cycle of under-achievement when examined 
over an extended period of time. This particular narrative goes beyond the low 
health indicators to highlight the inadequate levels of health funding, the 
imbalance in health expenditure between urban and rural areas, and between 
curative and preventative services. International development assistance 
agencies also draw attention to the low number of health staff, the poor 
                                                 
12 The Western Pacific Region is a geographical region of the WHO’s member countries 
which includes a diverse group of high, mid and low-income countries, eg: Japan, South 
Korea, China, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and  
number of smaller Pacific island nations. 
13 The PHC policy document declares that “the health sector has, in general, made continual 
progress.” See Ministry of Health, ‘Policy on Primary Health Care’, January 2000, p.2. 
14 Vatthana Pholsena, Post-war Laos. The Politics of Culture, History and Identity, (Singapore: 
ISEAS, 2006), p.213. 
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standard of health and medical education, the inconsistent quality of healthcare 
provision, and its low utilisation rates by the population. On occasion 
international donors couch the elements of under-achievement diplomatically 
by giving preliminary acknowledgement of progress, before identifying the 
sector’s short-comings. The WHO’s current Country Cooperation Strategy for 
the Lao PDR is a case in point. It states: 
 
In recent years the Ministry [of Health] has made significant progress 
in terms of health policy development and decentralization of health 
services to provincial, district and health centre levels. However, 
investment in health is still low … health service provision is strained 
by a lack of qualified, adequately distributed staff, adequate 
infrastructure and an affordable drug supply...15 [my emphasis] 
 
Similarly, a recent World Bank report summarises: 
 Despite notable progress in health on some fronts, Lao PDR continues 
to have some of the worst maternal and child outcome indicators, both 
globally as well as in the East Asia and Pacific region … By 
international standards, government spending on health – at 1.1 per 
cent of GDP – is low and has been erratic over time, primarily due to 
[fluctuations in] external financing … there are large disparities in 
government health spending between central and sub-national 
levels …16 [my emphasis] 
 
 Development practitioners in Laos become familiar with these 
narrative models and devices, in the course of contributing to strategies, plans 
and reports for bilateral and multilateral development assistance agencies. 
Employing this “discourse of lack” and highlighting the short-comings of the 
health sector is almost a requirement to secure international funding for future 
interventions. At other times, commentators have been less diplomatic; for 
example, the WHO refers in one document to the “strongly administrative” 
                                                 
15 WHO and Ministry of Health, Country Cooperation Strategy for the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, 2012-2015, (Vientiane: WHO, 2011), p.vii. 
16 World Bank, ‘Government Spending on Health in Lao PDR: Evidence and issues,’ Report 
no: 76229-LA, December 2012, p.2. 
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nature (a euphemism for ‘bureaucratic’) of the Lao PDR’s Ministry of 
Health,17 whereas political scientist Kristina Jönsson describes it bluntly as 
“malfunctioning.”18More troublingly, the authors of a review of French NGO, 
Comité pour la Coopération avec le Laos’ (CCL) development efforts state 
that they have observed no real improvements in the health sector over the 
organisation’s quarter-century in the country. Instead, they claim that 
improvements in health status have derived from general economic and 
development improvements unrelated to the health services.19 
 The criticisms above are not without substance. I witnessed several 
health-related episodes in the field prior to undertaking this research which 
suggested the official policies of the Ministry of Health and its supporting 
international development assistance agencies have run far in advance of the 
capacity for actual implementation.20 Government health services were not 
serving (and quite possibly were unable to serve) rural communities in the 
manner and to the extent to which the Lao government and donors intended, 
although it was less clear why this was so. Given the successive waves of 
grand plans to develop the Lao health sector, and an almost constant narrative 
of under-achievement, it is easy to wonder what meaningful progress, if any, 
the sector has made since its beginnings in Laos. 
  
                                                 
17 WHO, ‘Lao PDR. Country Cooperation Strategy at a Glance’, May 2010. 
18 Kristina Jönsson, ‘Policy making in transitional economies: poverty reduction and health 
care in Cambodia and Laos’, Studies in Health Service Organisations and Policy, 23, 2008, 
p.174. 
19 Florence Strigler et al, ‘La situation nutritionnelle et sanitaire et l’évolution du système de 
santé’, in Le Laos doux et amer. Vingt-cinq ans de pratiques d’une ONG, edited by 
Dominique Gentil and Philippe Boumard, (Paris: CCL-Karthala, 2005), p.132. 
20 I use the terms ‘international development assistance agencies’ and ‘international 
cooperation agencies’ interchangeably throughout the thesis, and make no distinction between 
the two terms. I do not, however, use the more recent term ‘development partners’, which has 




The starting point for my research was to find explanations for why the 
Lao health sector had failed ‘Am’s’ family, and others like his. I set out to 
uncover the sector’s achievements, but also to understand the reasons 
contributing to the long-standing poor health indicators, the shortages, short-
comings and under-achievements. In summary, my research question is: To 
what extent did five decades of heavy and highly diverse international 
development inputs, coupled with six decades of prior colonial efforts, benefit 
or hinder the Lao health sector? I aim to provide a more detailed explanation 
of prior efforts in the health sector and the development obstacles encountered 
in various decades, in order to promote greater understanding of the context in 
which Lao government officials and international development practitioners 




 Historian Pratik Chakrabarti suggests that studying the history of 
medicine can help us to understand the “deep problems that plague global 
health”.21 The examination of the relationship between past and present, and 
inversely between present and past, can create improved understanding of both 
past events and contemporary phenomena. In this vein, a study of the history 
of the Lao health sector could contribute to an understanding of the roots and 
dynamics of problems that currently encumber the sector and its future 
development. 
                                                 




 A combination of theoretical and pragmatic factors influenced my 
decision to apply history to this study. History and development may seem at 
first to be at odds. While the discipline of history examines change over time, 
the international development sector attempts to plan and foster change with a 
focus that rests unashamedly on the future. As such, development is more 
often paired with the disciplines of anthropology or sociology, which are 
anchored more firmly in the present. The development sector has been 
criticised by anthropologist David Lewis, among others, for its a-historical and 
decontextualised approach which studiously avoids delving into the historical 
context in which governments, development agencies and communities 
operate, and the legacies they carry, allowing development efforts and 
practitioners to exist in a cycle of the “perpetual present”.22 
 Historical sources, methodology and analysis can contribute to the 
policy and practice of both health and development in many ways. However, 
the use of history in the development field remains rare,23 despite advocacy 
from scholars who support greater use of history in health policy.24 Alison 
Bashford and Carolyn Strange argue that historians can offer useful 
perspectives to public health professionals, who may be interested in the past 
but have not been trained to think in a historical manner. 
 
                                                 
22 David Lewis, ‘International development and the ‘perpetual present’: Anthropological 
approaches to the re-historicization of policy,’ European Journal of Development Research, 
21, 2009, pp.332-346. 
23 Virginia Berridge, ‘History Matters? History’s Role in Health Policy Making’, Medical 
History, 52, 2008, pp.311-326; Virginia Berridge, ‘Thinking in Time. Does Health Policy 
Need History as Evidence?’ The Lancet, 6 March 2010, 375 (9717), pp. 798-799; and Michael 
Woolcock et al, ‘How and Why Does History Matter for Development Policy?’ Journal of 
Development Studies, 47(1), January 2011, p.71. 
24  Lewis, ‘International development’, pp.332-346; Alison Bashford and Carolyn Strange, 
‘Thinking Historically about Public Health’, Medical Humanities, 33, 2007, pp.87-92; and 
Sally Sheard, ‘History in Health and Health Services: Exploring the Possibilities’, Journal of 
Epidemiological Community Health, August 2008, 62(8), pp.740-744. 
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 Historical mindedness … entails searching for differences as well as 
similarities between past and present, and not presupposing one or the 
other … If policy-makers look to historians for clear answers, they are 
likely to be disappointed. Alternatively, if they are receptive to 
information that may have been forgotten, and, more importantly, if 
they are receptive to the wide-framed thinking that historians bring to 
bear … historically informed analysis will prove its value.25 
 
 In a similar vein, the past decade has witnessed increased support from 
political scientists and applied anthropologists of development for the role of 
history in development studies, and for its potential to contribute to better 
policies, practices and outcomes. 26  Political scientist Rob Jenkins outlines 
three ways in which development ideas and practices can benefit from a 
historical perspective: a history of development ideas can be presented; 
historical parallels can be used to support development theory; and the impact 
of historical pathways on future development choices can be highlighted.27 My 
approach coincides most closely with Jenkins’ third option, showing how 
historical pathways and frameworks influenced subsequent development 
options or choices within the Lao health sector. However, I must emphasise 
that this study does not concern itself with the future of the sector, and 
therefore makes no recommendations for future action. Recommendations are 
the work of policy makers, health professionals and development practitioners, 
not historians. 
 Personally, a key motivation for this research was the desire to 
challenge the low profile of history in development studies, to be discussed in 
more detail in the following chapter. The decision to use archival sources and 
potential informants inside and outside Laos had a more pragmatic motivation, 
                                                 
25 Bashford and Strange, ‘Thinking Historically’, pp.88, 91. 
26 Woolcock et al, ‘How and why does history matter’, p.71. 
27 Rob Jenkins, ‘Where Development Meets History.’ Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics, 44(1), 2006, p.2. 
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as this allowed me to begin research in countries with faciliatory research 
environments while waiting for research approvals in the Lao PDR. 28  I 
calculated that in a worst case scenario, in which Lao government research 
approval were unforthcoming within university-imposed deadlines, I could 
conduct the entire project outside the Lao PDR. My concerns were warranted. 
Eleven months elapsed before I was granted research status at the University 
of Health Sciences in Vientiane, and 20 months before access to Laos’ 
National Archives Department was forthcoming. Twelve months later, during 
writing up, the National Archives unexpectedly granted additional access to 
previously undisclosed sources. 
 
Scarce and scattered sources 
 This study draws on archival research and oral history interviews to 
reconstruct an understanding of developments within the Lao health system. 
Archives in several countries provided written documents, maps, photographs 
and newspaper articles, which presented official views from the colonial 
administration, successive Lao governments, international donors and 
international NGOs. Interviews and discussions, on the other hand, provided 
an opportunity to seek out more individual views and importantly, Lao voices 
and experiences which were under-represented in official archival sources. 
Ultimately my research relies more on written than oral sources, in contrast to 
the bulk of contemporary Lao histories which prefer oral history. 
                                                 
28 My request for research approval in the Lao PDR began at the National Institute of Public 
Health, but was referred to the Post-Graduate Department of the University of Health Sciences. 
From there it progressed slowly through the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and back again, three times. See the descriptions of the long and complicated 
processes of obtaining official permissions to conduct research in the social sciences and 
humanities in the one-party states of China, Vietnam and the Lao PDR. Sarah Turner, ed., Red 
Stamps and Gold Stars: Fieldwork dilemmas in Upland Southeast Asia, (Vancouver/Toronto: 
UBC Press, 2013). 
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 It was necessary to cast the research net widely, due to the scarcity and 
ad hoc nature of secondary sources and the restricted status of some primary 
sources. Access to archival collections in the Lao PDR is strictly controlled, 
and some United States government sources dating from the 1960s and 1970s 
are yet to be declassified. The archives consulted are located in the Lao PDR, 
France, the United States of America, and the Philippines, and contain 
documents in Lao, French and English languages. While not exhaustive, these 
sources provide a substantive overview from which a history of the Lao health 
sector can be reconstructed. No Vietnamese or Russian language sources were 
consulted due to lack of familiarity with these languages. However, future 
examination of such sources would add important perspectives and a fuller 
understanding of health and development in Laos, especially from the mid-
1950s onwards. 
 Rare access was granted to the collection of the Lao Department of 
National Archives (Kom Samnao Ekasane Heng Xat), hereafter referred to as 
the National Archives, located within the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kasouang 
Phay Nay), 29  and the photographic collection of the Lao News Agency 
(Khaosane Pathet Lao), within the Ministry of Information, Culture and 
Tourism (Kasouang Taleng-khao Vatthanatham lae Thong-thieo). Few 
scholars conduct historical research in the Lao PDR, and even fewer attempt to 
access archival collections.30 I accessed the National Archives’ collection after 
                                                 
29 The Ministry of Home Affairs (Kasouang phay-nay) is a new ministry created in the 2000s, 
with departments and functions previously located in the Prime Minister’s Office (Samnak-
ngane nayok) and LPRP committees. This new ministry should not be confused with the 
Ministry of Public Security, formerly named the Ministry of Interior (also Kasouang phay-nay 
in Lao). 
30 Sarah Turner, ‘Dilemmas and Detours. Fieldwork with Ethnic Minorities in Upland 
Southwest China, Vietnam and Laos’, in Red Stamps and Gold Stars: Fieldwork dilemmas in 
Upland Southeast Asia, ed. Sarah Turner, p.3. 
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a lengthy research application process through the Lao Ministry of Health’s 
University of Health Sciences. While archives staff were generally helpful, the 
cataloguing system is basic and likely incomplete. Most documentation 
available for consultation was clustered from 1966-1973, and after 1975. 
Archives staff disclosed additional holdings in a follow-up visit, which 
included selected colonial and Royal Lao Government (RLG) records, and 
information concerning the activities of the Central Health Committee (Khana 
Sathalanasouk Sounkang) of the resistance Neo Lao Hak Xat’s (NLHX) 
Liberated Zone dating from 1966 to 1975. 
 The photographic collection of the Lao News Agency is primarily a 
collection of NLHX and Lao PDR images, catalogued in only the most 
rudimentary fashion. Captions are often absent, or contain revolutionary 
slogans rather than descriptions of the images. I used official photographs as 
an indication of the regime’s publicity priorities during the various decades, as 
well as confirmation of oral and written records. 
 Data was also drawn from a selection of overseas archival collections 
in France, the Philippines and the United States of America. The Archives 
Nationales d’Outre-Mer (ANOM) in Aix-en-Provence, France provided an 
extensive collection of official materials from the colonial health service in 
Laos, and the individual health facilities that preceded its formation. 31  
Unfortunately, Lao voices were muted at best; almost all documents were 
written by French doctors, with only occasional reports by Lao or Vietnamese 
auxiliary staff. The collection provides a surprisingly comprehensive insight 
into the operation of the Lao health service over a period of 55 years, despite 
                                                 
31 ANOM was formerly named the Centre des Archives d’Outre Mer (CAOM). The health 
records for Laos are part of the collection of the Résidence Supérieure du Laos (RSL), Series 
S [Santé], boxes 1-12. 
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suffering from what Laurence Monnais describes as the historiographic “no 
man’s land” during the Second World War: the collection held no documents 
for the period from 1941-1946. 32  Due to time constraints, health-related 
materials for Indochina as a whole were not examined, nor were financial or 
public works materials for Laos which could have provided more contextual 
information. 
The collection at the WHO’s Western Pacific Regional Office library 
in Manila, the Philippines, provides a useful complement to the RLG and Lao 
PDR documents in the National Archives. It contains annual and biennial 
reports of the WHO regional office from the early 1950s until the present day, 
which detail WHO assistance to the RLG and later the Lao PDR governments, 
as well as the governments of other member countries in the region. 
Occasional reports contain rare photographs of health activities in Laos in the 
1960s and early 1970s. The WHO office library in Vientiane has a collection 
of more recent official strategies, plans and reports, with few predating the 
mid-1990s. 
The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) collection 
at College Park, Maryland, United States of America, provides archival 
evidence of American activities during the RLG period, although not all 
records have been declassified.33  As expected, most United States records 
were in English, with the exception of Lao government announcements and 
the reports of French technical advisors, which were conveyed to Washington 
DC in their original French. 
                                                 
32 Monnais-Rousselot, Médecine et colonisation, p.83. 
33 Researcher Jonathon Clemente also found that many United States Government materials 
concerning medical assistance to Laos during the Second Indochina War remain classified. 
Email correspondence of 4 June 2012. 
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In addition to the NARA records, the USAID website contains a large 
and increasing number of digitised documents from the 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s. The documentation provides information on USAID’s Public Health 
Program, including the contract of NGO Operation Brotherhood (OB). I also 
thank the family of the late Dr Primo Guevara, a former OB doctor, for 
generously sharing documents from his personal archives. 
 Occasional Lao memoirs complement the archival materials. There are 
extremely few book-length memoirs by Lao health workers, but brief accounts 
exist.34 Memoirs of foreigners who spent part of their working life in Laos 
and/or the Lao health sector are more numerous. A series of books by 
American doctor, Tom Dooley, penned in the late 1950s to raise funds for his 
medical work in rural Laos, offer a rich if sometimes dramatic description of 
health and medical conditions in selected rural towns.35 The memoir of Dr 
Charles Weldon, the former head of USAID’s Public Health Division in Laos 
from 1963-1974, describes his work during those years.36 Goodbye Vientiane, 
a collection of reminiscences of former OB staff offers some light-hearted but 
nevertheless interesting commentary on the rural health network it operated 
from 1957 until 1975,37 complementing Father Miguel Bernad’s more formal 
                                                 
34 Banyen Phimmasone-Lévy, ‘Yesterday and today in Laos: a girl’s autobiographical notes’, 
in Women in the New Asia: The Changing Roles of Men and Women in South and South-East 
Asia, ed. Barbara E. Ward, (Amsterdam: UNESCO, 1963), pp.244-267; Fred Branfman, ‘May 
the life of a former nurse from Xieng Khouang pass away without returning again,’ in Voices 
from the Plain of Jars. Life under an Air War, (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1972), 
pp.46-56; and Khammeung Volachit, Nang Phet Pativat. Xivit tit-phanh kap hong-moh 101 
viraxon  (Revolutionary female nurses: Life and the Heroic Hospital 101), (Vientiane: 
Manthoulath Press, 2012). 
35 Thomas A. Dooley, Dr Tom Dooley’s Three Great Books: Deliver Us from Evil, The Edge 
of Tomorrow[and] The Night They Burned the Mountain, (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Cudahy, 1960). 
36 Charles Weldon, Tragedy in Paradise. A Country Doctor at War in Laos, (Bangkok: Asia 
Books, 1999). 
37 Penelope Villarica Flores, Goodbye Vientiane. Untold Stories of Filipinos in Laos, (San 
Fransisco: Philippine American Writers and Artists Inc, 2005). 
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and praising account of OB’s early operations in Laos. 38  Former British 
diplomat, Mervyn Brown touches on the work of British Colombo Plan 
doctors in the early 1960s, including their brief capture by the Pathet Lao,39 
while French medical advisor Didier Sicard and his wife provide insight into 
the conditions at the medical school in the early years of the new regime.40 All 
sources provide interesting snapshots in time, but without an established 
historical framework the disparate and fragmentary accounts are unable to be 
placed into the broader context of the Lao health sector. 
 
Interviews, discussions and ethics 
 Archival research was supplemented with interviews and in-depth 
discussions with former health workers, technical advisors and international 
development agency staff. 41  I interviewed 56 current or retired doctors, 
pharmacists, dentists, nurses, midwives, health administrators, and technical 
advisors, who are now resident in the Lao PDR, France, United States, the 
Philippines and Australia. Moreover, a seminar organised by the University of 
Health Sciences in Vientiane in June 2014 brought together 40 Lao health 
professionals, some of whom offered helpful advice and information. 
 Interviews took the form of discussions, and offered a more 
personalised aspect of the health sector than the formulaic structure and 
contents of official reports. However, the word ‘interview’ (kane samphat) 
                                                 
38 Miguel A Bernad, Filipinos in Laos, with “Postscripts” by J “Pete” Fuentecila, (New York: 
Mekong Circle International, 2004). 
39 Mervyn Brown, War in Shangri-La: A Memoir of Civil War in Laos, (London: Radcliffe 
Press, 2001). 
40 Marie-Noële and Didier Sicard, Au nom de Marx et de Bouddha: Révolution au Laos, un 
peuple, une culture disparaissent, (Paris: Inter Editions, 1981). 
41 Ethics clearance for the interviews was obtained from the National University of Singapore 
(NUS) and the University of Health Sciences (UHS) in Vientiane. 
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proved highly formal and therefore fear-inducing for many of the Lao 
informants, and posed an initial barrier to the free flow of discussion. Outside 
the Lao PDR, most interviews were sound-recorded. Written notes were taken 
during or immediately after interviews that were not sound-recorded, and 
confidential transcripts of all interviews prepared. Most informants outside the 
Lao PDR agreed to be named in the research, whereas many inside the country 
requested anonymity. 
Some potential informants in Laos appeared wary of my intentions and 
declined to be interviewed. Some replied that they were too old, others that 
their roles had been mundane and therefore they had nothing to contribute. 
Others passed away before I could interview them. Some ensured their 
responses did not deviate from current official policy, or recommended that I 
interview higher-ranking persons who would be more practiced at repeating 
the official line. Vatthana Pholsena encountered similar problems conducting 
oral history discussions in Laos, and reports that she was advised: “People 
may think you want to spy on their past and find flaws”.42 
I did not ‘pursue’ potential informants vigorously but let them gravitate 
towards me through friendships and personal contacts. To respect the 
numerous requests for anonymity, I rarely provide direct quotes from 
discussions in the thesis text. Instead, I use them as background information to 
inform my archival research. 
The research stirred up mixed emotions for many Lao informants. One 
retired nurse smiled wistfully as she recited English-language slogans taught 
by a provincially-based Filipino medical team in the early 1970s. Another’s 
                                                 
42 Vatthana Pholsena, ‘Shifting Visions of the Past: Ethnic Minorities and the ‘Struggle for 
National Independence’ in Laos’ in Contestations of Memory in Southeast Asia. ed., Roxana 
Waterson and Kwok Kian-Woon, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), p.97. 
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eyes moistened as she recalled her carefree youth as a medical student in a 
beautiful Eastern European city in the 1970s and 1980s. However, one elderly 
man living in exile declined my email enquiry for an interview explaining, in 
impeccable English, that the past was too painful and so he had moved on.43 
Another exile wished me “Bonne chance”.44 
 
Thesis Outline  
The study concerns the interlocking themes of health, development and 
history in modern Laos. It is the first historical research project to examine the 
development of the Lao health sector, and the history of medicine in the Lao 
context. It presents an account of the development of the Ministry of Health 
and its various forerunners, as well as a historical overview of the expansion 
of the health network, and the professional education and training of Lao 
health workers. On a broader level, the study seeks to explore the influence of 
colonization and decolonization, and the provision of high levels of diversely 
sourced international development assistance to the health sector over a period 
of more than a century.  
The study provides an overview of developments in the Lao health 
sector from 1893 until 2000. It is a necessarily general study, at times 
sweeping, as it takes the first step in outlining the overall framework and 
context of the history of health and medicine in Laos before more analytical 
studies can be meaningfully conducted. The study begins with the French 
annexation of Laos, and closes as the Lao PDR’s fourth Five-Year Socio-
Economic Development Plan drew to an end. The year 1950 serves as a half-
                                                 
43 Email correspondence with former RLG official (anonymous), June 2012. 
44 Email correspondence with Dr Khamphaï Abhay, 10 October 2012. 
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way point. In that year, the French administration transferred management of 
the Lao health service to the RLG. As such, this study spans 57 years of 
colonial and 50 years of post-colonial health services. 
Some informants encouraged me to extend my study until the present 
day, arguing that more impressive advancements have been made since the 
turn of the twenty-first century, and that by ending in 2000 my study would 
not capture them. My response has been that a large part of my intention is to 
reconstruct and highlight periods of history that have faded from memory or 
been discarded. The period after 2000 is well-known to many people currently 
working in the health sector, and information about those years is still 
relatively easy to access. 
This study charts the establishment of a nationwide health service, 
including infrastructure, staffing and professional education and training, 
official policies and healthcare delivery within the limits of Laos’ 
geographical, administrative and cultural marginality. Secondly, the research 
highlights the provision of international development assistance by donor 
agencies to the various Lao administrations. It explores the limitations inherent 
in the numerous but also highly diverse sources of such development 
assistance, and their impact on opportunities for consolidation or reform 
within the health sector. Finally, the study exposes the limited knowledge and 
awareness of the history of the health sector, and how this has led to the 
glossing over of sequential developments by official sources, buying into the 
international development sector’s understanding of perpetual under-
achievement, and denying contextual understanding for those currently 
working in the health sector. 
20 
 
Chapter Two examines the academic fields of the history of medicine, 
international development policy and practice, and Lao historiography which 
frame this study. The chapter advocates that histories of medicine must go 
beyond the study of biomedicine and colonialism, where they have 
traditionally clustered, to engage with the role of biomedicine in the post-
colonial period, by examining its interplay with nation-building agendas and 
the international development sector. The chapter also discusses the latter’s 
role in national development, and its often a-historical approach. 
The following chapters provide a more detailed examination of the Lao 
health sector during four periods of the twentieth century. Chapter Three deals 
with establishment of a biomedical health service, l’Assistance médicale au 
Laos, in the colonial period (1893-1950). Chapter Four investigates its 
nationalisation and fragmentation in the post-colonial period under the 
administration of the RLG and in the ‘Liberated Zone’ of the resistance 
government of the NLHX, and its shaping during a period of extended war and 
conflict from 1950-1975. Chapter Five examines the changes and realignments 
within the health sector and the wider government sector in the socialist period 
of the early Lao PDR (1975-1990), while Chapter Six deals with the 
transitional period of new thinking and market economics in the decade from 
1991-2000, ushered in after the fall of socialist governments in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, in the post-socialist period. 
I conclude the study by summing up how Laos’ multi-faceted 
marginality, combined with its long-term heavy dependence on diverse 
sources of external assistance, has influenced, and at times limited, 
development of Laos’ biomedical health services. I conclude that the current 
21 
 
state of the health sector, and its often-cited poor performance, can be 
significantly explained by its historical development in the context of 
marginality and dependence on external assistance, with resultant disruptions, 
continuities and reconfigurations. And because the country’s comparative 
economic and educational poverty has compounded the sector’s slow 
development in the colonial, post-colonial, socialist and post-socialists periods, 
it is not possible to meaningfully examine Laos’ health sector without also 
being mindful of parallel national development efforts. 
  
Conclusion 
 The research aims to address the interests and requirements of 
international and Lao academics, and also to stimulate the curiosity of Lao 
health professionals about the history of their profession, the health sector, and 
wider history of the nation. It aims to provide deeper historical context about 
the Lao health sector for Lao government officials and also international 
development assistance agencies, which continue to provide funding and 
technical support to the sector. 
The thesis uncovers and reconstructs the development trajectory of the 
Lao health sector over the period from 1893 to 2000. It acknowledges the 
achievements of the biomedical sector, while seeking to unravel the cycle of 
grand plans and seemingly perpetual under-achievement frequently invoked 
by successive Lao governments and international development assistance 
agencies. It presents historical explanations for the poor performance of the 
Lao Ministry of Health and the health sector more generally, arguing that it is 
bound up in the geographical, administrative and cultural marginality of Laos, 
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its long-term dependence on external assistance for the development of many 
of its technical and administrative services, and the resulting limitations that 






HISTORIES OF HEALTH, DEVELOPMENT AND MODERN LAOS 
 
Introduction 
The history of health and development in Laos spans a wide academic 
territory that is politically, economically, socially, culturally and ultimately 
geographically diverse. The research combines the history of medicine, the 
history of development policy and practice, and the historiography of modern 
Laos. This chapter outlines the academic framework provided by each of these 
fields. Histories of medicine have tended to focus on the colonial period, 
whereas studies of health and development are more commonly concerned 
with the post-colonial period. This research weaves these two related fields 
with historiography to examine the development of health networks, human 
resources and healthcare services from the onset of French colonisation until 
the turn of the twenty-first century. The timeframe covered by the research, 
significantly longer than most studies of the development sector, allows for a 
considered view of national and sectoral developments, and for questioning 
(without a definitive answering) of whether the internationally-funded 
development process has fostered improvements in the health sector, or a 
cycle of under-achievement and failure. 
On a broader level, the study demonstrates the ways in which 
international political movements and events have impacted on Laos: a small, 
low-income, marginal nation; and the various dilemmas posed for Lao health 
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professionals, administrators and the population in general, and the options 
available to develop the health sector within these boundaries. This focus 
contrasts with much of the existing international literature in the fields of both 
the history of medicine and development studies, which focuses on the 
experience of larger and/or middle-income countries. 
 
Histories of Medicine 
 In this section, I highlight some of the key themes emerging from the 
study of the history of medicine in the past 30 years. I pay particular attention 
to studies that explore the history of medicine in Southeast Asia and French 
Indochina, and conclude by summarising the critique of the contemporary 
state of health and medicine in developing countries, which argues that the 
foundations of unequal health are rooted in the imperial past and perpetuated 
by the current system of international development assistance. 
 
Definitions of health, medicine, health systems and health services 
The knowledge and practice of medicine has a long history in diverse 
societies throughout the world, resulting in different medical traditions, and 
concepts of health and ill health (or illness) that are both culturally and 
historically specific. The various medical traditions or conceptual health 
systems, for example, biomedicine, Ayurvedic and Traditional Chinese 
Medicine have mixed and exchanged ideas, practices and drugs over time, 
resulting in few clean-cut divisions between them. All conceptual health 
systems, however, aim to protect or improve human health. In the early 
twentieth century, the Rockefeller Foundation defined ‘health’ as the ability to 
25 
 
work.1 The WHO, on its founding in 1948, adopted a more holistic definition: 
“a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity”.2 
This study deals primarily with the conceptual health system of 
biomedicine, as practised within a series of official health services in Laos. It 
engages with traditional Lao medicine only where it comes within the scope of 
the predominantly biomedical health services, despite traditional medicine 
offering a rich field of research.3 
 Academics use a wide range of terms to refer to biomedicine. In the 
history of medicine literature it is referred to alternatively as ‘European 
medicine’, ‘Western medicine’, and ‘modern medicine’. I treat all these terms 
as having more or less the same meaning. The period-based terms, ‘colonial 
medicine’ and ‘imperial medicine’, also crop up frequently, alongside the 
more location-specific ‘tropical medicine.’ I prefer to use the term 
‘biomedicine’, in part because biomedical education and practices were 
frequently transmitted to Laos via non-Western countries. I also prefer to 
avoid the problematic term ‘modern medicine’ because, as Hormoz 
Ebrahimnejad points out, biomedicine incorporates aspects of ‘traditional’ 
                                                 
1 E. Richard Brown, ‘Public Health in Imperialism: Early Rockefeller Programs at Home and 
Abroad,’ American Journal of Public Health, 66(9), September 1976, p.900. 
2 World Health Organization, Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization 
as adopted by the International Health Conference, New York, 22 July 1946 and entered into 
force on 7 April 1948. 
3 For more information on traditional Lao medicine, see Oudom Souvannavong, ‘Some 
practices of Traditional Medicine’, in Kingdom of Laos. The land of the million elephants and 
the white parasol, ed. René de Berval, (Saigon: France Asie, 1959 [1956]), pp.301-304; Joel 
M. Halpern, ‘Traditional Medicine and the Role of the Phi in Laos’, The Eastern 
Anthropologist, vol. XVI(3), 1963, pp.181-200; and Phou-gneun Souk Aloun, Médecine 
traditionnelle bouddhique du Laos, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001). 
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medicine, which is not static but continues to evolve, as does biomedicine.4 In 
Lao, biomedicine is referred to as phetsart, the science or discipline of 
medicine, or sometimes yah louang, referring to drugs or pharmaceuticals, or 
literally mainstream, official medicine. The various branches of traditional 
medicine - botanical, animal and spiritual/magic medicine - are often grouped 
together under the category of yah pheun-meuang, literally ‘indigenous 
medicine(s)’. 
 I avoid using the term ‘health system’, to reduce potential confusion 
generated by its dual meaning. While academics use the term to refer to 
conceptual systems of medicine, for example, as used at the beginning of this 
section, it also has a technical meaning favoured by the WHO to describe the 
organisation, people and actions which combine to provide healthcare 
services. In this case, I refer to specific health organisations, for example, the 
colonial health service or the Ministry of Health, as ‘health services’ rather 
than ‘health systems’, although I examine them according to the building 
blocks WHO states as being the necessary components of a health systems 
framework.5 I use the term ‘health network’ to refer to the distribution of 
health facilities (hospitals and dispensaries), and ‘healthcare services’ to refer 
to specific practices or actions which treat disease or promote health. 
 
Historiography of Colonial Medicine 
 The history of medicine does not confine itself to any particular 
medical system or tradition. However, the study of biomedicine in colonial 
                                                 
4Hormoz Ebrahimnejad, ‘Introduction’, in The Development of Modern Medicine in Non-
Western Countries. Historical Perspectives, ed. Hormoz Ebrahimnejad, (London: Routledge, 
2009), p.3. 




settings has emerged as one of its most productive branches. Historians have 
critiqued the close links between biomedicine and empire in a range of 
colonial settings. Studies of the Indian sub-continent,6 Africa7 and Australia,8 
as well as Southeast Asia, including Malaya,9 the Dutch East Indies,10 the 
Philippines,11 and Indochina12 have contributed to the understanding not only 
of the development and application of biomedicine in various locations, but 
also of the processes of colonial ideology and policy in the development of 
health services. Historians have shown how biomedicine and colonialism 
developed in tandem,13 how it was practiced by Christian missionaries, 
military forces and colonial administrations in non-European societies, and 
how its introduction and expansion in colonial settings became linked to what 
colonising nations perceived to be a responsibility to ‘civilise’ other societies. 
Early accounts of colonial medicine frequently referred to its role in a wider 
                                                 
6 David Arnold, ed., Imperial Medicine and Indigenous Societies, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1988); David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic 
Disease in Nineteenth-Century India, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Mark 
Harrison, Public Health in British India. Anglo-Indian Preventative Medicine 1859-1914, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Biswamoy Pati and Mark Harrison, eds., 
The Social History of Health and Medicine in Colonial India, (London: Routledge, 2009). 
7 Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills. Colonial Power and African Illness, (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press, 1991). 
8 Alison Bashford, Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and 
Public Health, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
9 Lenore Manderson, Sickness and the State: Health and Illness in Colonial Malaya, 1870-
1940, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996). 
10 G. M. van Heteren et al, eds., Dutch Medicine in the Malay Archipelago, 1816-1942, 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1989). 
11 Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race and Hygiene 
in the Philippines, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 
12 Laurence Monnais-Rousselot, Médecine et colonisation: L’aventure indochinoise, 1860-
1939, (Paris: Editions CNRS, 1999); Jan Ovesen and Ing-Britt Trankell, Cambodians and 
their Doctors. A Medical Anthropology of Colonial and Post-Colonial Cambodia, 
(Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010); Sokhieng Au, Mixed Medicines. Health and Culture in 
French Colonial Cambodia, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011). 
13 Chakrabarti, Medicine and Empire, pp. xv, 141. 
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civilising mission, recounting how medicine was promoted as “the triumph of 
science and sewers over savagery and superstition”.14 
 The late 1980s witnessed a critical approach to the study of the history 
of medicine and imperialism. Roy MacLeod and Milton Lewis argued that 
medical discourse “depoliticised” the problems of disease and illness in the 
colonial period by suggesting that all problems had technical or scientific 
solutions and neglecting their social and/or political aspects (for example, the 
unequal power relations between doctor (specialist) and patient; coloniser and 
colonised).15 The new generation of scholars uncovered social and cultural 
discourses of medicine, climate and colonialism. They explored how such 
ideas contributed to the specialisation of tropical medicine, and the manner in 
which biomedical thinking conceptualised racial and gender differences.16 
Critical histories of biomedicine in India and Africa highlighted the oppressive 
power of colonial medicine through Foucauldian concepts of biopower and 
governmentality.17 Consequently, Daniel Headrick’s term, ‘tool of empire’ has 
been widely adopted to describe how industrial (and biomedical) technologies 
assisted imperial powers to advance their military, economic and cultural 
objectives. Headrick observes that the technologies proved far more enduring 
in former colonies than the ideology of imperialism itself.18 
                                                 
14 Shula Marks, ‘What is Colonial about Colonial Medicine,’ The Society for the Social 
History of Medicine, 1997, p.205. 
15 See Roy MacLeod and Milton Lewis, eds., Disease, Medicine and Empire: Perspectives on 
Western Medicine and the Experience of European Expansion, (London: Routledge, 1988), 
p.1; and Arnold, ed., Imperial Medicine. 
16 Marks, ‘What is Colonial,’ p.213. 
17 See Vaughan, Curing Their Ills; Arnold, Colonizing the Body; Harrison, Public Health; 
Mark Harrison, Climates and Constitutions, Health, race, environment and British 
imperialism in India 1600-1850, (New Delhi/New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and 
Poonam Bala, ed., Biomedicine as a Contested Site. Some revelations in imperial contexts, 
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2009). 
18 Daniel R. Headrick, Tools of Empire. Technology and European imperialism in the 
nineteenth century, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.4. 
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 Colonisers were alleged to use biomedical healthcare and public health 
measures selectively, to protect the health of their administrators, settlers and 
occupying troops by creating sanitary buffers, and cynically promoting the 
health of colonised populations to increase their labour productivity.19 In the 
tradition of subaltern studies, research has also highlighted the resistance of 
local communities to unpopular and culturally unfamiliar public health 
measures such as vaccination and quarantine.20 Others have argued that the 
introduction of biomedicine into non-Western societies produced a site of 
contestation, in which colonised societies exercised a degree of agency, 
rejecting or selecting and reshaping the aspects of biomedicine that appealed 
to them.21 
 Biomedicine was also employed as a cultural tool, most notably in the 
period from 1890 to 1930 when colonialism reached its height. Scholars note 
that from the late 1800s biomedical care was extended to local communities in 
many European colonies. They argue that such actions were motivated by a 
growing humanitarian benevolence, albeit within discriminatory racial 
frameworks, but which also served to demonstrate colonial powers’ belief in 
their own higher level of civilisation compared to the people they colonised.22 
 Researchers now appreciate that biomedicine was as much a product of 
empire as its tool. Colonial medical officers returned home with broader 
                                                 
19 Brown, ‘Public Health in Imperialism’, p.899. 
20 See Vineeta Sinha, Colonial Encounters: Transplanting “western medicine”, ousting 
“traditional healing”, (Singapore: Department of Sociology, National University of 
Singapore, Working paper series, 1999); Au, Mixed Medicines; and Lenore Manderson, 
‘Political economy and the politics of gender: maternal and child health care in colonial 
Malaya’, in The political economy of primary health care in Southeast Asia, ed. Paul T. Cohen 
and John T. Purcal, (Canberra: Australian Development Studies Network, 1989), p.81. 
21 Bala ed., Biomedicine; Ebrahminnejad, ed., Development of Modern Medicine; and Jonathan 
Saha, ‘Uncivilised practitioners’: medical subordinates, medico-legal evidence and 
misconduct in colonial Burma, 1875-1907,’ South East Asia Research, 20(3), 2012, pp.423-
443. 
22 Chakrabarti, Medicine and Empire, p.164. 
30 
 
knowledge and practices acquired in the colonies.23 Additionally, scientific 
and medical researchers from the metropole benefited from the colonial 
expansion of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as it enabled them access 
to study new climatic zones and diseases.24 Rapid developments in European 
pharmacology were facilitated by earlier exchanges of therapeutic goods and 
practices, and the collection of a wide range of local medications by European 
traders and health professionals in colonised countries. The isolation of active 
elements in botanical, mineral and animal ingredients from the collected 
products allowed European researchers to proceed to manufacture 
pharmaceuticals.25  
Others are less convinced by the ‘exchange theory’ of biomedicine in the 
Southeast Asian context. Paul Cohen and John Purcal argue: “There was 
hardly any cross-fertilisation of ideas from Southeast Asian traditions into 
‘imperial medicine’.”26 And Karine Delaye notes that scientific cooperation 
between empires in Southeast Asia was problematic as colonial science had 
trouble crossing borders in that region.27 Regardless of the ‘exchange theory’, 
a tension remains between the allegation of colonial oppression through the 
imposition of unpopular biomedical practices, and the recognition of their 
ultimate health benefits. For example, quarantine measures were often 
unpopular but helped stem the spread of contagious diseases. Also, although 
                                                 
23 Anderson, Colonial Pathologies, pp.7-8. 
24 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, p. 290; Monnais-Rousselot, Médecine et colonisation, pp. 14, 
399. 
25 Chakrabarti, Medicine and Empire, p.34. 
26 Paul T. Cohen and John T. Purcal. ‘The political economy of primary health care in 
Southeast Asia: problems and prospects’, in The political economy of primary health care in 
Southeast Asia. ed. Paul T. Cohen and John T. Purcal, (Canberra: Australian Development 
Studies Network, 1989), p.6. 
27 Karine Delaye, ‘Colonial cooperation and regional construction: Anglo-French medical and 
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compulsory vaccination was unpopular in some places, it benefited large 
numbers of people. 
 No consensus about the effects of the introduction of biomedicine has 
been reached. David Arnold points out that colonial medicine has been 
accused of being a powerful, penetrating part of the colonising process, and at 
other times argued as having only superficial effects.28 Others downplay the 
reach of biomedicine, stating: 
 
 … there emerged a dualism in the delivery of health services, with a 
disproportionate share of the health budget allocated towards looking 
after the European community, while the paltry sum that was allocated 
for improvements of health of the indigenous population was grossly 
inadequate to extend the social benefits of modern medical care to the 
rural areas.29 
 
There is a growing body of research dealing with the history of 
medicine in Vietnam, Cambodia and the French consular centres in south-
western China.30 Laurence Monnais-Rousselot’s Médecine et colonisation, 
published in 1999, represents the most comprehensive academic study of 
biomedicine in French Indochina,31 while more recent studies examine 
specific developments in the health sector. From these studies we learn that 
biomedicine was introduced to Indochina by Christian missionaries in the 
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seventeenth century, and was promoted and expanded under colonial rule. 
French colonisers perceived biomedicine as a peaceful and benevolent ‘tool of 
empire’. Louis-Hubert Lyautey, a military official who served in Indochina in 
the late 1890s, is reported to have stated that medicine was “the ideal weapon 
of peaceful colonisation, because where the doctor has gone first, regiments 
can pass through without blood-letting”.32 He is quoted elsewhere as stating 
that “The doctor is the sole excuse for colonialism”.33 As in other colonial 
settings, France’s civilising mission involved a practice of cultural imperialism 
in which French scientific knowledge and research, including biomedicine, 
was used to “radiate” French cultural values, and to assert “international 
hegemony or moral authority over the colony”.34 While education had the 
power to civilise the mind, biomedicine was employed to civilise the body, 
and to demonstrate the superiority of European knowledge over indigenous 
medical traditions or health systems. 
 Monnais portrays the introduction of biomedicine to French Indochina 
as a ‘tool of empire’, in line with historians of medicine in other colonial 
settings. She shows how French colonial authorities initially employed 
biomedicine for their own ends to create sanitary buffers between Europeans 
and local populations, and in accessible communities such as army barracks, 
prisons, and work gangs.35 She also highlights later French attempts to expand 
                                                 
32Quoted in Eugène Teston and Maurice Percheron, L’Indochine moderne. Encyclopédie 
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33 Arnold, ed., Imperial Medicine, p.3. 
34 Lewis Pyenson, Civilizing Mission. Exact Sciences and French Overseas Expansion, 1830-
1940, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p.57. 
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the provision of healthcare into rural areas and the general population in the 
1920s and 1930s.36 
Biomedicine’s use as a colonial ‘tool of empire’ was shown to have a 
dual nature, for cases such as vaccination proved to be a beneficial practice for 
both colonising and colonised populations. Imperial power provided French 
scientists with access to tropical climates and disempowered communities 
within which they could experiment with their vaccines.37 The scientific 
discoveries of the Pasteur Institute, which had branches in French Indochina 
from the early 1890s, greatly expanded the ability of the colonial authorities to 
produce and distribute vaccines for smallpox, plague, cholera and tuberculosis. 
Local recognition of the benefits of vaccination is evidenced by the fact that 
researchers Louis Pasteur, Alexandre Yersin, and Albert Calmette are among 
the few Frenchmen whom today still have streets named in their honour by the 
communist government of Vietnam.38 
Monnais, and anthropologists Jan Ovesen and Ing-Britt Trankell 
remark on the processes by which local communities and individuals in 
Vietnam and Cambodia consciously selected elements of biomedicine to adopt 
or reject.39 Historian Sokhieng Au argues that local resistance stemmed the 
expansion of biomedicine in colonial Cambodia, As such, biomedicine not 
only showcased the power of French colonial science and knowledge in 
comparison to existing forms of traditional medicine, it simultaneously helped 
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to improve the health and well-being of colonised people, and could therefore 
be used to evidence the benevolent intentions of colonial rule.40 
Monnais’ work, fleshed out in recent years to cover maternal and child 
health, pharmaceuticals and the hospital system, has laid the foundations for 
the study of biomedicine in Indochina. Her work is largely descriptive, testing 
but ultimately accepting the general theories generated within the wider field 
of the colonial history of medicine. It also shows a heavy bias towards the 
three Vietnamese territories of Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina, possibly 
reflecting the nature of colonial sources.41 
Two recent studies of the history of the Cambodian health sector take a 
more theoretical approach. Ovesen and Trankell’s study, Cambodians and 
Their Doctors, draws on an eclectic collection of theories such as 
governmentality, biopower, globalisation and localisation.42 Sokhieng Au’s 
Mixed Medicines offers a more conventional history, confining itself to the 
years 1907 until 1940, and framed by her theory of ‘cultural insolubility’. She 
argues that, despite the title of her book, in many respects the indigenous 
Cambodian medical tradition and French biomedicine did not mix. The two 
cultural ideologies, she argues, were so different that they did not and often 
could not mix, because they existed in separate “cultural thought worlds” 
                                                 
40 Monnais-Rousselot, Médecine et colonisation, p.62; Laurence Monnais, ‘In the Shadow of 
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which were “culturally insoluble.”43 The absence of Lao-specific studies 
means little is known about the introduction of biomedicine and the reaction of 
local communities’ to it. Chapter Three explores the French colonial 
authorities’ introduction of biomedicine to Laos, and argues that the Lao 
experience differed from that of Vietnam and Cambodia in significant ways, 
despite its inclusion within wider Indochinese health policy. 
 
Post-colonial histories of health in developing countries 
 In the years following the end of the Second World War, many former 
colonies achieved independence. Historian of medicine Sunil Amrith argues 
that “perhaps the most fundamental shift” in thinking about healthcare services 
during this period was that health became widely accepted as a right of 
citizenship and the responsibility of governments. He observes: “In a very 
short space of time, to possess a health service had become a universal 
element of the functions of a state; any state”.44 Post-colonial studies of health 
and medicine are framed, for the most part, in terms of the political economy 
of health, rather than the history of science or the racial dimensions of power 
which characterise research on the colonial period.45 They examine health and 
development, international health, and more recently, global health, often 
within the framework of international development policy and practice. For 
this reason, I take up the matter of specific health-related studies of the post-
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colonial period after first examining the general field of international 
development policy and practice. 
 
Development policy and practice 
 Development policy and practice represents the second academic field 
of engagement for this study. Ideas about development have played a 
formative role in shaping the post-colonial Lao state, including its health 
sector. In this section, I provide an historical summary of the concept of 
development and the criticisms it has attracted, before moving to an 
examination of the position of health and development within the broader 
debate. The health sector has been included in global development policies, 
plans and funding programs for decades. And since the introduction of the 
concept of ‘human development’ in the 1990s, it has been accorded a more 
mainstream role. I also highlight the attempts of some academics to link 
research on the colonial and post-colonial periods, both in terms of the 
development sector and the health sector more specifically. 
 
Definitions of ‘Development’ 
 The wide array of terminology employed to refer to development is 
bewildering. ‘International development’, ‘assistance’, ‘cooperation’, ‘foreign 
aid’, ‘international aid’, or simply ‘aid’ are all bandied about in discussions of 
international development assistance. Scholars and commentators seemingly 
use the terms interchangeably, but at other times accord them specific 
meanings. I use international assistance as the umbrella category, and separate 
it into three sub-categories: development assistance, emergency (or 
37 
 
humanitarian) assistance and military assistance. It should be noted that the 
definition of Official Development Assistance (ODA) used by the world’s 
foremost development body, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
currently excludes military assistance, as well as emergency or humanitarian 
assistance (which is provided on a short-term ad hoc basis in response to 
specific events or crises, eg: floods, droughts, refugee flows), although as 
development commentator Stephen Browne admits, there can often be a fine 
dividing line between development aid and the latter.46 This thesis is 
predominantly interested in development assistance, and deals only fleetingly 
with emergency and military assistance in specific instances where health 
development assistance spills over into these sub-categories. 
The concept of ‘development’ has proved difficult for scholars to 
define. This is perhaps because even when one uses the term ‘development’ in 
a way that is distinct from the umbrella category of ‘aid’, it can refer to the 
state of ‘having been developed’, the process of ‘being developed’, and the 
financial and/or technical inputs that contribute to both of these options. In 
terms of the state of development, Gilbert Rist observes that it could have been 
called ‘civilisation’ – a popular concept during the peak of the colonial period, 
‘modernisation’, ‘liberation’, or even ‘westernisation’ given that its processes 
first emerged in the West.47 Another scholar defines the state of development 
as: “the achievement of desirable economic and social progress,”48 without 
entering into debate about what is ‘desirable’, or what represents ‘progress’, or 
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for whom. The World Bank picks up on this point, admitting that “different 
countries have different priorities in their development policies,”49 suggesting 
that development means different things in different countries. The OECD’s 
definition of ODA, current since 1972, focuses on the inputs to the 
development process. To qualify as ODA, financial and/or technical inputs are 
required to have as their primary objective the promotion of economic 
development and welfare of developing countries, and in the case of loans, to 
have a grant or concessional element of at least 25 percent (that is, a loan must 
be at least 25 percent below the market cost of borrowing the funds).50 
 
Growth of the Development Sector 
The early post-war period is commonly identified as the starting point 
of the international development sector, despite concepts of development and 
modernisation circulating since the Enlightenment of the 1700s, and the 
initiation of several development-related activities under colonial regimes.51 
Decolonisation, internationalisation and the beginnings of the Cold War 
helped shape the rise of development agencies, along with their assistance 
programs, and the deployment of technical advisors. Multilateral assistance 
organisations were formed to deal with relations in a changing world order, in 
what Amy Staples describes as an environment of optimism and 
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internationalism and a belief that social and economic progress would reduce 
the risk of future world conflicts.52 
In the 1950s the multilateral financial and technical agencies that 
addressed post-war reconstruction in Europe transformed themselves into 
agencies providing development assistance to newly independent nations 
categorised as Low and Middle Income Countries (LICs and MICs).53 The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, established in 1944, 
provided financial policy and concessional loans to develop the infrastructure 
assumed to be required for economic growth. They were joined by regional 
institutions like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966, which loaned 
and granted funds for development purposes to member nations in a specific 
region. Technical agencies such as UNICEF, WHO, and the United Nations 
Population Fund (UNFPA) also joined the development effort, although their 
technical and coordinating roles spanned Highly Industrialised Countries as 
well as those in the developing world.54 
The governments of the world’s leading economies - the United States 
of America, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan - were the 
major contributors to the multilateral financial and technical assistance 
agencies from the outset. These countries established their own bilateral 
development assistance agencies in the late 1950s and 1960s to plan and 
manage development programs, such as the United States Agency for 
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International Development (USAID); the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DfID); the Agence Française de Développement 
(AFD); and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA); and their 
respective forerunners. The OECD, a member organisation of the main high-
income bilateral donors, monitored the development policies and aid volumes 
of its members through its DAC from 1961. 
Given the Cold War environment, the development policies and 
activities of the socialist bloc were conducted separately to those of the OECD 
members. In the Soviet Union, the State Commission of Foreign Economic 
Relations (GKES) was responsible for assistance to low and middle-income 
developing nations, and the Soviet-directed Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA), also known as the Comecon, was formed in 1949 to 
coordinate development assistance from bloc members.55 
The United States, France and Japan emerged as the twentieth 
century’s largest international donors in terms of sheer volume of assistance 
provided to developing nations globally, whereas by the late 1990s the 
Scandinavian nations were contributing the highest percentage of their Gross 
National Product as ODA.56 The contributions of the Soviet Union and other 
CMEA nations are harder to gauge and compare, as their aid was structured 
differently to that of the OECD nations. For example, a significant portion of 
Soviet assistance to Laos in the late 1970s and 1980s consisted of commodity 
shipments with “concessionary elements”, although what that meant was not 
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clearly explained.57 The difficult-to-estimate scale of Soviet and Eastern 
European development assistance has contributed to the downplaying or 
neglect of its significance by development scholars who tend to focus on 
OECD members.58 This issue is of particular relevance in the case of Laos, 
because from 1960 it received international development assistance from both 
blocs. 
Much of the academic research on development policies and programs 
concerns only the ‘West’ and ignores the development interests and influence 
of the Soviet Union and other CMEA nations, giving an unrealistic, one-sided 
view of the more complex reality, just as a focus on only socialist 
development policy would do. This is especially so, given that from the 1950s 
to the 1980s, development agencies from the ‘West’ and the socialist world 
effectively competed for influence, and implemented development programs 
side-by-side in many developing countries, including Laos. 
It is important to note that development theories, priorities and 
methodologies have changed over the decades. The main aim of development 
programs in the 1950s and 1960s was to promote economic growth and 
industrial development for the developing world. Much of the scholarship 
dealing with ‘Western-funded’ development from that era focuses on 
economic policies and projects designed to stem the attraction of communism, 
the underlying assumption being that communism would not succeed in 
economically well-off societies. Soviet development policy appears to have 
placed a not dissimilar faith in the promotion of economic growth although in 
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its case, it supported centrally planned economies and people’s democracies 
modelled on the Soviet Union, which it hoped could provide it with needed 
commodities through barter-trade agreements.59 
The 1970s experienced an expansion in lending from the multilateral 
agencies, especially the World Bank and IMF, and a focus on agriculture as 
well as industry and infrastructure. By the 1980s, however, several developing 
countries had accumulated large debts, leading to a trend in economic 
structural adjustment lending. The resultant austerity had severe economic and 
social impacts in many developing nations, perhaps contributing to the rise of 
NGOs which complemented and sometimes combated the state.60 
Until the Eastern European overthrow of socialism in 1989 and the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the provision of international 
development assistance from both the OECD and CMEA nations was 
motivated as much by geopolitical agendas as by the development needs of 
recipient nations. The post-socialist period, however, ushered in a broader 
approach to development.61 The United Nation’s introduction of the concept of 
‘human development’ in 1990 renewed focus on the importance of health 
within the broader development paradigm. Human development policies 
require investments in basic human capabilities: primary education, primary 
health care, food security, family planning and essential social and physical 
infrastructure.62 Attention to poverty alleviation has risen in comparison to the 
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pursuit of geopolitical allegiance, and the concept of human development has 
joined, although not displaced, the preoccupation with economic development.   
 While the development sector has realised that economic growth alone 
is not sufficient to trigger an improvement in livelihoods for the majority of 
people living in poverty, the ‘policy diffusion/translation model’ remains a 
preferred method to bring about change. In the early decades, it was assumed 
that LICs and MICs, regardless of their particular contexts, would be able to 
copy the economic development trajectory of the Highly Industrialised 
Countries, whether capitalist or socialist, after receiving a certain amount of 
development assistance. In this manner, it was assumed that “… the ‘most 
developed’ states could offer itself [sic] as a model for the ‘less developed’ 
states, urging the latter to engage in a form of mimicry”.63 Even as the 
development focus broadened from economic development to encompass 
human development, policy diffusion has proved to be a lasting popular 
model.  
 
Critiques of Development 
 The process of development, and the international development sector 
that promotes it, has attracted criticism from many quarters. Despite its 
overarching humanitarian aims, the development sector has been accused of 
limiting the political sovereignty of developing nations, and trapping them in 
cycles of dependency and under-development. It has been critiqued as being 
self-interested, operating as an industry - a machine, even - and of being 
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driven by donor concerns rather than by recipients’ needs.64 In this section I 
sketch out some of the main political, economic, social, and historical 
criticisms of development, many of which are relevant to Laos, and some of 
the global responses to them. 
International development work is frequently portrayed as apolitical 
and humanitarian in nature. However, many critics remark on the intensely 
political issues at stake for both donors and recipients. James Ferguson, in his 
anthropological study of a World Bank-funded project in Lesotho, observes 
that processes employed by the development sector depoliticise the highly 
political elements of a project and propagate state power, which is often 
complicit in a society’s structural inequalities. He dubs development the “anti-
politics machine,” a term picked up by other scholars.65 The repetition of 
failed development initiatives has been acceptable to elite groups in 
developing countries, he argues, because they benefit by consolidating their 
own power and personal financial gain. In such circumstances, there may be 
little incentive for governments to wean themselves and move beyond 
receiving international development assistance. 
Bilateral development assistance organisations have been more overtly 
political than multilateral organisations. Bilateral donors have often directed 
their assistance to their former colonies; this is especially true of France and 
the United Kingdom.66 During the Cold War, another frequent use of 
assistance was to sway developing nations that were undecided about whether 
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to follow a capitalist or socialist development path. The USA openly linked 
development assistance to its political objective of stemming what it 
considered to be communist expansion, while the Soviet Union professed to 
practice ‘proletarian and socialist internationalism’ by providing assistance to 
established socialist states in the developing world and to developing nations it 
considered to have a ‘socialist orientation.’67 
Even after the end of the Cold War, the provision and acceptance (or 
refusal) of development assistance continues to confer political influence. 
Critics argue that such assistance imposes overt and covert conditions which 
compromise national sovereignty. At the same time, it relies on and sometimes 
strengthens the national elites and state forces that create or maintain socio-
economic and political inequality, limiting or obstructing poverty alleviation 
and social and economic development for disadvantaged groups.68 
 Criticism of economic development policy has been voluminous, in 
part because development has relied heavily on economics, and also because 
economics has often seemed to fail those it was designed to serve. The 
emergence of theories of dependency and under-development in 1950s and 
1960s Latin America challenged the dominance of modernisation theory. 
While supporters of modernisation theory promoted the emulation of former 
colonial metropoles, dependency theorists argued that such a path was doomed 
to failure, due to the relations of unequal exchange existing between 
developed and developing nations.69 The debt crises experienced by many 
developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s illustrated the point. Ferguson 
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argues that development is not an “anti-poverty machine,” because it rarely 
reduces poverty.70 Dependency theory had a significant moderating effect on 
approaches to development: the World Bank broadened its approach from 
purely promoting economic growth to include concern with equitable growth 
and distribution, and the United Nations unveiled the concept of human 
development, mentioned above, which involves economic and social aspects. 
The shift in development policy from a purely economic focus to a 
combination of social and economic factors coincided with the dismantling of 
the European socialist bloc, which meant both Western and former communist 
donors could focus on poverty reduction and social issues in the recipient 
countries rather than treating them as an arena for political and economic 
competition. 
 International development policy consequently promoted the health 
sector more strongly from the 1990s, although the predominance of economic 
thinking has meant that justifications for health policy and human 
development remain closely linked to economic measures in much of the 
development rhetoric. For example, the World Development Report for 1993 
argues that health status not only indicates the degree of economic 
development of a society, it can actively contribute towards it.71 More 
recently, the WHO’s Commission for Macroeconomics and Health has argued 
that improved health of the poor contributes significantly to economic 
development and poverty reduction, through higher labour productivity, higher 
rates of domestic and foreign investment, improved human capital, higher 
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rates of national savings, demographic changes (eg: lower fertility and 
mortality rates), and a reduction in the dependency ratio.72 
The historical critique of international development is of a different 
nature to the political, economic and social critiques. In essence, it attacks the 
generalised, decontextualised and a-historical nature of the international 
development sector - in David Lewis’s words, its grounding in a seemingly 
“perpetual present”.73 Through de-contextualisation and neglect, or 
misrepresentation, of history, it has been possible for international donors to 
repeatedly implement strategies, plans and projects … regardless of their 
appropriateness or success.74 Rist bluntly questions why, when “promises are 
tirelessly repeated and experiments constantly reproduced … each failure 
leads to another reprieve?”75 
Part of the answer lies in the fact that the international development 
sector is future-oriented. It has regularly minimized the achievements (and 
failures) of the past, basing itself firmly in the present and projecting its hopes 
onto the future. Moreover, international development staff often stay in a 
developing country for only a few years before moving on, and are therefore 
unwilling or ill-equipped to try a (new) approach.76 They work either directly 
or indirectly with a pool of recipient government staff, often poorly paid, who 
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somewhat cynically can be willing to implement unsuccessful development 
approaches as many times as international donors are willing to fund them. 
The language and vocabulary of development also contribute to the a-
historicisation of the sector, repeatedly describing a landscape of lack, 
weakness, fragility and low capacity. Vatthana Pholsena, writing about her 
own fieldwork, refers to a “discourse of lack” employed by her counterparts 
from the Lao Front for National Construction, who spoke of “lack of means, 
projects and authority.”77 The recurrent discourse or rhetoric of lack, which is 
by no means limited to Laos, serves to perpetuate the a-historical approach and 
understanding of the development sector. Given the sector’s simplistic 
trajectory of progress from poor to well-off, uneducated to educated, non-
vaccinated to vaccinated and so on, it is easy for development practitioners to 
assume that the absence of funds, equipment or skills is a long-standing one 
that their inputs can rectify, or at a minimum improve. It is less common for 
development agencies or staff to delve deeper into the history of a nation or a 
development sector, to learn how resources have fluctuated or been reallocated 
over decades. As such, the development sector is prone to acknowledge little 
that existed or was achieved prior to a (new) development input, despite the 
sector’s emphasis on change and progress. Lewis observes development 
practitioners “deliberately down-playing what went on before they arrived, as 
a way to demonstrate their own particular ‘added value’”.78 This also happens 
at an agency level when a new project begins. By obscuring previous 
engagement in development issues, whether by government, international 
development agencies, the private sector or local communities, the ‘rhetoric of 
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lack’ not only justifies the need for (new) engagement, it also wipes out any 
sense of a local history of development, thereby denying the opportunity to 
build on previous or existing structures, activities and achievements. 
Ironically, the ‘lessons learned’ promoted by the development sector in 
the 1990s and 2000s, which might have encouraged historical awareness, seem 
instead to have been distributed laterally, across the geographical spaces of 
specific development sites or developing nations, rather than handed down 
through the decades within the same geographical space. As such, the lessons 
learned are unlikely to be utilised to construct historical context or an 
appreciation of development activity and approaches that have occurred in the 
same place. The result of regular appeal to the ‘rhetoric of lack’, and the a-
historical approach to international development, is to deny past achievements 
and failures and to potentially obscure the main priorities for development 
assistance at national or sub-national level. 
 
Health and development 
Financial and technical support to the health sector was a standard 
feature of development assistance programs even prior to the 1950s. The 
health sector has attracted more attention, if not funding, since the 1990s. In 
some instances, health has been treated as an end in itself, while at other times 
it has been presented as a means to promote economic growth. For example, 
the WHO’s Declaration of Alma Ata on Primary Health Care in 1978 linked 
the successful socio-economic development of developing nations to the 
provision of universal, accessible, affordable essential healthcare being 
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provided as close as possible to where people live or work.79 In this manner, 
Cuba constructed a health network culminating in the mid-1980s Family 
Doctor Program which aimed to have a fully-trained doctor available on every 
urban block or in every rural village.80 In a related approach, China launched 
its Barefoot Doctor Program in 1968, to place a trained health worker in each 
community.81 These Primary Health Care (PHC) programs, and the Alma Ata 
declaration they inspired, were designed to ensure that the development of 
national health services was an essential element within national development 
plans, and did not risk being overlooked by governments or the international 
donors on which they relied for funding and support. 
The research on health and development in the post-colonial period has 
been framed in terms of political economies of health, which explain the 
structural barriers to accessing modern healthcare services. The WHO, the 
OECD and the World Bank propose that health development is a litmus test 
for wider aid effectiveness.82 Investing in the health of the poor has been a key 
strategy for organisations working for poverty reduction. As the World 
Development Report 1993 explains: 
 
The adverse effects of ill health are greatest for poor people, mainly 
because they are ill more often, but partly because their income 
depends exclusively on physical labour and they have no savings to 
cushion the blow. They may therefore find it impossible to recover 
from an illness with their human and financial capital intact.83 
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 Linking health status and poverty has gained gradual acceptance. From 
the 1950s, donors included public health activities and professional health and 
medical training in their international development cooperation programs. The 
WHO analysis has shown that the health sector globally received 
approximately five percent of all ODA in the 1980s and 1990s,84 and that the 
percentages increased in the 2000s. A large share of health ODA is devoted to 
HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment at the expense of more “traditional” 
endemic diseases or basic health system strengthening. Health funding is often 
comprised of relatively small and fragmented donations, placing heavy 
management and coordination responsibilities on recipient governments, and a 
higher proportion of health sector funding compared to other development 
sectors is channeled through global and regional rather than national-level 
health projects. Such funding mechanisms reduce the control of developing 
nations over the aid process. In 2008, the WHO counseled that “high profile 
initiatives and programmes need to put more of their funding directly into 
countries’ own health strategies and plans, and focus on making these funds as 
long-term and predictable as possible”. The WHO reminded donors and 
recipients that “many health interventions require a long-term perspective”.85 
 An OECD analysis of progress in the provision of development 
assistance to the health sector concludes that the effectiveness of such 
assistance risks being compromised by the complexity of aid architecture, and 
by the ‘disconnect’ between donor commitments and practices in terms of 
alignment with national health strategies, and harmonisation with other 
donors. While many donors agree with the wisdom of supporting country 
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strategies and national health plans, they insist on providing project aid rather 
than budget support. The analysis concludes that “there is strong evidence that 
project aid undermines aid effectiveness, distorts priorities and resource 
allocation, increases budgeting, reporting and audit demands, and weakens 
mutual and domestic accountability”.86 
 In the nations of post-colonial Southeast Asia, healthcare has been 
frequently viewed by national governments and international development 
assistance agencies alike within the framework of national and economic 
development. The development of human resources for health has been a 
common strategy, although by 1970s there was more emphasis on meeting the 
basic needs of the poor.87 However, the PHC approaches promoted in the 
1970s and 1980s, exemplified by socialist nations such as China and Cuba, 
and attempted by Laos, did not differ markedly from the basic healthcare 
approaches implemented by other developing nations of Southeast Asia in the 
1960s. Paul Cohen and John Purcal suggest this was no more than a case of 
old approaches repackaged with new rhetoric.88 
 
Critiques of the health sector in developing countries 
 On the whole, research on health and medicine in the post-colonial 
period, and particularly the role of international involvement and cooperation 
in the health sectors of developing countries, has been less critical of the 
practice of biomedicine than studies which focus on the colonial period.89 
However, by the 1960s dependency theory was being applied to the health 
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sector, as underdevelopment of health in rural areas was increasingly 
acknowledged. Vicente Navarro has likened the poor state of the health sector 
in developing countries to the state of their economies.90 In 1984, he 
foreshadowed Ferguson’s criticism of the development sector more generally, 
criticising the WHO and Alma-Ata’s approach to PHC for their failure to 
engage with inequitable power relations, locally, nationally and 
internationally. This failure included relations between multinational 
pharmaceutical companies and medical professionals and their patients; 
between members of communities; and between men and women.91 
 
Linkages between Colonialism and International Development 
 Despite the emphasis on the international development sector’s post-
war origins, it is important to be mindful that there is considerable continuity 
with efforts and initiatives begun during the colonial period.92 Donor nations 
are often former colonial powers and recipients their former colonies. As such, 
the colonial past has played a key role in shaping national and international 
development efforts if not specific ideologies in the post-colonial period, 
including those of the health sector. David Lewis and Uma Kothari recognise 
that the patterns of international development have their origins in the 
structure of empire and colonies, or metropole and periphery, despite what 
they lament as the seeming “inability of development theorists and 
practitioners to look back beyond the idea that development began after the 
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Second World War and engage with colonial histories”.93 Kothari argues that 
many of the practicalities and logistics of development assistance have a 
“colonial ancestry of ideas and practices,”94 and that as such, decolonisation 
and the rise of international development have “led to a reconfiguration 
[emphasis in original] of people, ideas and spaces rather than a wholesale 
epochal transformation.”95 It could be argued that the multilateral and bilateral 
development organisations which dominate the sector today were part of the 
reconfiguration, as colonial power was restructured into the emerging 
multilateral organisations. For example, Michael Worboys, one of the first 
generation of history of medicine scholars, points out that tropical medicine 
formed the main scientific expression of Western medicine [his term] and 
health policy for the Third World over past 75 years.96 
Despite the strong colonial linkages in the post-colonial world, few 
histories of medicine span both periods. Sunil Amrith’s Decolonizing 
International Health, and the previously-mentioned Cambodians and Their 
Doctors are exceptions. Amrith provides an insightful exploration of the ways 
in which colonial health structures and biomedical practices survive in South 
and Southeast Asia. Although he focuses mainly on India, Singapore and 
Malaysia, his observations are of relevance to the former French Indochina.97 
Ovesen and Trankell make a similar point by emphasising the continuity of 
French influence in post-colonial Cambodia. 
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 There is ongoing tension between the history of medicine’s 
predilection for discourse analysis and narrative of colonial oppression, and 
health and development’s preference for political economy and a focus on 
actual mortality and morbidity. The few studies that address both colonial and 
post-colonial histories of health and medicine perhaps exaggerate this 
difference of approach. Marks cautions historians of colonial medicine to 
avoid undue focus on medical discourse and texts, because at base the history 
of medicine should also be concerned with the history of actual morbidity and 
mortality.98 This is useful advice, because it helps connect studies of the 
colonial period with more contemporary research on health and development. 
 
The historiography of modern Laos 
 The historiography of Laos is modest in volume and range compared to 
that of other Southeast Asian nations, influenced by the country’s marginality 
on both international and regional stages, its small population and economy, 
and the tight control exercised by the current one-party state over the 
production of history. Moreover, social, cultural and even economic themes 
such as health, medicine and development rarely find their way into the orbit 
of Lao history. As such, it is not surprising that few studies touch on, let alone 
focus on, the history of health or medicine in Laos. 
 In general, Lao and foreign language histories rarely stray from 
political and military themes, with the bulk of them centring on the thirty years 
of war and revolutionary struggle from 1945 to 1975. Official Lao-language 
histories, and even private autobiographies which pass the censor, often 
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emphasise a familiar story of foreign aggression and heroic Lao resistance, 
while foreign-language histories are drawn into an exploration of how the 
intricacies of international foreign policy played out in Laos. The only rival to 
the narrative of war and revolution is that of national development, although it 
is more often found in the contemporary media than in the academic field of 
historical research. 
 Histories of modern Laos often begin with French annexation in 1893, 
highlighting that colonial rule, which spanned a period of sixty years until 
1953, reunited the country.99 Laos became the fifth colony of French 
Indochina, joining the Vietnamese territories of Cochinchina, Annam and 
Tonkin, and the Kingdom of Cambodia. Martin Stuart-Fox observes that 
throughout the colonial period, Laos was the least developed and most 
marginal of the Indochinese territories.100 He argues that French efforts 
centred firmly on the Vietnamese territories, and that interest in Laos was 
based on its potential as an alternate road to China, a stepping stone to Siam 
and an extension of Vietnam rather than on any real potential found within the 
territory itself.101 At the same time, Søren Ivarsson, suggests that French 
colonisation created a cultural barrier between Laos and Siam (now 
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Thailand).102 Despite all efforts, Laos’ small and ethnically diverse population 
(estimated to number between one and two million inhabitants during the 
colonial period), its tiny economy, and difficult communications, led to it 
being repeatedly described as a “colonial backwater”.103 Grant Evans notes 
that Laos was an economic burden for the entire sixty years of colonisation. 
He argues that its colonisation should be understood as motivated by French 
nationalism rather than economic exploitation.104 Attempts to establish a 
modern bureaucracy, including health and education services, were severely 
constrained by the meagre supply of human resources. As Frenchmen posted 
to Laos were few, the colonial administration encouraged the migration of 
Vietnamese administrators, small traders and workers. 
 State-sanctioned communist and nationalist histories chronicle a 
politically-inspired narrative of colonial abuses and local communities’ 
resistance, presented in the current day as evidence of the Lao people’s innate 
revolutionary spirit of resistance and struggle. The state-produced Pavatsat 
Lao is the prime example of this genre of history, highlighting the exploitation 
of the colonial taxation system and railing against the lack of social services 
provided, despite such services not existing before colonisation and requiring 
taxes to fund their development.105 In comparison, foreign language histories 
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argue that French colonialism had no more than a light touch on Laos, and was 
generally ineffectual in terms of economic and/or social development.106 
The period of post-colonial independence is one of the most politically 
confused periods of Lao history. The newly independent Laos entered the 
1950s with minimal trained personnel capable of leading, administering and 
developing a modern, bureaucratic state. The country was heavily dependent 
on international development assistance, much of it initially provided by 
France. The RLG struggled with the imbalance between its political 
independence and its financial and technical dependence on donor nations, as 
well as a growing insurgency supported by communist forces from the 
neighboring DRV. Laos’ economic dependence intensified during the First 
and Second Indochina wars, as the socialist-inspired Neo Lao Hak Xat 
(NLHX, more commonly known in English language publications as the 
Pathet Lao) struggled with the RLG for control of Laos. Again, significant 
levels of external influence were at play: the United States and its allies 
(including France, but also Thailand, South Vietnam and the Philippines) 
supporting the RLG; and the DRV, China and the Soviet Union supporting the 
NLHX resistance in the mountainous areas of rural Laos. The lengthy conflict 
heightened economic dependence on external sources, and opened the way for 
the international development sector to establish a strong presence in Laos. 
The overwhelming focus of histories in this period is the Second 
Indochina War and its effects on Laos. While foreign studies focus on the 
domestic and foreign policy aspects of all sides of the conflict, Lao-produced 
histories rarely acknowledge or explore the structures, activities and/or 
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achievements of the RLG regime, creating what Evans describes as “a huge 
silence” concerning the RLG and its period in office.107 It is rendered 
invisible: irrelevant or simply absent from the official narrative of Lao history. 
The previously-mentioned government-sponsored history perfectly 
demonstrates this point in its treatment of the health sector. It provides some 
decontextualised information about healthcare services in the colonial period, 
before skipping almost the entire RLG period, and resuming its health-related 
narrative in the late 1970s.108 
The post-1975 national narrative is one of peace, solidarity and 
national construction, in which the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) 
and its ‘correct’ policies assume centre stage. International donors, and the 
financial and/or technical assistance they provide, have a key role in this 
history, but rarely feature in the nationalist narrative. There is some irony in 
this point, as the potted histories that international donors and development 
assistance agencies are prone to present often commence on 2 December 1975, 
the date of establishment of the current political regime. 
 Despite the vital role played by international development assistance in 
modern Laos, surprisingly little historical research has been conducted on the 
development sector itself, with the exception of Viliam Phraxayavong’s 
History of Aid to Laos, and Timothy Castle’s study of American military 
assistance to the RLG.109 The sector has consistently portrayed Laos as 
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Southeast Asia’s laggard in terms of socio-economic development, lacking 
both financial and human resources, and therefore in need of long-term 
assistance. The colonial administration observed that Laos would require 
significant assistance, and even Vietnamese immigration, to catch up with 
what it considered to be the ‘vigour’ and go-ahead nature of its Vietnamese 
territories. Lao statesman Outhong Souvannavong expressed concern that Laos 
was not ready for independence in the late 1940s because, in his view, it could 
not survive without French aid,110 and United States cables confirmed in 1954 
that “the development program … can be realized only through foreign 
financing”.111 The Head of the United States Operations Mission in 1959 
stated bluntly: “Laos is the most remote and primitive and least organized of 
the free [non-communist] nations in Southeast Asia”.112 He went on to outline 
his government’s view of Laos: 
 
 The Royal Kingdom of Laos is not a country of factories, highways, 
power dams or large structures. It is a low-income nation with a largely 
self-sufficing agricultural economy and undeveloped in nearly all 
respects. Emphasis is on bare essentials, be it in terms of the food that 
is eaten, the implements used, the goods exchanged, or the shelters of 
most of the population. Practically the whole country is in its 
unchanged natural state. It is the least developed in the region, lacking 
proven material resources, physical and institutional development, and 
most classes of even semi-skilled workers and entrepreneurial 
leadership. The difficulties of the situation are further aggravated by 
recurring political instability. Despite all this, the Lao continues to live 
unaffected and unruffled – and undeveloped, quite removed from 20th 
century ways of life.113 
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Senior Lao government officials accepted the nation’s need for external 
assistance, given the rudimentary level of its own financial and human 
resources and its aspirations to be a modern nation on a par with other nations 
in the region. Fifty years after independence, Somsavat Lengsavad, a senior 
Lao PDR minister responsible for economic affairs, acknowledged the 
government’s continued heavy reliance on international assistance. He stated: 
“It is the Government’s firm commitment to gradually lessen the Lao PDR’s 
high dependency on official development assistance (ODA),” but added “This 
will happen progressively … over time”.114 
 
Expanding the boundaries for social and cultural history 
 In terms of Lao history, Grant Evans provides perhaps the most 
comprehensive overview of social and cultural issues, which he weaves into 
the general political narrative of his Short History of Laos.115 Mayoury 
Ngaosyvathn’s scholarship on gender history,116 Vatthana Pholsena’s work on 
upland minority people in the Second Indochina War and its aftermath,117 and 
Simon Creak’s recent study on the history of sport and attitudes concerning 
the human body also expand our knowledge of social and cultural history in 
the Lao context.118 
The very few secondary sources which touch on the health sector have 
contributed to a sketchy, ad hoc understanding of its place in Lao society. The 
light colonial presence in Laos has supported an assumption that French 
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authorities neglected the development of the health sector, along with a host of 
other technical and administrative services.119 Lao-language histories make 
more frequent references to the health sector than does English scholarship. 
Pavatsat Lao devotes approximately seven of its 1,310 pages to health matters, 
quoting statistics from the French colonial period, as well as from different 
years of the Lao PDR, but offers no comparison or explanation of the 
fluctuations in those statistics.120 Nor does it make any mention of the years 
from 1940-1980 when international development assistance to the RLG made 
a significant impact to the development of health services in the most highly 
populated areas of the country. The official history of the Lao People’s Army 
conveniently sums up the general attitude and amount of information provided 
about the topic: “The health sector did not receive much attention. Rural areas 
had no health facilities at all, epidemics spread throughout the entire society, 
and the incidence of disease among children was high”.121 
Among international historians, Stuart-Fox makes only short reference 
to health matters in A History of Laos. He quotes ad hoc health statistics, and 
repeatedly makes the point that qualified health staff were in short supply, 
whereas Evans makes no mention whatsoever of health or medical issues.122 
Several of the scholars who do mention health matters make claims not 
supported by examination of the colonial archives. Stuart-Fox contends, for 
example, that medicine in colonial Laos rarely expanded outside the major 
                                                 
119 Lao People’s Army, Pavatsat Kongthap Paxaxon Lao, 1945-1995 (The History of the Lao 
People’s Army, 1945-1995), (Vientiane: Army Printing House, 1998), p.9; McCoy, ‘French 
Colonialism’ p.82; and Hesketh Bell, Foreign Colonial Administration in the Far East, 
(London: Edward Arnold and Co., 1928), p.285. 
120 Ministry of Information and Culture, Pavatsat Lao, pp.571-574; 1093; 1112-1113; 1117; 
and 1131-1132. 
121Lao People’s Army, Pavatsat Kongthap, p.9. 
122 Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, pp. 44, 66, 69, 75, 77, 83, 100-101, 141, 154, 178, 193, 196. 
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towns, and was initially provided only to Europeans, a line repeated by other 
scholars until it has assumed the status of fact.123 Pavatsat Lao claims that 
French medicine was intended mainly for French people and local elites, as do 
Phongsavath Boupha, Kristina Jönsson and an entry in the Encyclopedia of 
Global Health.124 Souneth et al accuses the colonial authorities of indifference 
to health issues, claiming that only one hospital existed in 1900, and that it 
was located in Vientiane, a statement incorrect on both counts. He goes on to 
allege French refusal to expand the health network or increase the number of 
medical staff despite a request from Prince Bounkhong of Luang Prabang. As 
he recounts the incident, the prince: 
… requested there be hospitals in the provinces, for the people’s health 
and to allow them to avoid illness, because every day there were more 
deaths than births. The French government of Indochina forgot that 
Laos is a small country. (128/146) [sic] After this request, the French 
imperialists did not build more hospitals or increase the number of 
medical staff at all. They thought that illness was a natural matter, so 
they left the Lao people to treat their own illnesses at home, in the 
villages, using spirit doctors (moh phi), traditional healers (moh yao) 
and mediums (nang thiam).125 
 
 The above-mentioned claims are consistent with the general tendency 
of histories of medicine produced in the 1980s and 1990s to argue that colonial 
health services operated for the benefit of the colonisers and to the detriment 
of colonised people. However, while scholarship has progressed to a more 
nuanced appreciation of the complex interrelationship between biomedicine, 
                                                 
123 Ibid., p.44. 
124 Phongsavath Boupha, The Evolution of the Lao State, p.16, and the similar – but not 
identical - Lao language version, Phongsavath Boupha, Kane kha-ngay toua khong lat lao 
(The Evolution of the Lao State), (Vientiane: Nakhone Luang Printing Press, 1996), p.31; 
Kristina Jönsson et al,  ‘Health policy evolution in Lao People’s Democratic Republic: 
Context, processes and agency’, Health Policy and Planning, 2014, p.4; and Justin Corfield, 
‘Laos’ in Encyclopedia of Global Health, ed. Yawei Zhang, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 
2008), pp.995-996. 
125 Ministry of Information and Culture, Pavatsat Lao, p.571. 
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colonial power and local populations, analysis of the Lao experience has 
remained relatively static and superficial. 
Several recent studies that address health or other social issues suggest 
a lack of historical data. For example, a French study refers to the ‘heritage’ of 
the Lao health system,126 and an article by Jönsson et al mentions the “layers 
of influence” on the health system, but neither the heritage nor the layers prior 
to 1975 are investigated, presumably due to limited access to sources.127 
Recent health-related PhD theses skip over the awkward matter of the sector’s 
history, again presumably due to the lack of accessible sources.128 This state of 
affairs has resulted in rumours, misunderstandings, and simplifications of what 
may or may not have taken place in the Lao health sector. 
 The challenge of doing historical research in Laos, in a suspicious 
official environment, is compounded by a general disinterest in research. As 
Jönsson and colleagues point out in a 2007 article on health systems research, 
even applied research occupies an awkward space in the Lao PDR: 
 
Research [in Laos] … does not have the positive connotations that it 
has in most high-income countries. Medical staff is accustomed to 
working by routine, and tends to be suspicious of research ... There is 
no real appreciation of research in Lao PDR, no tradition among 
medical staff to follow international professional journals, and limited 
incentives to publish internationally … Among some policymakers, 
according to our interviewees, research was seen as expensive and  as a 
waste of scarce resources. Besides, policymakers claim to know the 
situation in their own country … They do not always see the usefulness 
of research findings, and sometimes deny or do not want to 
                                                 
126 Strigler et al, ‘Situation nutritionnelle’, p.121. 
127 Jönsson et al, ‘Health Policy Evolution’, p.4. 
128 Kristin Lundberg, ‘Women, Weaving, Wellbeing. The Social Reproduction of Health in 
Laos’, PhD dissertation, University of Kansas, 2008; Audrey Bochaton, ‘Pai Thaï, Pai fang 
nan. Construction d’un espace sanitaire transfrontaliere: le recours aux soins des Laotiens en 
Thaïlande’, PhD dissertation, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre, 2009; and Denise Buchner, 
‘Stories without endings. A narrative of illness and disability in rural Laos’, PhD dissertation, 
University of Calgary, 2011. 
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acknowledge findings that may be inconvenient either for their 
ideology or their career.129 
 
Lao historiography provides valuable context to a history of health and 
development, by locating it within the existing albeit modest body of work 
within the field. The marginality of Laos, the dominance of political and 
military themes over social and cultural themes, and the strong policing by the 
Lao authorities of what is acceptable and unacceptable history means that 
many subjects remain unexplored. According to Stuart-Fox, the close policing 
has the effect of “impoverishing” the comprehensiveness and richness of Lao 
scholarship.130 However, while state-sanctioned revolutionary history presents 
a clear progression from exploitation, resistance and struggle to victory, the 
history of national development, and more specifically the health sector, is 
more problematic. To date, the Lao development sector oscillates between 
narratives of continual progress and perpetual under-achievement, which 
generate an ambiguity in the overall narrative. 
 
Conclusion 
A history of health and development, and the development of the Lao 
health sector in particular, brings together the academic fields of the history of 
medicine, the history of development policy and practice and the 
historiography of modern Laos. It raises issues of the use of biomedicine as a 
tool and/or product of empire, and the degree to which it was imposed or 
voluntarily adopted by the Lao population. It questions the role of biomedicine 
                                                 
129 Kristina Jönsson et al, ‘Health Systems Research in Lao PDR: Capacity development for 
getting research into policy and practice’, Health Research Policy and Systems, 5 (11), 2007. 
Note: the pdf version has pages stating “page number not for citation purposes”. 
130 Martin Stuart-Fox, ‘Serendipity, or Discovering Lao History,’ in Historians and their 
Discipline. The Call of Southeast Asian History, ed. Nicholas Tarling, (Selangor: The 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 2007), p.130. 
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in post-colonial Laos, as the growing international development sector used 
the health status of the population as a measure of the nation’s poverty, and 
traces how support of national health services became a core sector of 
international development programs in Laos since the 1950s. The following 
chapter examines the introduction of biomedicine to Laos by the French 
colonial administration, and its expansion nationwide, which provided a 





THE TYRANNY OF DISTANCE: 
THE COLONIAL ASSISTANCE MÉDICALE AU LAOS 
(1893-1950) 
 
The French interest in Laos was always in relation to somewhere else.1 
Vientiane governs Laos with its eyes fixed on Hanoi, 
 and its back to the territory [Laos].2 
 
Introduction 
The health sector of present-day Laos rests on the foundations of the 
health service established by French colonial authorities more than one 
hundred years ago. Laos’ geographical, administrative and cultural distance 
from the decision-making metropoles of Hanoi and Paris made it unlikely that 
its needs and realities would be fully appreciated and considered in the 
formulation of Indochinese health policy. As such, the Lao Health Service 
(Assistance médicale au Laos) or AML was shaped by policies and practices 
designed for and implemented in the Vietnamese territories and transferred to 
Laos (and Cambodia). Laos’ insufficient budgets and the premature 
introduction of health policies caused considerable frustration for French 
doctors in Laos, and were exacerbated by the territory’s status as the smallest, 
poorest and last territory to be annexed to French Indochina.  Examination of 
health sector developments in the colonial period reveals that Laos’ multi-
                                                 
1 Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, p.20. 




faceted marginality, and its dependence on external funding and staffing were 
defining characteristics. 
This chapter explores health developments in Laos during the French 
colonial period from 1893 to 1950. The chapter closes three years prior to Lao 
independence in 1953, because in 1950 France transferred responsibility for 
the health service to the semi-autonomous Royal Lao Government (RLG).3 
French authorities consolidated a modest healthcare service in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. They built a network of health facilities in 
urban and rural locations staffed with French doctors, provided training for 
Lao health staff, and delivered biomedical healthcare to the local (indigène) 
community, contrary to the claims of several contemporary historians that the 
locations were primarily urban, subaltern staff mainly Vietnamese, and 
patients French or members of the local elite.4 
All Indochinese territories struggled with fluctuating and inadequate 
health budgets. Laos, however, was burdened by the additional challenges of 
having fewer trained health staff, and lengthier and more costly supply chains, 
limitations compounded by its marginal status within French Indochina. It was 
difficult to attract and retain sufficient European and Vietnamese medical 
officers to work in Laos throughout the colonial period, and only a limited 
number of Lao completed health and/or medical training. Moreover, local 
communities were unfamiliar with biomedicine and seemingly reluctant to use 
                                                 
3 Responsibility for the health service was transferred to the Royal Lao Government (RLG) in 
April 1950, in accordance with the Franco-Lao Treaty of 19 July 1949. See ANOM, RSL, 
Series S, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950 de l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, p.15. All RSL 
documents cited in this chapter are from this series and will henceforth be cited by box 
number only. 
4 Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, p.44; Phongsavath Boupha, Kane Kha-ngay Toua Khong Lat 
Lao, p.31; Jönsson et al., ‘Health policy evolution’, p.4; and Corfield, ‘Laos’ in Encyclopedia 
of Global Health, pp.995-996. 
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it. Therefore, while Lao staff were trained, and Lao patients accessed 
biomedical care, many health workers throughout the colonial period were of 
Vietnamese origin, as were a disproportionate number of patients. 
 
Transferring biomedicine to Laos: a symbolic ‘tool of empire’ 
The transferral and expansion of biomedicine to the colonies formed 
part of France’s mission civilisatrice. There was a particularly strong link 
between biomedicine and colonialism in Laos because, unlike in other 
Indochinese territories, biomedical services were provided almost exclusively 
by colonial medical officers, many of whom were seconded from the military. 
In other territories, Christian missionaries and private physicians participated 
in the expansion of biomedicine, but these groups had only peripheral 
involvement in colonial Laos. Missionaries provided first-aid and nursing care 
in occasional villages, and a private sector of doctors and pharmacists emerged 
only after decolonisation.5 
Biomedicine was transferred as a branch of technical knowledge and 
skills that could potentially help France, its officials and the communities it 
had colonised.6 However, it would be incorrect to argue that biomedicine in 
Laos facilitated the kind of economic exploitation alleged to have occurred in 
colonial settings elsewhere. For a start, there was very little economy to 
exploit. Laos operated at a rudimentary level of economic productivity, and 
required annual financial subsidies to cover its basic administrative and 
                                                 
5 This research uncovered no evidence of private biomedical practice in colonial Laos. The 
annual AML report for 1937 specifically states there were no “médecins civils libres”, 
although there were a handful of private pharmacy shops in the main centres by the early 
1930s. See RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel 1937’, p.4. Oudom Souvannavong advises in 1949 
that there was still no sign of private medical practice in Laos. Oudom Souvannavong, ‘Une 
étude du problème medico-social au Laos’, Thesis, Doctorat en médecine, University of Paris, 
1949, cited in Monnais-Rousselot, Médecine et colonisation, p.218. 
6 Ibid., pp.21-63. 
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technical expenses. The introduction and expansion of biomedicine did, 
however, demonstrate the reach and power of the colonial administration, and 
its ability to apply European science to health problems for those who came in 
contact with its expanding but far from universal network. Biomedicine was 
provided by doctor-officials who were unquestionably ‘agents of empire’, 
although their activities were dominated not by the care of colonial staff and 
troops, or the economic exploitation of the population as in other locations, but 
by the care for local (mainly Lao and Vietnamese) patients and the training of 
local health staff. As such, biomedicine in the Lao context could be seen as a 
symbolic ‘tool of empire’ with strong links to empire, despite its weak effect 
on the population of Laos. 
 Biomedicine appears not to have reached land-locked Laos until the 
late 1800s when French explorers, several of them military and naval doctors, 
made forays into Lao territory from Vietnam, Cambodia and Siam. (Christian 
missionaries were largely absent from Laos at the time of French annexation).7 
Elements of biomedicine may have filtered into Lao territory through 
occupying Siamese forces in the early to mid-1800s, as Siam hosted Western 
doctors at this time, but no evidence was uncovered in this research.8 Medical 
doctors involved in France’s exploration missions in the mid to late 1800s, 
such as Jules Harmand and Paul Neis, make no mention of local communities’ 
                                                 
7 Christian missionaries were the initial conveyers of biomedicine in neighbouring Southeast 
Asian countries, opening small dispensaries and orphanages. A Catholic vicarate of Nong 
Seng was established in 1899 at Outhène, on the Mekong opposite Pak Hinboun, and a small 
Protestant mission station opened at Songkhone, Savannakhet province, in central Laos in 
1902. In addition, Catholic missionaries from neighbouring Annam were active in north-
eastern Laos from the 1880s. See www.mepasie.org/rubriques/haut/pays-de-mission/la-
thaïlande-et-le-laos/, p.11; Jean Decorvet and Georges Rochat, L’Appel du Laos, (Yverdon: 
Imprimerie Henri Cornaz, 1946); and personal email correspondence with Oliver Tappe, 5 
December 2014. 
8 Medical researcher Dr Mayfong Mayxay raised this question in a seminar at the University 
of Health Sciences, Vientiane, on 26 June 2014. This is unlikely, but a possibility yet to be 
explored by historians of Thailand. 
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pre-existing familiarity with biomedicine.9 It is therefore highly probable that 
biomedicine was introduced by the French administrators and military doctors 
who followed the explorers. 
 The French authorities progressively set in place a network of health 
infrastructure and biomedical healthcare services. At first, the military 
established basic medical posts and storage points at irregular intervals along 
the Mekong. These posts dispensed first-aid and basic biomedical services to 
the few French civil servants, the ‘native’ colonial troops (garde indigène) 
recruited mainly from Vietnam, and the occasional, experimental member of 
the local Lao community. 
 The initial sites of Laos’ biomedical network were established prior to 
the formation of formal health services for Indochina or Laos. The first health 
facility was established in April 1895 in Luang Prabang in northern Laos,10 
followed in 1896 with a second at Khong in southern Laos. At the time, 
colonial Laos was divided into Upper Laos and Lower Laos, administered 
from these two fore-mentioned towns. Long distances and poor travel 
conditions separated the two health facilities, a point emphasised by a French 
tourist in 1897, who stated, “One should not become ill in Vientiane, nor in 
Savannakhet, because it is twenty-five to thirty days to the Luang Prabang 
hospital [upstream], and a minimum of fifteen days to the one in Khong 
                                                 
9 See Jules Harmand, Explorations coloniales au Laos, (Paris: Soukha Editions, 2010 [1878-
1879]); and Paul Neis, Travels in Upper Laos and Siam, with an Account of the Chinese Haw 
Invasion and Puan Resistance, (Bangkok: White Lotus, 1997 [1884]). 
10 RSL, Box 1, Governor-General’s Decree No.662 of 30 April 1895. 
72 
 
[downstream]”.11 A third facility opened on the Mekong at Pak Hinboun in 
what is now Khammouane province in 1898.12 
 Not until 1903 was a health facility established in Vientiane. The town 
became the administrative capital of Laos in 1900, following the merging of 
Upper and Lower Laos into one administrative entity, but it took some time 
for the various branches of the colonial authorities to relocate there. In May 
1903 the Resident Superior, the highest ranking colonial official in Laos, 
ordered the closure of the Pak Hinboun health facility and the relocation of its 
staff and services to Vientiane the following month.13  The Ambulance de 
Vientiane, later named the Hôpital principal de Vientiane, was established on 
the present site of Mahosot hospital.14 Another facility had opened in Xieng 
Khouang in north-eastern Laos in May 1903, bringing the initial colonial 
facilities to a total of four.15 
This timeframe placed Laos decades behind the rest of Indochina, as 
military hospitals in Saigon and Phnom Penh and a civilian hospital in 
Choquan had operated since the early 1860s.16 Similarly, American Protestant 
                                                 
11 Isabelle Massieu, Le Laos, (Paris: Magellan and Cie, 2005 [1900]), p.71. 
12 Documents dating from November 1896 refer to the Khong facility, and from February 
1898 to the one at Pak Hinboun. See RSL, Box 2. 
13 Journal Officiel de l’Indochine Française, (Hanoi: Imprimerie F.-H. Schneider, 1903), 
pp.1011-1012. See also Sophie Clément-Charpentier, ‘Les débuts de Vientiane, capital 
coloniale’, in Recherches nouvelles sur le Laos. New Research on Laos, ed. Yves Goudineau 
and Michel Lorrillard, (Vientiane and Paris: École française d’Extrême-Orient, 2008), p.312. 
Lucien de Reinach’s 1901 report created some confusion when he stated that Laos’ three 
ambulances included Vientiane and not Pak Hinboun, as this information is not supported by 
the primary sources at ANOM but has been repeated by some scholars. See Lucien de 
Reinach, Le Laos, (Paris: A. Charles Librairie-Editeur, 1901), cited in Marion Fromentin 
Libouthet, L’Image du Laos au temps de la colonisation française (1861-1914), (Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2012), p.182; and Ministry of Information and Culture, Pavatsat Lao, p.571. 
14 ‘Mahosot’ translates loosely as ‘large pharmacy’. Mathurin and Fontan claim the name 
‘Mahosot’ was applied to the Vientiane hospital from 1948, but AML monthly and annual 
reports continue to refer to the ‘Hôpital de Vientiane’ until 1950. See L. Mathurin and R. 
Fontan, ‘La médecine au Laos’, Médecine tropicale, vol 33(6), November-December 1973, 
p.645; and RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950 de l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, pp.5, 
76. 
15 RSL, Box 2: Governor-General’s Decree dated 8 April 1903. 
16 Monnais, ‘In the Shadow’, pp.145-146. 
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missionaries in the neighbouring kingdom of Siam had begun medical 
activities in the northern centre of Chiang Mai in 1872,17 and a biomedical 





 The early health facilities of Laos were variously referred to as medical 
posts, hospitals and ambulances. The term ‘ambulance’ derives from the 
mobile field hospitals used by the military in their conquest of Indochina. Over 
time these facilities became stationary, serving civilian as well as military 
patients, but the term continued in official usage, becoming the preferred term 
for the main health facilities from the early 1900s.20 The larger sites possessed 
consultation rooms, pharmacies, male and female wards, and basic surgical 
capability, as well as kitchens, laundries, bathrooms, and staff accommodation. 
                                                 
17 Daniel McGilvary, A Half Century Among the Siamese and the Lao. An Autobiography, 
(Bangkok: White Lotus, 2002 [1912]), p.96. 
18 Chatichai Muksong and Komatra  Chuengsatiansup, ‘Medicine and Public Health in Thai 
Historiography: From an Elitist View to Counter-Hegemonic Discourse, in Global 
Movements, Local Concerns. Medicine and Health in Southeast Asia, edited by Laurence 
Monnais and Harold J. Cook, (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), p.232. 
19 Alfred Raquez, Around Laos in 1900. A Photographer’s Adventures. Volume 2: The 288 
Photographs, (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2013), p.9. 
20 Monnais, ‘In the Shadow’, p.147. 
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Such facilities were typically staffed by a European (French) doctor, and 
assisted by a small team of Vietnamese male nurses, most of whom learned 
their nursing skills in the garde indigène. Lao health staff were trained as the 
colonial period progressed. 
 
Grand plans: Health policy and financing 
 In the early twentieth century, the colonial authorities of French 
Indochina laid plans to create a quality biomedical health service that could 
expand services to the indigène community in urban and rural areas in each 
territory of the Union. Healthcare was to be standardised and institutionalised, 
and delivered by qualified doctors and trained paramedical staff. Little attempt 
was made to regulate the practice of indigenous or traditional medicine which 
co-existed alongside biomedicine. A concerted effort was made to increase the 
number of health facilities in rural areas in the 1920s and 1930s, and the Social 
Assistance program of the 1930s encouraged women to seek maternal health 
care and to deliver in maternity clinics. Healthcare to the local community was 
intended to be free for the poor, following the policy model of the Free 
Medical Service (Assistance médicale gratuite, or AMG) introduced in France 
in 1893, but with space for some local flexibility.21 
 Administrative and financial infrastructure was created to implement 
colonial health policy. The Inspection-Général de la Santé for French 
Indochina was established in 1897. Health budgets were drawn in part from 
the Indochina-wide general budget, and in part from the local budget of each 
territory. Under this system of financial redistribution, colonial programs in 
                                                 
21 Monnais-Rousselot, Médecine et colonisation, p.30. 
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Laos and Annam were effectively subsidised by Cochinchina, Tonkin and 
Cambodia.22 Monnais notes that the general budget rarely allocated more than 
one percent of its funds to the health sector, and that while 10-15 percent of 
local budgets tended to be allocated for health, those budgets were 
considerably smaller. She also notes that despite the generally limited size of 
health funds, there was an incremental increase in budget allocations 
throughout Indochina in the first three decades of the twentieth century.23 
Colonial authorities created health administrations in each Indochinese 
territory in the early 1900s and opened a School of Medicine in Hanoi in 1902 
to train local auxiliary doctors (médecins auxiliaires), pharmacists, midwives 
and nurses. 24  A practical school of medicine opened in Saigon in 1904, 
presumably for those students reluctant to travel north for professional training. 
Nursing and midwifery schools later opened in the major Indochinese centres, 
including Vientiane, to support the work of higher-level medical staff. 
A British colonial official visiting French Indochina in 1928 noted the 
“ambitious scale” on which the French made plans for their territories.25 The 
development plans for the establishment of a Lao health service and the 
training of Lao staff proved to be extremely ambitious, given the absence of 
even rudimentary existing services and the modest funding and human 
resources available. When French staff and funding decreased in the mid-
1930s, a process which seems likely to have continued throughout the years of 
World War II, the colonial health service and many of its facilities slid into 
neglect and disrepair. 
                                                 
22 Libouthet, L’Image du Laos, p.172. 
23 Monnais-Rousselot. Médecine et colonisation, pp.82, 460. 
24 Ibid., p.277. 
25 Bell, Foreign Colonial Administration, p.191. 
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The Assistance médicale au Laos (AML) 
 The Lao Health Service, or Assistance médicale au Laos (AML), was 
the smallest and most remote of Indochina’s colonial health services. Though 
established on paper in May 1904, its actual organisation into a centralised 
technical service seems to have followed the establishment of the Indochina-
wide Native Medical Service (Assistance médicale indigène) or AMI in 
1905. 26  The AMI demonstrated the explicit colonial intention to provide 
healthcare services to non-Europeans. It had three main objectives: medical 
treatment, disease prevention, and medical training. 27  Its creation also 
signalled a transfer in overall responsibility for healthcare from the military to 
the civilian administration, although considerable military influence remained 
in its management and oversight.28 The service recruited its own corps of 
European and indigène health staff to provide basic, affordable healthcare, free 
to the poorest. It provided medical consultations, hospitalisation, surgery, 
pharmacy and laboratory diagnosis, as well as maternal and child healthcare, 
vaccinations, and quinine supply for the non-European population throughout 
Indochina.29 
In the larger and more established territories, the creation of the AMI 
marked a split from the existing military health service and the General 
Service for colonial civilian staff.30 In Laos, these distinctions were absent, as 
there were no exclusively military or European health services. The modest 
existing health facilities treated military and civilian officials and local people 
                                                 
26 RSL, Box 2, Dr Rouffiandis to Resident-Superior, 25 April 1905. 
27 Ovesen and Trankell, Cambodians and Their Doctors, p.28. 
28 Ibid., and Monnais-Rousselot, Médecine et colonisation, p.68. 
29  On the mandate of the Indochina-wide AMI, see Monnais-Rousselot, Médecine et 
colonisation, p.69; Au, Mixed Medicines, discusses its work in Cambodia. 
30 Monnais, ‘In the Shadow’, p.151. 
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under the same roof, if not in the same room. Following the establishment of 
the AMI, all medical staff in Laos were AMI staff, regardless of whether they 
were civilian or seconded military officers, and all patients attended the same 
health facilities and consulted the same doctors. 
 The AML was one of the first technical services established in Laos 
and therefore medical officers were some of the earliest colonial officials 
posted there. Vincent Rouffiandis, the head doctor (médecin-chef) of the 
Vientiane ambulance, was appointed the inaugural head of the AML, titled 
Chef de service local rather than Directeur locale de la Santé as in the other 
territories. In addition to curative medical services, which formed the bulk of 
its work, the AML was responsible for preventative health services, para-
professional education and training, and the management of scientific 
institutions. A territory-wide Local Hygiene Committee, attached to the AML, 
managed preventative or public health services from 1905 and provincial 
committees from 1907.31 Vaccine stations operated in Xieng Khouang from 
1905, and Luang Prabang and Houayxay from the 1920s, and a Vaccine 
Institute in Vientiane supervised the provincial stations from 1922. 32  The 
stations produced vaccines for use locally, because the distances and travel 
times from Saigon and Hanoi made their shipment to Laos impractical. Other 
institutions were also established. A nursing school opened at the Ambulance 
de Vientiane from 1915. A central pharmacy was created in 1923, and a small 
bacteriology laboratory and a midwifery school opened in Vientiane the 
following year. AML reports also regularly list the existence of two 
“leprosaria”, located outside the towns of Pakse and Luang Prabang, although 
                                                 
31 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport médical annuel (Année 1908)’, p.2. 
32 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de 1923 de l’AML’, p.1; and ‘Rapport annuel de 1926 sur 
l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, p.21. 
78 
 
it is unlikely that they were anything more than agricultural villages in which 
leprosy sufferers had been instructed to reside.33 
The full complement of health services was not established in Laos, 
possibly due to its small population, its remote location and its limited 
administrative budget. Laos did not require a Maritime Sanitary Police for the 
health and quarantine inspection of visiting ships due to its landlocked location. 
However, it did not receive a separate rural health service as in the Vietnamese 
territories, presumably because the AML already had a relatively rural focus. 
There were no maternity clinics outside of the main hospitals, no 
ophthalmology institute, no asylum for the mentally ill, no sanatorium for 
tuberculosis patients, and no dental services, although such services existed in 
other Indochinese territories. Patients were required to travel to those 
territories, or to Siam, to access these services. Nor was there a private 
medical sector in Laos, presumably due to the limited number of potential 
paying customers. 
Traditional healers (Buddhist monks, spirit doctors and shamans) 
continued to provide health-related services, but they remained in the informal 
sphere, unregulated and unlicensed by the colonial authorities. Colonial 
records provide little if any evidence of formal cooperation between imported 
                                                 
33 AML reports indicate no leprosy institutions apart from the two ‘leprosy villages’, which 
first appear in the1908 AML report. Their combined population was reported as around 200 
over many years, but had declined to 62 in 1950. Leprosy-sufferers may have been gathered 
into villages in other regions of Laos, but AML reports mention them only rarely and never in 
detail. There is no mention of leprosy villages established or supported by Christian 
missionaries. For a rare account of the leprosy village near Pakse in the 1920s, see Decorvet 
and Rochat, L’Appel du Laos, p.104. 
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biomedicine and local traditional medicine, or even Sino-Vietnamese medical 
services which existed in the major towns.34 
The AML initially organised its activities into four medical 
circonscriptions, or districts: Luang Prabang, Khong, Vientiane and Xieng 
Khouang. 35  A fifth circonscription, Savannakhet, was added when a 
dispensary opened there in 1913.36 The head of each ambulance was tasked 
with supervising outlying dispensaries and medicine depots within the 
circonscription, and conducting both curative and preventative healthcare, 
including vaccination rounds in the surrounding rural areas, with or without 
the support of a designated mobile doctor-vaccinator. The circonscriptions 
stretched over several provinces, making effective coverage of the population 
extremely unrealistic. Dr Vivie, the AML Head in 1909, attempted to explain 
the challenges to his superiors in Hanoi: 
 
… Laos covers an area of 267,000 square kilometers, which is half the 
size of France. The medical circonscription [district] of Vien-Tiane 
alone covers an area almost the size of Tonkin, and larger than that of 
Cochinchina. The borders cover a wide expanse: they touch on 
southern China, Burma, Siam, Cambodia, Annam and Tonkin; and all 
the conditions for the incubation and spread of epidemic diseases are 
present, on one or the other side of the border. Moreover, the Lao races 
live in complete ignorance of even the most basic rules of hygiene and 
treatment; they are decimated by disease, epidemics, infant mortality, 
opium. Most of the country has never seen a European [French] doctor. 
Not even 1/10 of the population has benefited from our methods [of 
biomedicine]. Epidemics begin, spread and subside without anything 
that can be done to combat them, except, after receiving fairly specific 
information by telegraph [from the afflicted areas], to send instructions 
which arrive after everything is over. The [medical coverage] for 
European officials is also compromised. The posts in the main 
provincial towns of Ban-Houei-Sai, Saravan, Attopeu, and Sam Neua 
                                                 
34 For a description of traditional medicine in use in Laos at the turn of the twentieth century, 
see Charles Spire, Les Laotiens: coutumes, hygiène, pratiques médicales, (Paris: Challamel, 
1907). 
35  The medical circonscriptions in Laos should not be confused with the administrative 
circonscriptions, a term that was used interchangeably with ‘province’. 
36 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel médical d’ensemble de l’année 1913’, p.1. 
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have seen a doctor only once in 14 years, the towns of Muong Sing and 
Muong Ou never have. The influence of the Lao Medical Service 
[AML], centred around 4 small circles on the map, extends along a few 
kilometers’ radius from each ambulance and along a few rare and short 
straight lines which represent the route covered by a doctor-
vaccinator.37 
 
 Given the overwhelming challenge posed by geographical distances, it 
is not surprising that colonial authorities chose to expand the health network as 
financial and human resources gradually became available. They established 
small dispensaries and medical posts in the small rural towns of Laos, rather 
than attempting to serve the countryside from a few urban bases only. 
 
Development of the Colonial Health Network 
Health facilities in Laos rose from the initial four ambulances at the 
time of the AML’s establishment in 1904 to 76 facilities of varying levels at 
handover of the health service to the RLG in 1950.38 The number of facilities 
increased rapidly in the 1920s as public works budgets became available for 
the upgrading of hospitals and the construction of new infirmaries and rural 
dispensaries. These were augmented by dispensaries constructed by village 
communities themselves. The number of facilities peaked at 65 in 1933,39 
before declining presumably due to shortages in funding and staffing brought 
on by the Depression and the outbreak of World War II in Europe. Facilities 
increased again in the late 1940s, approaching the levels recorded in the early 
1930s. 
The developing colonial health service created a hierarchy of facilities, 
organised into three main categories. They were, in descending order of level 
                                                 
37 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport médical pour le Laos (Année 1908)’, pp.10-11. 
38 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de1950’, p.7. 
39 RSL, Box 4: ‘AML Rapport annuel 1933’, p.8-bis. 
81 
 
of care provided: hospitals, ambulances/infirmaries (essentially small 
hospitals), and dispensaries/medical posts. Below this hierarchy were 
medicine depots, stock-piles of basic medications often attached to army 
encampments and rarely staffed with medically-trained personnel. Ambulances 
established in the six main towns of Luang Prabang, Vientiane, Xieng 
Khouang, Pakse, Savannakhet and Thakhek were re-classified as hospitals in 
1923. They were staffed with one or more fully qualified French doctors, one 
or more local assistant doctors (médecins auxiliaires), a small team of locally 
trained nurses, and in rare instances an assistant pharmacist and/or a registered 
midwife. The remaining ambulances, later renamed infirmeries, were 
essentially secondary hospitals providing mid-level care in the smaller towns. 
They were staffed sometimes by a doctor, but more commonly by an auxiliary 
doctor and some nurses. At the lowest level, dispensaries or medical posts 
operated in large villages, providing the most basic level of care and receiving 
technical supervision and supplies from the nearest ambulance. Such facilities 
were often managed by a male nurse with no more than six months’ training in 
a nearby hospital. 
No expansion of the AML took place in its first decade of existence. 
There was rapid expansion into rural areas in the following decade, though, as 
ambulances and/or dispensaries were added throughout Laos: Attapeu and 
Xepone in 1917, and Xam Neua, Phongsaly, Meuang Sing and Houayxay in 
1919.40 By 1926, the basic infrastructure of the health network was in place. 
The six hospitals mentioned previously formed the network’s core. Eight 
ambulances-infirmeries located in the smaller provincial and district towns 
                                                 
40 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de l’Assistance au Laos (1917)’, p.1; and ‘Assistance 
Médicale, rapport annuel 1919’, pp.3-4.  
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mentioned above, with the addition of Paklay, provided secondary healthcare. 
In addition, 38 dispensaries had been constructed in rural villages. They 








1895  ‐  1 ‐ 
1900  ‐  3 ‐ 
1905  ‐  4 ‐ 
1910  ‐  4 ‐ 
1915  ‐  4 1  
1920  ‐  5 10 
1925  6  4 30 
1930  6  8 n/a 
1935  6  8 36 
1940  6  8 39 
1947  6  6 31 
1950  6  6 65 
 
While the number of hospitals and ambulances remained steady 
through 1950, the number of dispensaries fluctuated. They peaked at 51 in the 
early 1930s, but had dropped significantly to 36 in 1935, signalling the rapid 
expansion of facilities had outpaced the supply of health staff and operating 
budgets and was therefore not sustainable. Only 31 dispensaries were 
operating in 1947 according to the AML’s annual report. 43  The number 
jumped to 65 in 1950, suggesting a last-minute scramble on the part of French 
                                                 
41 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de 1926 sur l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, p.21. 
42The statistics in Figure 3.2 have been compiled from AML reports from 1895-1950, held in 
RSL, Boxes 1-12. The statistics have been supplemented with additional AML annual reports 
for 1939 and 1947, missing from the ANOM holdings but reproduced in Oudom 
Souvannavong, ‘Une étude du problème’. 
43 Oudom Souvannavong, ‘Une étude du problème’, Table 1, unpaginated. 
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medical officers to re-expand the health network before handover to the 
RLG.44 
The early medical facilities were of the most basic construction. The 
original ambulance in Luang Prabang was built of bamboo and thatch, and 
described by Dr Lefèvre as a “large shed … steaming in summer, freezing in 
winter.”45 Budgets for the construction of brick and tile structures became 
available by 1908, but proved to be inadequate, causing construction to 
proceed slowly. Permanent buildings and facilities were added, upgraded or 
repaired over the next decade as funds allowed at each ambulance. A 
construction boom took place in the 1920s, as more sizable budgets became 
available. Several permanent structures were erected in the main centres of 
Vientiane, Pakse, Savannakhet and Thakhek in 1923-1924. A timber prototype 
for rural dispensaries was developed in 1926, and funds allocated to the Public 
Works service for their construction at locations throughout Laos.46 A certain 
degree of public interest seems to have been generated by the construction 
program, because from the mid-1920s village communities began constructing 
their own dispensaries, in addition to those constructed by the Public Works 
service. By 1928, 26 rural dispensaries had been built by the authorities, and 
another 29 by local communities.47 Sokhieng Au suggests that such behaviour 
in Cambodia was prompted by the popularity of pharmaceuticals and the hope 
of obtaining them at rural dispensaries, even if the presence of foreign (French 
and increasingly Vietnamese) medical staff was less popular.48 However, the 
                                                 
44 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, pp.19-21. 
45 RSL, Box 1: Monthly report of Dr Lefèvre at Luang Prabang ambulance, 5 November 1897, 
unpaginated. 
46 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de 1926 sur l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, p.19-bis.  
47 RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1929 sur l’Assistance médicale du Laos’, p.32.  
48 Au, Mixed Medicines, p.80. 
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increase in rural dispensaries overstretched the AML’s capacity to staff and 
equip them, a problem flagged in the AML’s 1926 and 1929 annual reports. 49 
The network ceased expansion in the mid-1930s and contracted in the 1940s 
as funds dried up. 
 
Colonial Staffing and Professional Training 
 Staffing proved to be a major challenge for the AML throughout the 
colonial period, both in terms of training sufficient numbers of Lao staff, and 
attracting sufficient numbers of French and Vietnamese staff to manage the 
health service and fill the professional gaps. Problems with the supply of 
foreign staff were compounded by the high rate of turnover with few willing to 
spend more than a few years in the remote outpost of Laos. Positions within 
the AML, in accordance with the wider AMI, were designated by race, 
profession and level. Racial classifications were simply ‘European’ and 
‘indigène’ (native), where European usually referred to someone of French 
birth, whereas indigène encompassed Lao, Vietnamese, Cambodian and even 
Chinese staff. The professions ranged from doctor and auxiliary doctor, later 
revised to Indochinese doctor (médecin indochinois) and the higher-ranking 
docteur indochinois, pharmacist and auxiliary pharmacist, midwife and 
auxiliary midwife, and nurse. Levels (classes) designated seniority within each 
profession. New graduates entered at the intern or probationer (stagiaire) level, 
and proceeded through five levels. When nurses reached level one, they could 
                                                 
49 RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1929’, p.11. 
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be promoted to senior nurse (infirmier major).50 Promotions in Laos occurred 
approximately every two years. 
Nearly all French staff serving in the AML were male doctors, many of 
whom were seconded from the military. The colonial records reveal, however, 
that the racial categories of European and native were sometimes blurred. The 
presence of a European civilian doctor in Xieng Khouang in 1914 named Le 
Quang Trinh demonstrates that naturalised French citizens (in this case a 
presumably Vietnamese-born doctor) could hold a European-designated 
position, regardless of ethnicity.51 Similarly, two men with European names 
but who may well have been of mixed race, Emile Schutz and Maurice 
Philippe, moved between the AML’s racial categories. Both began as native 
médecins auxiliaires but transferred to the European staff-roll as head nurses 
by the early 1930s in Vientiane and Luang Prabang respectively.52 Their move 
is likely to have been motivated by the higher salaries and associated social 
benefits for European nurses than native auxiliary doctors. Schutz 
subsequently re-transferred into the ranks of native doctors, and in 1950 was 
listed as a médecin indochinois in Salavan province.53 
 
European (French) staffing 
Laos was not a popular posting for ambitious French doctors, and 
colonial authorities had difficulty attracting them. Doctors considered 
                                                 
50 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de l’Assistance au Laos, 1916’, p.5. 
51 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport médical ensemble de 1914 du Chef du Service de l’Assistance 
médicale au Laos’, p.5.  
52 Schutz transferred to the European staff-roll in 1928, Philippe in 1931. See RSL, Box 4: 
‘Rapport annuel de 1928’, p.3; and ‘Rapport annuel de 1931’, p.7. 
53 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.17. 
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Cambodia and Laos as “frontier societies” and preferred to work in Vietnam.54 
French doctors working in Laos numbered only four from 1916-1918, reached 
13 in 1929, and peaked at 14 in 1950,55 but averaged only eight during the 
years from 1913 to 1933. (Paradoxically, more French medical staff worked in 
Laos under the RLG administration than during the colonial period.) A bonus 
was discussed in 1929 as a possible lure to resolve the staffing “crisis”.56 
Certainly, a posting to Laos offered few urban comforts, nor any of the 
after-hours, private consultation opportunities available in Indochina’s larger, 
wealthier urban centres, which helps explain why so many of the doctors in 
Laos were seconded from the military. In 1910, for example, six of the seven 
French doctors posted to Laos were in this category. In 1930 four of eight 
French doctors were military, and by 1950 all 14 were.57 The high proportion 
of military doctors had a marked impact on the operations of the AML during 
both World Wars, as it appears many were recalled to Europe, leaving Laos 
with only a skeleton staff. 
Numerous AML heads railed at the insufficient staffing allocations and 
requested increases in the number of doctor-positions, due to the time-
consuming nature of travel throughout Laos’ large medical circonscriptions 
and the expansion of the health network. The service totalled a modest 14 
positions in 1906. Five were French doctors: a médecin-chef  at each of the 
four ambulances, and a mobile doctor-vaccinator based in Vientiane, and the 
remaining nine were ‘native’ male nurses: two at each ambulance, and one to 
                                                 
54 Au, Mixed Medicines, p.68; and RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1929’, p.7. 
55 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.14.  
56 RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1929’, p.128. 
57 RSL, Box 3: Assistance Médicale au Laos: Rapport médical d’ensemble pour l’année 1910, 




accompany the doctor-vaccinator.58 Limited staffing required the médecin-chef 
of the Vientiane ambulance to double as the Head of the AML until the 1920s. 
The AML head in 1913 protested that the complement of doctors was 
“completely insufficient”, and that 16 were required to adequately serve the 
size of the Lao territory rather than the current ten.59 His proposal appears to 
have fallen on deaf ears as colonial Laos never reached that level of European 
staffing. 
Another problem was the high rate of vacancies within the official 
allocations. Positions were difficult to fill, and European staff had a propensity 
to remain on extended overseas leave. From the mid-1910s to the early 1920s, 
there were often only four, sometimes five, doctors working in Laos despite an 
allocation of 10 positions. Some managers despondently gave up requesting 
additional staff positions, and asked instead that the authorities merely furnish 
the number of doctors funded in the budget.60 By the 1930s, health managers 
appeared resigned to chronic understaffing.61 
The AML also struggled with high staff turnover. Rarely did French 
doctors stay for more than a few years, and those who proved unable to adapt 
departed even faster. To minimise the risk of premature departure, Dr Henric 
recommended in 1912 that mobile doctor-vaccinators should ideally be 
“young, active, strong, familiar with horse-riding and physical exercise”.62 In 
1929, Dr Le Nestour made the following recommendations: 
                                                 
58The position of médecin-chef was a combined technical/administrative role. Originally, each 
ambulance was headed by a médecin-chef. Later, during the RLG period, a médecin-chef was 
appointed as Head of the Health service in each province.  
59  RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel [1913] médical d’ensemble du Chef du Service de 
l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, pp.4, 26. 
60 RSL, Box 3: ‘AML Rapport médical ensemble pour l’année 1910’, unpaginated. 
61 RSL, Box 4: ‘AML Rapport annuel de 1932’, p.3-bis. 





In the general interests of the [Lao] Medical Service, it is desirable for 
doctors to serve several placements, or even their entire careers here. In 
this country, very different from the other countries in the [Indochinese] 
Union, one needs in order to succeed more than just technical 
knowledge but also knowledge of the ‘natives’, their language, their 
morals [customs], as well as the desire and tenacious motivation to be 
of use to our cause.63 
 
Dr Francière was a rare example. Posted to Luang Prabang hospital as 
a young, civilian stagiaire (intern) doctor in 1910, he worked in Laos for more 
than two decades, rising to become a doctor of the first class, and eventually 
Head of the AML in 1926.64 His long experience and obvious affection for 
Laos, and fluency in Lao, benefited the AML. The majority of colonial 
medical staff, however, remained only a few years at most which was 
insufficient to understand the social and cultural setting and develop 
functionality in Lao. Most French doctors could not communicate directly 
with patients, and relied on Lao nurses to interpret. Some of the Vietnamese 
assistant doctors and nurses were in a similar situation.65 
 
Native (indigène) Staffing and Professional Education 
By the early 1920s, the colonial health administration acknowledged 
that a cadre of Lao health staff was needed to help address the difficulty of 
attracting and retaining French doctors and reduce the cost of expanding the 
health network. The approach also supported greater sustainability of the 
health service. In 1921, the AML head stated, “the whole future of the 
                                                 
63 RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1929 sur l’Assistance médicale du Laos’. 
64 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de 1926 sur l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, p.4. 
65 Only three French doctors and one Vietnamese médecin auxiliaire are on record as learning 
Lao. See RSL, Box 2: Ambulance de Hinboun, Dr Gravot to Resident Superior, 5 May 1903; 
Box 5: AML monthly report for September 1913, unpaginated; and Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de 
1925 de l’Assistance médicale du Laos’, pp.7-8. 
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Assistance Médicale in this county is linked to this essential question: to have 
a [health] service in Laos [staffed] with médecins auxiliaires of Lao origin”.66 
At least ten Lao students qualified mainly as médecins auxiliaires, 
mainly in Hanoi. No Lao students are known to have completed the higher-
level docteur indochinois qualification, offered in Hanoi from 1923, which 
was equivalent to medical training in France but licensed graduates to practise 
medicine only in Indochina.67 By the close of the colonial period Oudom 
Souvannavong was the only Lao to have qualified as a docteur en médecine, 
graduating from the University of Paris in 1949.68 
The École de médecine de l’Indochine in Hanoi, opened in 1902, 
offered training to natives in auxiliary medicine, pharmacy, midwifery and 
nursing. The school’s minimum entry requirement was completion of lower-
secondary school (collège), but identifying Lao candidates with sufficient 
education and French-language ability proved challenging. Secondary 
education in Laos was the least developed of all territories in French Indochina, 
and while the Collège Pavie had opened in Vientiane in 1921, few of its 
graduates chose to leave Laos to study medicine.69 
 
   
                                                 
66 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de 1921 de l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, p.41. 
67 Teston and Percheron, L’Indochine moderne, pp.192-193. 
68 Oudom Souvannavong’s thesis focused on the future needs of the Lao health system to 
ensure improved health for mothers and their infants. See Oudom Souvannavong, ‘Une étude 
du problème’. 
69 The Collège Pavie building, constructed in the early 1920s, subsequently became the the 
dormitory for the Royal School of Medicine (École Royale de Médecine) when it opened in 
late 1957. See Himmakone Manotham, Nakhone louang vieng chanh samay lao pen ananikom 
khong falang (Vientiane in the French colonial period), (Vientiane: Sisavath Press, 2010), p.20; 
and Oun Sananikone, Lao Issara. The Memoirs of Oun Sananikone. translated by John B. 
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The first Lao médecin auxiliaire, Tiao Katignarath, graduated from 
Hanoi in 1916. Early Lao graduates included at least another three princes, 
Tiao Singkham (1918), Tiao Singkeo (1920) and Tiao Khamphay (1925). 
Records suggest that several of the Lao students enrolled in medical studies 
did not graduate. In 1927 the medical school introduced a special section of 
the médecins auxiliaires course especially for Lao students, on the assumption 
that a course specifically tailored for their needs would increase both 
enrolment and completion rates. However, only five of the seven first-year 
students progressed to the second year and all students reportedly failed the 
exams the following year, sparking fears that the section would be short-
                                                 
70 The statistics in Figure 3.3 have been compiled from annual and monthly AML reports from 
1906-1950, held in the RSL, Boxes 1-12. They have been supplemented with AML annual 
reports for 1939 and 1947, absent from the ANOM holdings but reproduced in Oudom 
Souvannavong’s thesis. There is no breakdown by gender, but narrative reporting indicates 
that male nurses predominated for the entire period. 
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lived. 71  Such fears appear to have been well-founded because no further 
mention is made of the special section and only one Lao, Khamko, is 
mentioned in later AML annual reports as having graduated in the 1930s. 
A second medical faculty opened in Saigon in 1941, and “six or seven” 
Lao students are reported to have transferred there from Hanoi.72  A third 
medical school opened in Phnom Penh in 1946. It offered training for assistant 
doctors, now termed médecins assistants. Nine Lao students, all male, were 
studying there in 1950, which reportedly included all those who had been in 
Saigon and had opted to transfer their studies to Phnom Penh.73 The reason for 
the transfer is unclear, although one source suggests it was because Lao people 
had a “strong dislike for things Vietnamese”.74 The AML received a sudden 
influx of ten newly graduated médecins assistants in 1950. The Lao records do 
not indicate where these staff trained, who appear to have been treated as 
subordinate to the médecins indochinois, but it is highly probable that most 
had graduated from Phnom Penh.75 
Because the production of Lao médecins auxiliaires proceeded slowly, 
Vietnamese were posted to Laos from 1922 to supplement their ranks. These 
staff typically arrived in Laos as interns and returned to Vietnam soon after 
they were promoted. Trinh Van Dam, the first such intern, was assigned to 
provide medical care to the mainly Vietnamese labourers engaged in building 
                                                 
71 RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1929 sur l’Assistance médicale du Laos’, p.9. 
72 Khamsone Sassady states that Lao medical students continued their studies throughout 
World War II in both Hanoi and Saigon, and Mathurin and Fontan suggest that six or seven 
Lao médecins assistants trained in Saigon, but they cite no source for their information. See 
Khamsone Sassady, ‘Contribution à l’étude de la médecine laotienne’, Thesis, doctorat en 
médecine, University of Paris, 1962, p.112; and Mathurin and Fontan, ‘La médecine au Laos’, 
p.646. 
73This information is mentioned in the Lao-language text but not in the French-language text 
of Laos 1950. See also Ovesen and Trankell, Cambodians and their Doctors, p.78. 
74 Frank LeBar and Adrienne Suddard, eds., Laos. Its people, its society, its culture, (New 
Haven: HRAF Press, 1967 revised edition [1960]), p.186. 
75 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.17. 
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Colonial Route 4.76 The contingent of Vietnamese auxiliary doctors rose to 
eight by 1932, and presumably remained at that level until the 1940s.77 Their 
numbers were augmented by occasional Chinese auxiliary doctors, also 
graduates from Hanoi. 
While the centralised medical administration sent Vietnamese staff to 
serve Lao, Khmer and ethnic minority communities, colonial authorities in 
Laos were mindful to prevent Lao doctors being outnumbered by Vietnamese 
colleagues, a point that appears not to have been sufficiently respected in 
Cambodia.78 The AML boasted an unusual professional hierarchy for both 
Indochina and Laos. While French doctors occupied the senior technical and 
administrative positions, experienced Lao médecins auxiliaires with increasing 
seniority formed the middle ranks, and newly graduated, junior Vietnamese 
auxiliary doctors occupied the lowest rungs of the hierarchy. For the most part, 
recently arrived Vietnamese staff opted to depart Laos quickly - maybe 
because their position differed from other administrative or technical services, 
where French-educated Vietnamese often supervised lower-level Lao officials. 
Only one Vietnamese doctor remained on the AML staff in 1950, employed as 
a médecin indochinois in Xayabouly. It is not possible to ascertain whether he 
was posted from Vietnam, or Lao-born to Vietnamese parents.79 
As with the médecins auxiliaires/médecins indochinois, the cadre of 
Lao nurses and midwives was slow to take shape. The Governor-General of 
Indochina created a cadre of civilian nurses for the AML in 1906, but the 
                                                 
76 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de 1922 de l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, p.4. 
77 RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1932 de l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, pp.3a-3b. 
78 Au, Mixed Medicines, p.74. 
79 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.17. Xayabouly would be an unusual posting for a 
Vietnamese doctor, as few Vietnamese immigrants or labourers resided there. It is therefore 
more probable that the doctor was Lao-born. 
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budget was insufficient for their recruitment. 80  Initially Laos relied upon 
Vietnamese nurses recruited from the garde indigène or from the local 
community with varying success. The AML records remain largely silent 
about the turnover rates among nurses in the early years, treating them as 
marginal characters. However, some Vietnamese nurses stayed in Laos long-
term, learnt the language, and made significant contributions. Nurse Nguyen 
Van Noc, who worked in southern Laos for three decades from the 1890s, first 
at Khong and later Pakse, is worthy of special mention. On his death in 1921, 
the Pakse médecin-chef paid tribute to him: 
 
After having served at various health facilities in Cochinchina, he came 
to Laos at the beginning of the [French] occupation, participating in the 
difficult military campaigns, and was a valuable aid to the doctors who 
created the first medical organisations in often difficult conditions in 
this new country. Remarkable for his demeanour, his devotion, his 
loyalty, and his professional knowledge, he received numerous awards 
and the highest assessments from all of his supervisors…even in his 
last days, he was the most punctual and the most zealous of the nurses. 
His blameless life was a constant example to his young colleagues who 
venerated him like an ancestor, and upon whom he exercised the most 
positive influence. Servants [of colonial France] such as this are too 
rare, and as such, their passing must be noted. 81 
 
Recruiting Lao nurses proved to be a hit-and-miss endeavour. More 
systematic recruitment of nurses began from 1908, and in 1909 two Lao had 
been employed as nurse interns (infirmiers stagiaires). 82  From 1912, an 
informal practical nursing school is reported to have operated at the Vientiane 
ambulance. The AML annual report states that a group of volunteers worked 
in the hospital without salary and learnt on the job. Nine volunteers, eight of 
them Vietnamese, were employed as nurse interns in 1913 after passing an 
                                                 
80 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel 1907 de l’Assistance médicale du Laos’, unpaginated. 
81 RSL, Box 6: Monthly report of Pakse ambulance for December 1921, unpaginated. 
82 RSL, Box 3: ‘Médical annuel ensemble, Année 1909’, unpaginated. 
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exam. 83  That year the AML’s nursing cadre comprised 29 nurses: 25 
Vietnamese, four Lao, and all male.84 Not until 1917 does a female nurse 
appear, employed in Pakse.85 
The Vientiane nursing school was officially opened by the Resident 
Superior in March 1915. 86  Prospective students were required to have 
completed primary education, and to have some basic familiarity with French 
language. Over the following years the nursing school struggled to find Lao 
students with a sufficient educational background, and most students were 
drawn from the immigrant Vietnamese community.87 Given the low student 
numbers, the school closed from 1920 until 1922, but re-opened in 1923 under 
the supervision of Tiao Katignarath, recently transferred from Savannakhet 
hospital to Vientiane. 88  Student numbers hovered around 14 per year 
throughout the 1920s. 89  However, concern about the predominance of 
Vietnamese students prompted the adoption of pro-Lao affirmative action, by 
requiring a Lao language test in the late 1920s. The strategy backfired: rather 
than increasing the number of Lao, enrolment data suggests the test 
encouraged Vietnamese students to brush up their language skills. 
The number of nurses employed by the AML gradually climbed, as did 
the proportion of Lao compared to Vietnamese. By 1930 approximately 40 
percent of nurses were Lao, compared to 29.5 the previous year.90 In later 
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years, the AML annual reports no longer distinguished between Lao and 
Vietnamese, so it is not possible to observe the changing ethnic composition of 
AML staff. However, what emerges from the 1930s onwards is the gradual 
entry of female nurses, although no overt strategy for their recruitment appears 
within the official reports. By 1950 the AML comprised 220 nurses, 23 
percent of whom were female.91 
A midwifery school which operated at the Vientiane hospital from 
1924 also encountered difficulty in recruitment. It was exacerbated by the 
requirement that all students be female, and willing to undergo a two-year 
curriculum rather than the shorter, six-month nursing curriculum. Several of 
the early graduates were of mixed race, either Lao-Vietnamese or Lao-French, 
possibly because they were more likely to possess the formal education 
required for acceptance into the course, and to enjoy family support to seek a 
profession.92 The midwifery school in neighbouring Cambodia, which also 
opened in 1924, is reported to have recruited mixed-race women. 93  The 
Vientiane school closed its doors in 1932, after teaching only three or four 
students per year.94 The Phnom Penh school also closed in 1932, suggesting 
the closures were prompted by Indochinese health policy as much as by 
specific local circumstances.95 The Vientiane school re-opened in August 1940 
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as the Nursing and Midwifery School with ten students (eight male and two 
female).96 
Midwifery training was revived in the immediate post-World War II 
period, and administratively placed in the new Social Welfare section of the 
larger Medical and Social Welfare Service. This initiative began with 
midwifery training in France for two young Lao women, who were intended to 
serve as instructors on their return. Ultimately, only one travelled to France, 
while the other remained in Laos to marry.97 A parallel initiative involved 
training a cadre of lower level, rural auxiliary midwives (accoucheuses 
rurales), who would undergo six months’ training in the nearest hospital, 
before returning to practise in their local area. An ambitious plan set out to 
train a corps of approximately 120 young women beginning in 1949. 98 
Interestingly, the plan did not appear to follow an earlier Vietnamese strategy 
of providing biomedical top-up training to traditional midwives who were 
already practising, but rather was intended to train young women new to the 
profession.99 By 1950, one state-registered midwife (sage-femme d’état) was 
employed by the AML, presumably trained in France, as well as four lower-
level Indochinese midwives.100 
No Lao qualified as pharmacists or auxiliary pharmacists during the 
colonial period. Auxiliary pharmacist positions were filled by a series of staff 
from Vietnam beginning in 1926. 101  Nor did any Lao qualify as dental 
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surgeons or dental assistants. In fact, dental care was not provided by the AML, 
suggesting that only the most rudimentary care, such as tooth-pulling, was 
available from private operators in the colonial period. 
A final word on staffing: supervision was problematic throughout the 
colonial period. The consistently low numbers of staff saw newly graduated 
médecins auxiliaires regularly assigned to head up provincial and district-level 
infirmaries and dispensaries, and new nurses dispatched to even more remote 
dispensaries and medical posts. Often they had little guidance or supervision 
and sometimes nothing more than a French-Vietnamese bilingual nursing 
manual to assist them. 102  Some struggled with their responsibilities. One 
médecin auxiliaire stagiaire was assigned to head the recently opened Xam 
Neua dispensary fresh out of medical school in 1920, but was officially 
disciplined several months later for not fulfilling his professional duties. He 
was transferred to Luang Prabang to recommence his internship under the 
guidance of a French doctor rather than being fired, presumably due to the 
scarcity of Lao médecins auxiliaires.103 
 
Curative Care 
 The AML endeavoured to provide a range of curative and preventative 
healthcare services. Contrary to assumption among several present-day health 
practitioners, the colonial health service provided medical care to both 
Europeans and natives. The patient load was cosmopolitan, considering the 
size and remoteness of Laos, and biomedical services received varying degrees 
of acceptance among different social groups. French doctors quickly realised 
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that the healthcare services in Laos would differ from those operating in the 
rest of Indochina. In 1908 the AML head explained: 
 
The medical and public health services are … very difficult in Laos, 
due to the diversity of the population … Each people has its [own] 
morals, its special customs. It is impossible to set up a generalised 
system … all that we can do from Vientiane is [to support] a combined 
general program, [with] a kind of template/framework, to be modified 
in the provinces according to the mentality/mindset of the [local] 
population.104 
 
 The colonial record is silent on whether the AML or individual doctors 
were in fact able to tailor services to the diverse local communities. The AML 
considered the employment of Lao medical staff as a potential access point to 
local people, but medical workers from ethnicities other than the Lao were 
rarely if ever mentioned. Certainly, doctors were aware of the need to re-orient 
the service to better support people in Laos’ rural areas. A recommendation in 
1929 noted that the AML should practise primarily rural medicine, rather than 
hospital-based medicine “which is expensive in Laos … and profits only those 
in the towns, and especially, Vietnamese immigrants”.105 
The AML offered consultations and hospitalisations for both 
Europeans and natives, but medical services were segregated. Beds, wards and 
even buildings were designated for Europeans or natives. All health facilities 
in Laos contained a vast majority of beds for natives, and there was no 
situation comparable to Phnom Penh where in 1908 the Hôpital Mixte was 
reported to possess almost equal numbers of beds for Europeans as for natives 
(63 as opposed to 83).106 The number of native beds increased as the health 
network expanded, while those for Europeans remained relatively steady. 
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However, the percentage of ‘European’ beds was disproportionate to their 
actual presence in Laos, if only slightly. For example, in 1950, when 
Europeans comprised less than one percent of the estimated local population, 
three percent of hospital beds (14 of the 490 available beds) were set aside for 
them.107 Furthermore, hospitals provided meals to patients from 1908, with 
separate European and native menus. European patients were given more 
courses, and presumably more food.108 
The patient mix was varied, with Vietnamese disproportionately 
represented within the native category until the AML ceased reporting ethnic 
distinctions. This can be explained initially by the clustering of health facilities 
in urban centres which, except for Luang Prabang, had majority Vietnamese 
populations, or near garrisons of the predominantly Vietnamese garde 
indigène.109 Moreover, Vietnamese immigrants were more likely to have some 
cultural familiarity with biomedicine, as it had been introduced to Vietnam 
decades earlier, and at the same time, were less likely to resort to Lao 
traditional medicine than their Lao counterparts. Thirdly, they were more 
likely to have some knowledge of French, the official language of the health 
facilities. However, patients of many other ethnicities also availed themselves 
of colonial healthcare services, as demonstrated by Figure 3.4. 
 While the medical care provided by the original ambulances was basic, 
staff diagnosed a wide variety of medical conditions, performed surgery, and 
dispensed European pharmaceuticals. The caseload was varied, with malaria, 
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dysentery, respiratory and digestive problems featuring prominently. Records 
show that there were almost three times as many male patients as females in 
the 1910s, and two times as many in the 1920s. Possible explanations for this 
phenomenon will be addressed below. In 1907, 589 natives and 56 Europeans 
were hospitalised at the four ambulances. By 1950, the AML recorded 5,126 
patients nationwide, of whom only 67 were European.110 As such, the number 
of Lao (or native) patients had increased by more than 800 percent, while the 
number of European patients had remained steady. 
 
Figure 3.4: Provincial patient numbers by ethnicity, 1926111 
Facility  Lao  Kha  Meo  Phouthai  Phoutheng  Viet  Chin  Siam  Malay  Malabar 
Xam Neua  1009  ‐  173  432  211  1207  114  ‐  ‐  3 
Thakhek  119  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  355  3  30  1  ‐ 
Xepone  1578  ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐  2025  64  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Attapeu  1787  354  ‐  ‐  ‐  455  21  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
 
Colonial officials identified malaria as the major obstacle to the health 
and well-being for Europeans and locals alike.112 It was the main reason for 
hospitalisation, and the main cause of death among hospitalised patients 
throughout the colonial period. Quinine sulphate, the only known preventative 
for malaria at the time, was used by as a preventative and treatment. The State 
Quinine Service for Indochina was established in 1909 under the supervision 
of the health service.113 It was introduced to Laos several years later in 1914, 
although it did not operate in some provinces until the 1920s. The service 
distributed quinine from the ambulances and dispensaries, as well as from 
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secondary depots outside of the formal health service.114 Quinine was mainly 
distributed free of charge in Laos, as AML Head Dr Pujol predicted in 1914 
that it would take some time for Lao people to realise the benefits of quinine, 
and to be prepared to pay for it.115 His prediction was borne out in 10 years. 
The 62 depots in 1923 more than doubled within two years. 116  Despite 
significant efforts to promote the use of quinine, malaria continued to be the 
main disease for which the local community sought treatment throughout the 
colonial period. Twenty six percent of consultations in Vientiane in 1925 were 
made by patients with malaria.117 At handover in 1950, the AML was still 
dealing with a majority of malaria cases. 
Medical treatments for other health complaints were not always 
popular. Colonial doctors observed that Lao people were reluctant to undergo 
surgery, fearing “bloody operations”, and preferring pharmaceuticals to 
surgery.118 Acceptance of surgery increased over the decades, because by 1950 
the AML reported that it performed 80,095, presumably minor, operations that 
year.119 
European pharmaceuticals proved popular, but their supply was 
irregular, and caused constant headaches, in large part caused by Laos’ inland 
location. Pharmaceuticals and medical supplies were ordered only once or 
twice a year, to guard against their expiry. Items were sourced from Hanoi, 
Haiphong or Saigon and in some instances, France. The difficulty in accessing 
up-to-date price lists, and the long lead times for delivery, meant that the AML 
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had a hard time balancing the books and keeping its medical warehouses 
adequately stocked. The early files of the AML reveal numerous examples of 
delayed or lost medicine shipments.120 Doctors improvised as best they could 
in such circumstances, requesting travelling government officials, other 
Europeans, or colleagues in Phnom Penh to assist with enquiries and 
deliveries.121 
The AMI policy promoted a system of free pharmaceuticals in 
Indochina. In Laos, pharmaceuticals were generally not free, however, except 
for the poorest of patients. This may have been partly due to the difficulty and 
cost of securing a consistent supply. It may also have been an attempt to curb 
the practice reported by French doctors of members of the Lao elite obtaining 
free (or heavily subsidised) medications, and selling them on to others at 
profit.122 This particular example suggests that some who avoided entering the 
culturally unfamiliar setting of the French colonial health facility were still 
prepared to buy pharmaceuticals through other channels. 
In 1924 a Central Pharmacy was established in Vientiane under the 
rationale that it would reduce costs for the AML. The move was greeted with a 
veritable torrent of exasperation from Dr Guillemet, the AML Head at the time, 
who unloaded his frustration at his predecessor’s assumption that a 
pharmaceutical service could operate without adequate staff, funding or 
premises. He exclaimed: “The fundamental error consists of thinking that an 
institution which has proved itself in three countries of the Indochinese Union 
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could not fail to achieve similar satisfactory results in the fourth [Laos] … 
Laos cannot be compared to any other country in the [Indochinese] Union”, 
though he failed to specify exactly why the plan was doomed.123 
Without a single trained Lao pharmacist or assistant pharmacist 
throughout the colonial period, Vietnamese pharmaciens auxiliaires were 
appointed to staff the Central Pharmacy from 1924. 124  Difficulties with 
ordering, transportation and supply plagued the service. On occasion, 
shipments of medicines arrived without invoices, and so AML staff were 
unable to price the medicine for sale at its real cost.125 The situation improved 
slightly when from 1934 the service began ordering all of its products from the 
pharmaceutical depot in Tourane (Danang). Hospitals and ambulances were 
re-supplied twice per year, except the Bacteriology Laboratory in Vientiane, 
which was re-supplied monthly. Vientiane absorbed the bulk of medicine and 
supplies, followed by Luang Prabang, Champassak, Savannakhet and 
Thakhek. 126  The service struggled with insufficient staffing, budgets and 
logistics problems, possibly exacerbated by weak management practices which 
resulted in stockpiles and shortages of various medicines. 
 Finally, evacuations were a consistent feature of the AML. Both 
Europeans and natives were evacuated downstream to Phnom Penh and 
Saigon, or overland to Vinh and Hanoi. A total of 27 patients were evacuated 
from Laos in 1906: 16 Europeans and 11 natives.127 If Vietnamese comprised 
the bulk of native evacuations (no breakdown by nationality is available), and 
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they may well have, many evacuations could be described more correctly as 
repatriations. Evacuations reduced as the AML’s capacity to provide medical 
services improved, but nevertheless remained a routine element of medical 
care in Laos. 
 
The Challenges of Preventative Healthcare 
Preventative healthcare or public health (hygiène) was considered as 
important as the curative health services offered by colonial hospitals and 
infirmaries. A multi-stakeholder Public Hygiene Committee was created in 
November 1905, three years after the formation of similar committees in the 
other Indochinese territories. Provincial committees were established in 1907, 
comprising staff from the AML and other offices and, in Vientiane, 
representatives from the European and Vietnamese communities.128 To combat 
practices regarded as backward, unclean, and superstitious, the AML outlined 
three programs to address hygiene in the main urban centres, in rural villages, 
and through public health education. Urban efforts were directed at the 
prevention and control of transmissible and contagious diseases, rabies, 
smallpox vaccination, and prostitution, as well as food hygiene at markets and 
abattoirs, cleanliness of public establishments (mainly schools, prisons and 
workshops), and the general cleanliness of urban centres. The establishment of 
‘native’ births and deaths registers was also attempted unsuccessfully. 
In rural areas, the preventative health program involved limiting the 
spread of epidemic disease, attempting to regulate burials and cremations, and 
maintaining village cleanliness and order. This included, for example, 
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protecting water sources; locating wells at a distance from latrines, manure 
piles, dumps and cemeteries; promoting the use of rubbish dumps and latrines; 
and constructing pens for livestock. Public health education included medical 
rounds and free consultations in schools, military garrisons, work camps and 
prisons; vaccinations for various diseases such as smallpox, cholera and 
typhoid; public health meetings; and leaflets and brochures promoting the use 
of clean drinking water and prevention of trachoma.129 In the 1920s, maternal 
and child healthcare was added to the public health agenda, before being 
passed to the Social Action and later Social Welfare services of the 1930s and 
1940s. Governor-General Beau had advised in 1907: 
 
The local doctors trained…are…the most effective agents of 
propaganda [information].…[T]hey are admirably equipped to take the 
lead in this campaign, to explain to their compatriots the benefits of 
vaccine or the necessity of disinfection, to teach them how dysentery is 
spread, or typhoid fever, or cholera, or tell them of the dangers of dirty 
water …130 
 
Malaria, smallpox, and cholera were identified as major health problems 
in colonial Laos. Epidemic control and vaccination formed the major plank of 
the colonial preventative health program, due largely to the scientific research 
of the Pasteur Institute in France and Indochina. However, while it has been 
argued that massive vaccination campaigns for smallpox and cholera had a 
major effect on population and mortality in Vietnam, Stuart-Fox is not 
convinced that the same can be said for Laos, implying that mortality rates 
remained high despite the authorities’ attention to vaccination.131 
                                                 
129 RSL, Box 3: ‘Médical annuel ensemble, Année 1909’, unpaginated. 
130 RSL, Box 2: Governor-General’s Instruction No.99, 31 January 1907. 
131 Pierre Brocheux and Daniel Hémery, Indochina. An Ambiguous Colonisation, 1858-1954, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), p.256; and Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, p.52. 
106 
 
Vaccination was compulsory throughout Indochina from 1908. 132 
Smallpox was the most common vaccination provided in Laos, although 
cholera, plague and typhoid vaccines were also provided some years. 
Smallpox vaccines were sourced from the Pasteur Institute in Saigon for 
southern Laos,133 and from the vaccine station in Xieng Khouang for northern 
and central Laos.134 Au argues that only those groups most accessible to the 
authorities were vaccinated.135 In Laos, it is not possible to discern any social 
groups specifically targeted by the authorities, although it is safe to assume 
that vaccination was more likely to occur if one lived in a town or a village 
located on a travel route between two towns. 
 Vaccination rounds began soon after the establishment of the first 
ambulances in Laos. They were carried out on horseback in the dry season, 
and by boat in the wet season. Dr Lefèvre made a vaccination tour from Luang 
Prabang to Vientiane in March 1898, accompanied by the King’s brother Tiao 
Chakravat who liaised with the local communities along the route. His 
handwritten report states that he vaccinated 1,524 people in 37 villages.136 The 
Pak Hinboun doctor reports making vaccination rounds soon after the 
ambulance opened in 1898,137 as did the Khong doctor. From 1904 the AML 
had one allocated mobile doctor-vaccinator position, which was later increased 
to three positions for the whole of Laos. These positions, however, were often 
vacant due to the difficulty in attracting medical staff. In 1915, the mobile 
vaccination service was reported to rely on French provincial administrators 
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and native vaccinators, including low-level Lao clerks (samiens) because of 
the insufficient numbers of medical personnel.138 A decade later official policy 
had changed and the colonial authorities tried to restrict the vaccination work 
to doctors and/or nurses, to counter charges of rent-seeking and sloppy 
performance.139 
 In 1922 Dr Guillemet was upbeat about plans to re-institute the mobile 
vaccination service as the supply of medical staff increased. Xieng Khouang 
continued to operate as a vaccine station, but no longer supplied northern Laos, 
as similar stations were established in Luang Prabang and Houayxay, complete 
with buffaloes and rabbits. BCG vaccinations for tuberculosis were introduced 
in 1924 in addition to smallpox and cholera, although these were not widely 
used.140 
 The temporary departure of doctors to conduct vaccinations in rural 
areas placed pressure on remaining staff, or effectively closed the health 
facility in their absence. The AML reported relatively high rates of vaccination 
each year, in both urban and rural areas. One should be careful in interpreting 
these figures, however, given the known situation of staff shortages, 
geographic and cultural difficulty in accessing rural communities, and the 
uncertain quality of the vaccines without refrigeration. 
The maternal and child health program met with less success in Laos 
than in other Indochinese territories. Statistics for consultations and 
hospitalisations reflect considerable obstacles in providing services to Lao 
women and children. Of the 112 deliveries recorded in 1924 at Vientiane and 
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Luang Prabang maternity clinics, for example, there were 110 Vietnamese, 
one Chinese and one Lao.141 Dr Guillemet explained: 
 
Only the Vietnamese women come to give birth in our ambulances. 
The Lao women never come... [They] have been afraid of and 
displayed excessive modesty in respect to our health facilities.. [W]e 
need a doctor who knows the language and the morals [customs] 
who can on certain occasions make house calls, and can convince 
them to accept care at the time of delivery.142 
 
As mentioned above, colonial health facilities were the professional preserve 
of men (there were virtually no female staff), many of them foreign and with 
little fluency in Lao. It is therefore hardly surprising that Lao women avoided 
such an environment. 
The AML was aware that infant mortality was high, but seemed unable 
to address it.143 A maternity clinic was constructed at the Vientiane ambulance 
in 1915, but there were no midwives to staff it.144 A Chinese midwife from 
Cholon was posted to Vientiane on contract from August 1916 to December 
1917, but her contract was not renewed due to a budget shortfall.145 Moreover, 
the midwifery school in Vientiane (discussed earlier in this chapter), was 
supplemented by maternity clinics attached to the main hospitals in later years: 
Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Pakse, Thakhek, Savannakhet and Xieng 
Khouang.146  
After the World War II the AML tried a new approach, employing 
rural auxiliary midwives in their home villages. The curriculum is unknown, 
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but presumably trained the midwives to provide home-based services and refer 
women to medical facilities in the event of complications. In 1950, 978 
deliveries took place in AML health facilities.147 This was an increase on the 
713 deliveries recorded in 1932 but a slight decrease from the 1,012 recorded 
in 1939. While the 1950 statistics do not indicate ethnicity, an estimated 90 
percent of mothers in 1939 were Vietnamese.148 As already noted, Vietnamese 
women were probably more familiar with biomedicine and French language 
than Lao women. They may also have faced fewer taboos in dealing with male 
staff, some of whom were Vietnamese. 
 
Multi-faceted marginality of geographical, administrative and cultural 
distance 
 Laos’ geographical, administrative and cultural distance from Paris and 
Hanoi meant that it existed on the margins of the larger Indochinese Union. Its 
different circumstances were routinely overlooked, despite protests from 
French doctors, conflating its presumed health needs and abilities to respond 
to policy directives with those of the other territories. Charles Rochet, a long-
term colonial education official and friend of Laos, found it necessary to 
remind his readers, and presumably his fellow administrators, in the mid-
1940s that Laos was not the same as Indochina, which often seemed to refer to 
the Vietnamese territories alone, and neglected the realities of Laos.149 
Geographically, Laos was relatively isolated from the other 
Indochinese territories, as well as from other neighbouring countries. It was 
                                                 
147 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.12. 
148 RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1932 de l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, p.53; and 
‘Rapport annuel 1939’, p.14. 
149 Rochet, Pays Lao, p.64. 
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landlocked, hemmed in by mountainous terrain, and rapids in its river systems 
which blocked large boats from accessing its hinterland. Travel within the Lao 
territory was also difficult and time-consuming, as geographical distances 
between towns and villages were of a larger magnitude than in other 
Indochinese territories, there were few roads, and no railways. Telegraph, 
telephone or other technologies were unable to bridge the geographical 
distances, as the communications was still in its infancy. 
Administrative distance or marginality overlaid the geographic 
distance. Laos was the smallest, poorest and last Indochinese territory to be 
annexed by France. It was incorporated into the Indochinese Union more than 
35 years after the first French involvement in Cochinchina, and its first 
biomedical facilities were established several decades after those elsewhere. 
The Lao health network was locked in a game of catch-up. It remained 
relatively small, offering a limited range of healthcare services and referring 
seriously ill and socially-privileged patients to the larger and better equipped 
cities of Phnom Penh, Saigon and Hanoi. 
 The AML’s inability to secure a larger share of financial resources 
demonstrate Laos’ administrative distance from Hanoi.150 Laos ran at a loss 
and relied on subsidies from Hanoi. The local budget funded AML staffing 
costs, medications and supplies, which totalled more than two-thirds of the 
budget, as well as the running costs of the facilities and the public health 
program. The general (Indochina) budget funded major infrastructure 
                                                 
150 Monnais-Rousselot, Médecine et colonisation, pp.78-82. 
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development, such as the construction of facilities, and occasionally specific 
staff, such as those posted to work with the road-building teams.151 
 Health expenditure for Laos was one percent of the colonial budget in 
1896, rising to a meagre 1.6 percent in 1910.152 Modest funding supplements 
were received from the reimbursement of hospitalisation costs of European 
officials and paying patients, and the sales of medication and state-
monopolised quinine.153 After the boom of the 1920s, budget reductions were 
the order of the day, before climbing again after the war. In 1907 the Head of 
the AML deemed the budget allocation “largely sufficient” but most 
subsequent health managers complained about the limited funding, and 
ascribed Laos’ lack of certain medical facilities or staffing numbers to its 
limited budgets.154 For example, construction of a leprosarium was beyond the 
Lao budget in 1908, requiring Laos to make do with the much cheaper (and 
incidentally, more humane) option of designated agricultural villages for those 
with leprosy. 155  The employment of European nurses was ruled out as 
unaffordable.156 Permanent quarantine lazarets could not be constructed in 
1916 because of limited funds,157 and the AML’s 1929 report noted that the 
health service waited several years before it could afford to construct premises 
for the Central Pharmacy created in 1924.158 
  
                                                 
151 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de l’Assistance au Laos, 1916’, p.3. 
152 Ministry of Information and Culture, Pavatsat Lao, p.571. 
153 RSL, Box 4:‘Rapport annuel de 1929 sur l’Assistance médicale du Laos’, p.20. 
154 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel 1907 de l’Assistance médicale du Laos’, unpaginated. 
155 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport médical annuel pour le Laos (Année 1908)’, p.37. 
156 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport médical d’ensemble de l’année 1913 du Chef du Service de 
l’Assistance médicale au Laos’, p.7. 
157 RSL, Box 3: ‘Rapport annuel de l’Assistance au Laos, 1916’, p.16. 
158 RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1929’, p.14. 
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Culturally, a host of factors created distance between the French 
authorities, the local population, and the plan to introduce and expand 
healthcare services in Laos. The formal education system had received scant 
attention from French authorities, and so few Lao students possessed the 
minimum educational requirements to study medicine in Hanoi, or Saigon or 
Phnom Penh. At the same time, it was difficult to attract French and 
Vietnamese medical officers to the unfamiliar cultural environment of Laos, 
compounded by its geographical and administrative marginality and relative 
poverty within Indochina. Within Laos, daily communication was challenging 
as no single ethnic group represented a clear majority, unlike in the 
Vietnamese territories and Cambodia. The population spoke different 
languages, many of which had no script, and adhered to a range of customs 
and beliefs that differed from the ethnic Lao. 
Rochet alleged that colonial administrators turned their backs on Laos 
to face Hanoi, implementing policies to please their superiors rather than 
benefiting the Lao population. 159  He recommended that to improve the 
effectiveness of colonial programs in Laos, one needed to reduce the cultural 
distance, but it is doubtful that this ever happened to any significant degree. 
Another long-term colonial official, Dr Francière, summed up the practical 
dilemma faced by the Lao health service in 1930: 
 
Day by day the service is becoming more and more complicated, with 
fewer personnel to run it. Its time has certainly not come yet, given the 
lack of European doctors and lack of Indochinese doctors  to create a 
mobile Hygiene service, unless [we] leave [the whole thing] in the 
hands of simple nurses.160 
 
                                                 
159 Rochet, Pays Lao, p.65. 
160 RSL, Box 4: ‘Rapport annuel de 1930’, p.9. 
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It appears that Hanoi administrators assumed the Lao health service was the 
same, or similar enough, to keep pace with those in Vietnam and Cambodia. 
But Laos had fewer staff, a more culturally diverse and predominantly rural 
population, and larger distances between towns and villages to negotiate. As 
with other areas of colonial policy, health policy was directed from Hanoi, and 
rarely took into account Laos’ specific needs. 
 
Conclusion 
The Assistance médicale au Laos registered a number of achievements 
in the years to 1950. These included construction of a health network, training 
a Lao cadre of medical and health professionals, and provision of healthcare to 
both locals and colonials. Health budgets were allocated, doctors and other 
staff were despatched to the various provinces, and both curative and 
preventative healthcare services were launched from the network of hospitals 
and clinics throughout the territory. 
Biomedicine, embodied by the AML, was a symbolic tool of empire 
employed in France’s civilising mission of its colonies. Its introduction to 
Laos was not as closely linked to providing healthcare for the colonial ruling 
class, or to supporting economic priorities as in many other colonial settings 
because the territory hosted few French administrators, and its economic 
position within Indochina was marginal. Therefore, while the French vision 
for the Lao health service was grand, the colonial presence was light in terms 
of both funding and staffing. Successful implementation of many medical and 
healthcare services approved in policy was delayed or hampered by financial 
and staffing limitations. 
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Without a budget surplus of its own, Laos’ health service and the 
colonial administration more generally were dependent on the budgets and 
policies formulated in Paris and Hanoi, rather than Vientiane. And while 
policies and programs may have been appropriate for the more urban, more 
educated, more densely populated and more ethnically homogenous 
populations of Vietnam and to a lesser extent Cambodia, they were often 
inappropriate for rural, sparsely populated and multi-ethnic Laos. Many of the 
French doctors posted to Laos grasped this dilemma, and raised their concerns 
with their superiors with apparently little success. 
The short supply of trained staff provided ongoing obstacles for both 
expansion and quality improvements of the Lao health service. The impetus 
for training Lao health staff was predicated on making biomedical healthcare 
more self-sufficient, more financially affordable and more culturally 
accessible to the Lao population. 
The AML had only a superficial effect on the local population, due to 
its limited coverage. Ongoing funding and staffing shortages reduced its 
effectiveness, as did Laos’ geographical and cultural distance from the 
metropoles. Biomedicine was concentrated overwhelmingly within AML 
facilities, as there were rarely sufficient staff to enable effective outreach 
through mobile services and public health education in the surrounding rural 
communities, while Lao society was predominantly rural. As such, most Lao 
continued to rely on traditional medicine dispensed by local healers, Buddhist 
monks, spirit doctors and shamans rather than adopting or incorporating 





DIVIDED EFFORTS: THE IMPACT OF WAR AND INSTABILTY 
ON THE HEALTH SECTOR (1950-1975) 
 
Introduction 
The Lao health sector experienced significant fragmentation in the 
years following independence. It split from a single, colonially-funded and 
operated service into multiple services under the separate jurisdictions of the 
RLG and the NLHX resistance administration. The entry into Laos of 
international assistance agencies and their rapid rise in influence further 
diversified the mix of stakeholders, especially in the RLG zone. Laos did not 
yet possess the necessary technical or financial resources to fully manage and 
control its health sector, particularly since for most of this period Laos itself 
was divided, and so dependence on external assistance was the rule. Three 
main health services emerged: the RLG’s Ministry of Health, supported 
primarily by France and the WHO; the parallel Operation Brotherhood (OB) 
network in the RLG zone, funded by the US; and a service under the Central 
Health Committee (Khanakamakane Sathanalasouk Sounkang) or CHC in the 
NLHX’s Liberated Zone, supported by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
(DRV). 
Independence presented the Lao government with the opportunity to 
shape a health service directed and delivered by Lao nationals, and focused on 
its own people’s needs rather than external policy imperatives. But while 
efforts to improve and expand healthcare services were made by the 
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internationally recognised RLG, its overall focus was on the survival of the 
nation-state in the face of the communist-led NLHX rather than the 
development of its technical and administrative services. The First and Second 
Indochina Wars diverted attention away from national development and 
towards the more immediate demands of the war effort. The long-running 
political conflict between the RLG and the NLHX and their respective allies 
fragmented the technical expertise and financial resources available for the 
health sector development, dividing rather than unifying the development 
efforts that did take place. 
 This chapter charts the nationalisation of the Lao health service and the 
development of the RLG’s Ministry of Health from 1950 until the change of 
regime in 1975. It documents its fragmentation into separate services 
implemented by the RLG, OB-USAID, and the NLHX’s Central Health 
Committee. The chapter explores some of the internationally-funded projects 
implemented within the Ministry of Health, and contextualises the 
contributions of smaller organisations operating within the health sector at the 
time, such as Tom Dooley and Medico. There are gaps in the story because 
sources from the post-colonial period are less complete and at times more 
difficult to access than those of the colonial period. 
 
Divisions within the health sector 
The Lao health service handed over to the semi-autonomous RLG in 
1950 had been patched together after wartime neglect, and remained the 
smallest and least developed health service in the post-war Associated States 
of Indochina. The service required strengthening and consolidation to fill the 
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gaps left by the departure of Vietnamese médecins indochinois in the 1940s 
and the reassignment of French doctors from managers to specialist advisors in 
the 1950s, and to expand healthcare into unserved rural areas.1 
Even before full independence in 1953, the Franco-Lao Treaty of July 
1949 and its practical arrangements signed in February 1950 provided for 
increased autonomy, including assuming the management of several technical 
sectors. 2  In accordance with these agreements, the Commissioner of the 
French Republic in Laos handed over responsibility for the administration of 
public sector health services to the RLG in April 1950.3 
Consolidation of the health service was quickly jeopardised by political 
fragmentation and the introduction of various sources of international 
assistance to both the RLG and the NLHX. Following a short-lived period of 
independence in 1945-46 one faction of the nationalist Lao Issara movement 
had accepted to move towards independence under French tutelage, and most 
of its members had returned from exile in Thailand in 1949-1950 to join the 
RLG. The other faction joined the Communist-led Lao Front for Independence 
(Neo Lao Issara) which transformed in 1956 into the NLHX resistance 
administration. The RLG inherited the bulk of colonial health infrastructure 
and staffing, while the NLHX made efforts to establish and maintain a parallel 
network of military health facilities in its ‘Liberated Zone’, albeit with more 
modest resources.  
                                                 
1 Jean Deuve estimates the ‘Lao authorities’ numbered approximately 400 in the late 1940s, 
and staff employed in the technical services another 700. See Deuve, Royaume du Laos, p.5. 
2 Anonymous, Laos Mil neuf cent cinquante. Le Royaume du Laos, ses institutions et son 
organisation générale (Pathet Lao 1950. Rabiabkane Pok-khong lae Kanechattang Thoua-
pay), (no publication details, undated), p.108. See also Katay Don Sasorith, Le Laos. Son 
évolution politique. Sa place dans l’Union française. (Paris: Éditions Berger-Levrault, 1953) 
pp.72-73. 
3 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.15. 
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A second fracture came when the US government, frustrated at a 
perceived lack of capacity and responsiveness within the RLG’s Ministry of 
Health, began to organise its own, separate health facilities in rural areas. It 
contracted Filipino NGO Operation Brotherhood (OB) to run a predominantly 
rural network of hospitals and dispensaries, which also included a referral 
hospital and nursing school in Vientiane. At the same time, a modest private 
sector of medical clinics, pharmacies and dental clinics operated by RLG staff 
emerged alongside government health services in the major lowland towns. 
Further fracturing occurred as RLG and NLHX authorities delineated between 
their civilian and military health services, although these divisions were 
sometimes blurred. 
Finally, various international donor agencies and technical advisors 
jostled to provide financial and technical assistance to both RLG and NLHX 
governments, now engaged in a struggle aggravated and supported by Cold 
War rivalries. Contrary to the case in former British colonies, where it was 
common for individual colonial officials to transition into advisory positions 
after independence, this appears to have been rarely the case in the Lao health 
sector, except for the very few French military doctors present at the time of 
handover.4 Even in this specific case, the transition from colonial official to 
post-colonial advisor appears to have occurred at the organisational rather than 
the individual level. 
  
                                                 
4 Kothari, ‘Spatial practices and imaginaries’, pp.235-253. 
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The RLG Ministry of Health 
 The RLG’s Ministry of Health was the leading health service until 
1975.5 It managed most health facilities and health staff beginning from April 
1950. Moreover, it regulated the country’s nascent private sector, received the 
bulk of assistance from international development agencies, and represented 
Laos in international fora such as the WHO, which it joined in May 1950. 
 Lao independence required the Ministry of Health to take on policy 
making, management, financing and administrative functions which had 
previously been carried out by Hanoi- and/or Paris-based staff, which it was 
not well-prepared to do. Sources provide scant information about the 
Ministry’s overall health policy or motivations: its aim appears to have been 
the maintenance and improvement of the existing health service along French 
lines. However, as LeBar and Suddard argued in 1960, the Ministry faced 
major obstacles, due to its limited financial means, insufficient staff and the 
low level of their professional training: “The framework and the intent exist: 
the problem is to produce personnel with the requisite professional 
competence,” they stated.6 
 Political responsibility for the health service was grouped within a 
multi-function Ministry of Cults, Education, Health, Social Welfare and 
Information. 7  The positions of Minister for Health (a member of the 
Constituent Assembly or Parliament), Secretary of State and Director-General 
of the Health Service managed the sector. A Secretary of State, similar in rank 
                                                 
5 The Ministry of Health was referred to in 1950 as the Department of Health (Direction 
générale de la Santé publique) and the Health Service (Assistance médicale laotienne or the 
Phanek Satharanasouk). I use the term ‘Ministry of Health’ throughout the thesis to refer to 
both the administrative department and the technical health service, as well as the central, 
provincial and district level services. 
6 LeBar and Suddard, Laos, p.185. 
7 Anonymous, Laos 1950, p.77. 
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and position to a Vice-Minister, provided closer policy oversight of health 
matters than the Minister of a multi-function ministry.8 It was unproblematic 
that most Ministers were not medically trained, as the Director-General 





The Director-General was assisted by two deputies, who administered 
the Ministry of Health’s two bureaux. The Administrative Bureau managed the 
functions of personnel, accounts and pharmacy, while the Technical Bureau 
handled hospital management and social welfare. The médecin-chef positions, 
literally Head Doctors, managed technical and administrative operations in 
each province, in roles virtually unchanged since the colonial period, except 
                                                 
8 English language reports often substitute the term ‘Secretary of State’ with that of ‘Minister,’ 
even though this was not strictly correct; it is not clear whether the two terms were 
consistently distinguished in Lao.  
9 Anonymous, Laos 1950, p.99. 
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that now positions were occupied by Lao médecins indochinois rather than 
French doctors.10 
The Director-General position was not immediately nationalised, a 
situation common to other technical services. At least two French military 
medical officers served consecutively in the dual roles of Director-General and 
advisor to the Minister of Health until Dr Oudom Souvannavong was 
appointed Director-General in March 1953.11 At the time of his appointment, 
Oudom was the country’s only fully qualified medical doctor.12 Mathurin and 
Fontan list Koukeo Saycocie, Thongphet (Phetsiriseng) and Khamlek Vilay as 
successive Directors-General, although they provide neither dates nor 
references for their information. 13  By 1970 the position was occupied by 
médecin assistant Phouy Phouttasak, who served until the regime change in 
1975.14 Oudom was the inaugural head of the Technical Bureau in 1950, while 
Koukeo oversaw the Administration Bureau.15 Oudom had higher professional 
qualifications, but Koukeo had seniority in terms of work experience. Oudom 
transferred into politics within 18 months of his promotion to Director-General 
serving as Minister for Health from November 1954 until 1958. He remained 
                                                 
10 Anonymous, Laos. 1950, p.97; Ordonnance Royale No.100 of 2 April 1952, annexed to 
LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-007: ‘Legislation administrative de l’Hôpital Mahosot’, 15 May 
1967; and RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.17. 
11 Ibid., pp.1, 5; Anonymous, Laos. 1950, pp.86, 136-138; and ANOM, Haut Commissariat 
Indochinois, SPCE, Box 393: ‘Personnalités laotiennes. Le cabinet de S.E. KATAY- DON-
SASORITH (investi le 25 novembre 1954’, Direction de Service de Protection de la 
Representation Civile Française et du Corps Expeditionnaire en Indochine), p.2. I thank 
Martin Rathie for sharing the latter reference. 
12 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.15. 
13 Koukeo and Khamlek were médecins indochinois, while Thongphet was a médecin 
assistant. See Mathurin and Fontan, ‘La médecine au Laos’, p.646. 
14 WHO, WPR/RC21/4, 1970. 
15 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.15. 
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involved in the health sector, later appointed as Inspector-General for Health 
and President of the Lao Red Cross.16 
While RLG cabinet reshuffles repeatedly changed the Ministry’s 
political leadership, its structure remained stable. In 1967 Dr Khamphaï Abhay, 
Laos’ first qualified pharmacist, was appointed Secretary of State for Health; 
he remained in the position until 1974, when he was promoted to Minister.17 
By early 1967 the Ministry’s two original bureaux had expanded to three with 
the separation of the Technical Bureau into curative and preventative 
healthcare branches. The curative branch supervised hospitals and health 
facilities, whereas the preventative branch of public health comprised four 
initial departments (services): malaria eradication; maternal and child health; 
laboratory, research, hygiene and prophylaxis; and pharmacy. 18  All public 
health services except pharmacy were the focus of ongoing WHO-supported 
projects, which provided technical advisors and modest operational funds. The 
laboratory department later split from hygiene and prophylaxis to form a 
separate department.19 By 1973, management responsibility for the School of 
Public Health had been added to the preventative health branch, while external 
relations, through which international cooperation and funding flowed, had 
been transferred out of the Ministry and into the Secretary of State’s Cabinet 
Office.20 
                                                 
16 Oudom continued to serve in the Lao Red Cross post-1975, seemingly demoted to Vice-
President. Lao media articles mention him by name in 1977, 1978 and 1980. See Foreign 
Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), ‘Briefs: Soviet Red Cross Aid’, 3 September 1977; 
‘Red Cross delegation returns’, 2 November 1978; and ‘Soviet Red Cross delegation heads for 
home’, 16 December 1980. 
17 Dr Khamphaï Abhay, by email, 10 October 2012. 
18 Dominique M. Guerrini, Organigrammes: Organisation politique et administrative du Laos, 
January 1967, p.21, found at http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/SEAiT.Organigrammes. 
19 LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-011: ‘Rapport statistique de l’Assistance médicale. Année 1968’, 
Table B/1. 




The Lao health sector began its long-standing relationship with the 
international development sector in the 1950s. The sources of external 
assistance broadened from the former colonial power of France to include the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Japan and also the Soviet Union, 
among others. This process of increased diversification of external assistance 
to Laos laid the foundations for some of the management challenges 
experienced in later years. 
The RLG’s first five-year development plan, promulgated in 1959, 
stated that all health activities would be funded from domestic revenue. This 
was completely unfeasible, as the budget had been in deficit each year since 
independence.21 A large proportion of the RLG’s meagre funds was directed to 
the war effort, and the funding shortfall remained even after the introduction 
of a business turnover tax in 1961 which included a contribution to health and 
education financing.22 As such, the RLG health sector remained heavily reliant 
on external funding. Detailed health budgets for the first decade were not 
available.23 Khamsone Sassady states that RLG allocations to the health sector 
for 1956-1960 ranged from 2.46 to 6.99 percent of the government’s budget.24 
This figure fluctuated from year to year, averaging 2.64 percent from 1962-
1973 (see Figure 4.2), when the US considered that 10-15 percent would have 
been more appropriate.25 The most expensive budget items were salaries and 
                                                 
21 LeBar and Suddard, Laos, p.189. 
22 NARA, RG 59, Box 2560: ‘Economic Review Covering Second Three Biweekly periods of 
1961: February 16 - March 31’, 13 April 1961. 
23The Lao National Archives Department may have an almost complete set of RLG Ministry 
of Health budgets and reports, but access is highly restricted and even indexes can suddenly 
become unavailable to researchers. 
24 Khamsone Sassady, ‘Contribution à l’étude’, p.111. 




pharmaceuticals, which in 1968 accounted for 61.5 percent of the total health 
budget.26 
Foreign influence increased as funds from international assistance 
agencies plugged the considerable financial and material gaps in the system. 
International donor funds were relied upon for the construction and 
maintenance of health facilities, professional education and training, and 
medical equipment and supplies, as domestic budgets were swallowed by 
staffing and pharmaceutical costs. Assistance most commonly took the form of 

















The Ministry’s statistical reports from the 1960s and early 1970s make 
no reference to international financial and technical contributions, emphasising 
                                                 
26 LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-011: ‘Rapport statistique … Anneé 1968’, Table B/2. 
27 WHO, WPR/RC21/4, 1970, p.91. 
28 Figures are drawn from the Ministry of Health’s annual statistical reports for 1966-73, 
found in LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-004, 211-008, 211-011, 211-014, 211-017, 211-018, and 
211-024. The report for 1972 was missing. 
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only its own technical achievements but remaining silent about its reliance on 
external assistance. One must refer to WHO or USAID records to learn of the 
many international donors, for example, France’s Mission d’aide économique 
et technique (MAET), USAID, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, and the Colombo 
Plan.29 The seeming reluctance to highlight international assistance contrasts 
markedly with the Lao PDR period, when the securing of assistance was 
viewed as an achievement in its own right.30 
International assistance influenced not only the functioning of the Lao 
health sector but even its structure. Absence of donor funds could effectively 
void specific components of national health development plans, while 
earmarking of funding could steer plans in directions favoured by donors. For 
example, a National Malaria Department was established when WHO and 
USAID funds for anti-malaria activities became available in the mid-1950s, 
and stood vacant when external funding dried up. A National Maternal and 
Child Health Department appeared during the early stages of the WHO-funded 
Maternal and Child Health Project in the 1960s. The Head of this new 
Department was well aware of the tensions involved in a weak administration 
receiving large volumes of external development assistance: 
 
Knowing that lack of credibility/trust [on the part of foreign donors] 
has been a general and persistent problem in all departments of the 
Ministry, we must count on international and foreign aid for our 
program’s development. At the same time, we must focus our attention 
on [ensuring] the regularity and consistency of our own available 
budget. Because the harmonious expansion of a program depends on 
                                                 
29 WHO, WPR/RC19/3, 1968, p.125. 
30 The RLG Ministry of Health reporting formats closely followed those of the colonial 
Assistance médicale au Laos. It could be argued that during colonial times the source of 
external assistance was of no importance, as the French Union of Indochina was the only such 
source. During the Lao PDR period, however, reporting formats highlighted the wide 
international recognition and support that the regime enjoyed, with the receipt of international 
development assistance, or cooperation, being evidence of this support. 
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the credibility that regularly comes from a well-utilised staff, suitable 
facilities, and available equipment. Foreign aid that adds to our 
reputation cannot be well utilised except when it relies on what is 
locally available and on the development of our Service.31 
 
 While the US was the RLG’s largest donor and Laos was per capita the 
largest recipient of American aid worldwide in the decade from 1949-1959,32 
France was the most influential bilateral donor to the Ministry of Health. Its 
involvement shifted from colonial management and implementation to post-
colonial technical advice and financial assistance. Health was France’s third 
largest sector of development assistance to Laos from 1955 to 1971, receiving 
5.3 percent of its budget, behind education (80.05 percent) and public works 
(11.31 percent).33 Assistance flowed through both the MAET and the Mission 
militaire française (MMF). 34  Scholarships for medicine, pharmacy and 
midwifery studies in France were provided.35 Moreover, France furnished the 
majority of international instructors at the Royal School of Medicine, and 
provided support for medical infrastructure, equipment and supplies, and 
various teaching materials.36 The MMF contributed skilled personnel, such as 
the military doctors who served concurrently as Director-General of Health 
and advisor to the Minister of Health in the early 1950s prior to appointment 
of a Lao candidate. French military doctors and nurses served as technical 
specialists at Mahosot and major provincial hospitals until at least 1973, when 
16 French health professionals still served within the Ministry. Over time 
                                                 
31 LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-046: Direction du Service national de la PMI, ‘Rapport annuel 
1968’, pp.7-8. 
32 Judith Cousins and Alfred W. McCoy, ‘Living it up in Laos. Congressional Testimony on 
US aid to Laos in the 1950s’, in Laos. War and Revolution, ed. Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. 
McCoy, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p.340. 
33 Viliam Phraxayavong, History of Aid, p.96. 
34 Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, p.92. 
35 Viliam Phraxayavong, History of Aid, p.55. 
36 Joel M. Halpern, Laotian Health Problems, Laos project paper 20, (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts, 1961), p.25. 
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fewer French specialists were based in the provinces, presumably due to the 
ongoing conflict, and the RLG’s increasing concentration of staff and services 
at Mahosot.37 
The US government allocated 7.7 percent of its development budget, 
or USD 33,359,000, to the Lao health sector over the period 1955-75. 38 
However, much of this assistance was directed not to the Ministry but to 
USAID’s own parallel health network, discussed later in this chapter. 
American assistance to the Ministry included funding support for the 
construction of health infrastructure at Mahosot and in the provinces, as well 
as equipment and supplies. 
More modest assistance was provided by Colombo Plan members, 
including Japan, and socialist nations. Britain and Japan provided small 
numbers of medical staff to assist several provincial facilities. During the 
1960s, British doctors served in Xayabouly, Salavan, Luang Prabang and 
Thakhek hospitals.39 Japan operated a mobile clinic in the Vientiane Plain area, 
and placed doctors in Savannakhet hospital and at a dispensary on the outskirts 
of Vientiane. 40  Indian medical teams assisted hospitals in Vientiane and 
Paksan from 1964-68,41 and Swiss technical advisors assisted Luang Prabang 
hospital in the 1970s.42 Australia and Canada provided modest amounts of 
medical equipment and supplies, including pharmaceuticals and some 
scholarships. Assistance from socialist bloc nations such as the Soviet Union 
                                                 
37 LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-024: ‘Rapport annuel … 1973’, p.11. 
38 USAID, ‘Termination Report, USAID Laos’, (Washington DC: USAID, 1976), p.332. 
39 USAID, ‘Foreign Assistance to Laos’, (Vientiane: USAID, 1969), p.10, and Brown, At War 
in Shangri-La, pp.34, 93-94, 123. 
40 NARA, RG 59, Box 2560: ‘Bi-weekly economic review for Laos, No. 6 (March 11-24), 28 
March 1960; and LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-024: ‘Rapport annuel …1973’, p.11. 
41 USAID, ‘Foreign Assistance’, p.13. 
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and Czechoslovakia began in the early 1960s to Souvanna Phouma’s neutralist 
government and then the Second Government of National Union, and 
generally took the form of scholarships to study medicine in those countries.43 
 The WHO, and to a lesser extent other United Nations agencies such as 
UNICEF, were the main multilateral donors. 44  WHO archives show that 
assistance to the Associated States of Indochina, including Laos, was 
prioritised from 1951, and that funds were allocated to assist the Lao Ministry 
of Health from 1952.45 The WHO initially monitored its activities in Laos 
from Saigon; a country liaison officer was first posted to Laos in 1962, and a 
WHO country office opened in 1968. 46  Throughout this period WHO 
assistance was directed only to the RLG, which was a WHO member, and not 
to the NLHX.47 
 RLG representatives participated in WHO meetings in Geneva and 
Manila, and regularly served as French-language rapporteurs at international 
conferences, although they were often absent from non-routine meetings and 
training opportunities. The WHO initiated a number of health development 
and capacity building projects with the Ministry of Health, including yaws and 
malaria eradication in the 1950s; maternal and child healthcare and family 
planning, rural health, and health administration in the 1960s and 1970s; and 
support to nursing education and development of the Royal Medical School. 
However, weak government structures and staff capacity posed problems for 
                                                 
43 USAID, ‘Foreign Assistance’, p.16. 
44 The Kingdom of Laos joined the WHO on 17 May 1950. See World Health Organization, 
Twenty Five Years - Western Pacific Region, (Manila: WHO, 1973), p.5. 
45 WHO, WPR/RC2, 18-21 September 1951, p.14 and p.79; and WHO, WPR/RC3, 25-30 
September 1952, p.13. 
46 WHO, 50 Years Working for Health in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 1962-2012, 
(WHO: Manila, 2013), p.ii. 
47 Despite its rhetoric of neutrality, the WHO assisted South Vietnam rather than North 
Vietnam, and Taiwan rather than the People’s Republic of China during this period. 
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WHO advisors. A health planning advisor in 1961 cited “… lack of 
organisational machinery, inadequate coordination between government 
agencies, the relative unfamiliarity of national staff with the planning process, 
lack of budgetary and material resources and, in certain instances, internal 
instability …” as limitations on health development efforts.48 
 The numbers of WHO advisors posted to Laos rose rapidly in the 
1960s and 1970s to support the increasing number of WHO development 
projects, which peaked at 22 in 1973.49 The organisation’s budget for Laos 
climbed from USD 92,000 in 1966 to USD 251,000 in 1969.50  Tellingly, 
WHO reports about its Lao program focus on planned projects and initiatives, 
but rarely report on actual achievements. A typical paragraph reads: 
 
 In Laos the government plans to extend the medical services 
throughout the country, especially in the rural areas, to intensify 
campaigns against endemo-epidemic and social diseases and to 
undertake work in the field of urban and rural sanitation. A 
considerable number of sub-professional workers will be required and 
a training area will have to be established … it is hoped to develop a 
general plan for local health service development …51[my emphasis] 
 
Reporting in this manner suggests that Ministry staff were thinly stretched and 
unable to fully realise many of the WHO’s plans. 
The Ministry of Health was assisted not only by bilateral and 
multilateral donors, but also by international NGOs that fielded technical 
specialists to work in Lao health facilities. Such specialists often brought 
additional funding raised from their respective governments or private sources. 
American Tom Dooley represents perhaps the best-known example of NGO 
                                                 
48 WHO, WPR/RC15/3, 1964, p.11. 
49 LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-024: ‘Rapport annuel … 1973’, p.11. 
50 USAID, ‘Foreign Assistance’, p.5. 
51 WHO, WPR/RC11/3, 1960, p.16. 
130 
 
assistance during this period. The Ministry also received assistance from OB, 
as well as International Voluntary Services, the Swiss Red Cross, Catholic 
Relief Services and smaller church groups. 
 Dooley worked in Laos under the aegis of a small American NGO, 
Medical International Cooperation Organization (Medico), specifically created 
for his mission. Despite being a committed Catholic, his work in Laos was 
motivated not by religion but by anti-communism, or ‘freedom’ as he termed it. 
Dooley became a household name in the US, due to his high-profile 
fundraising efforts and the books he wrote about his work in Laos and 
Vietnam.52 His example helped popularise the concept of secular but highly 
politicised aid work and may have inspired the formation of the Peace Corps. 
 Dooley and a small team of two to three male ex-navy nurses 
(corpsmen) worked in rural infirmaries and dispensaries in Vang Vieng, 
Namtha, Meuang Sing and Houayxay from 1956-60.53 They supplemented the 
meagre RLG Ministry staff, provided on-the-job training, and expanded the 
range and quality of healthcare locally available. Dooley and his team seem to 
have dominated these facilities, due to their access to funds and supplies 
beyond the reach of Ministry staff. Therefore, while Dooley talked of the need 
for sustainability rather than dependence on external technical advisors and 
funding sources to justify the short-term nature of Medico’s assistance to each 
facility, it is unclear to what extent his organisation contributed to longer-term 
sustainability. 
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of Thomas A. Dooley, 1927-1961, (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997). 
53 See Halpern, Laotian Health Problems, p.27; and Thomas A. Dooley, The Night They 




 Evidently, the US Government was not overly impressed with Dooley 
or the Dooley Foundation that replaced Medico after his premature death from 
cancer in 1961. An internal USAID minute from 1969 sums up its general 
view of the Dooley Foundation: 
 
 They have no doctor at present [in the Khong facility being discussed]. 
There is a large amount of equipment from the Foundation which is not 
or cannot be used [presumably because it was in disrepair, unable to be 
fixed in Laos, incompatible with existing equipment, or unfamiliar to 
local staff]. Dooley Foundation has been plagued with lack of funds, 
lack of doctors, lack of administrative capacity, over-extension and 
over-publicity.54 
 
RLG’s health network 
The number of medical facilities under RLG management more than 
doubled during the period 1950-75. Biomedical health facilities opened in 
areas distant from the major towns, although sources reveal little about 
staffing, supplies or the quality of healthcare services provided. The statistics 
demonstrate, however, the Ministry’s desire to expand biomedicine into rural 
Laos. In 1950 the health network consisted of six hospitals in the major towns, 
six smaller infirmeries-ambulances in smaller provincial towns such as 
Salavan and Attapeu, and 64 rural dispensaries. 55  The network began to 
expand in the 1960s. The number of main hospitals under RLG management 
remained constant, while the number of infirmeries-ambulances more than 
doubled to 14 in 1966. By 1973 some infirmaries had been upgraded to 
hospitals, taking the total number of hospitals to 16. The number of rural 
dispensaries increased at a greater rate, from 64 in 1950 to 106 in 1966 and 
                                                 
54 NARA, RG 286, Box 1: ‘USAID mission to Laos. Executive Staff meeting, Monday 
December 22, 1969’. 
55 See RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.7. 
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148 in 1973.56 Growth was not incremental, though, as dispensaries opened 
and closed as territory was gained or lost in the ongoing fighting between RLG 
and NLHX forces. Nor did growth necessarily correlate with quality of service; 
visiting a dispensary in Namtha province in the late 1950s, Dooley reported 




Type of Health Facility  19501 19661 19731 
Principal hospital 1 1 1 
Hospital  5 5 14 
Small hospital ‐ Infirmary (infirmerie‐ambulance) 6 16 8 
Health centre  ‐ ‐ 5 
Rural dispensary 64 106 148 
 
Mahosot hospital was the nation’s largest and most advanced health 
facility, even though one observer considered it only “moderately well 
equipped by western standards” in 1961.58 Luang Prabang and Pakse hospitals 
were reported in 1950 to have greater bed capacity, but as RLG development 
concentrated on Vientiane, Mahosot’s capacity rose from 52 in 1950 to 394 in 
1973.59  Moreover, in an important break with the colonial past, the RLG 
dispensed with the practice of classifying hospital beds for Europeans and 
natives (indigènes). In Vientiane, the Ministry opened specialist health centres 
                                                 
56 Ibid., insert between p.6 and p.7; LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-004: ‘Rapport statistique de 
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57 Dooley, Three Great Books, p.234. 
58 Joel M. Halpern, Laotian Health Statistics, Laos Project Paper No. 10, (Amherst: University 
of Massachusetts, 1961), p.4. 
59 See RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.18; and LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-024: 
‘Rapport annuel … 1973’, p.24. 
133 
 
for tuberculosis, ophthalmology and dermatology. Two villages outside of 
Luang Prabang and Pakse served as sites for the semi-isolation of people 
suffering from leprosy, in a continuation from the colonial period. They were 
often officially referred to as ‘leprosaria’, although no leprosarium as such was 
ever built in Laos and treatment could be fairly described as community-
based.60 
Funds to construct and/or upgrade health facilities were provided 
mainly by international donors. France funded an extension to Luang Prabang 
hospital in the 1950s and new buildings for the Royal Medical School in 
Vientiane in the late 1960s.61  For its part, the US funded a new Nursing 
School at Mahosot, the Maternal and Child Health Centre in Vientiane, five 
Maternal and Child Health wings in provincial hospitals, and the renovation of 
similar wings in an additional ten sites.62 Martin Stuart-Fox concludes that 
hospital construction was one of the success stories of USAID’s assistance to 
the RLG.63 
 
RLG health staffing, Lao and international 
 As health facilities increased, so did the number and professional 
diversity of health workers at all levels. Lao staff with high-level 
qualifications were in most demand to manage the various departments of the 
Ministry, provide technical guidance, and work with the mounting number of 
international donors. However, while management roles were allocated to 
                                                 
60 LNAD, RLG/MOH, 211-024: ‘Rapport annuel … 1973’, p.24. 
61 USAID, ‘Foreign Assistance’, p.7. 
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national staff, foreigners continued to play important roles in both training and 
healthcare provision, as sufficient Lao staff could not be produced fast enough. 
 For the most part, Lao staff were clustered in the middle and lower 
ranks of the professional hierarchy, due to the continuing low completion rates 
within the formal education sector. They were employed as assistant doctors 
(termed médecins assistants since independence rather than médecins 
indochinois) 64  and nurses, and from the mid-1960s also as assistant 
pharmacists, assistant dentists and laboratory technicians. In the meantime, 
international doctors, pharmacists and dental surgeons continued to 
supplement the few qualified Lao at the higher levels. The overall number of 
trained staff in the Ministry of Health increased more than six-fold between 
1950 and 1973, from 260 to 1,644, or 2,514 if one includes staff employed in 
the military’s medical service, and expanded to include a much wider selection 
of health-related professions.65 
The transition to a reliance on Lao doctors was slow due to the 
employment choices of medical graduates. It was reported that in 1968 two-
thirds of qualified Lao doctors remained overseas, rather than returning 
home.66 Of those who returned, many opted to join the military rather than the 
Ministry of Health, possibly attracted by the higher salaries and symptomatic 
of the pressure exacted by the long-running conflict on civilian services. An 
American report from 1971 states: “With only 36 Laotian doctors in the 
                                                 
64 Lao government documentation rarely mentions médecins indochinois after the mid-1960s, 
despite some colonial-trained doctors remaining in the workforce. Both médecins indochinois 
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66 USAID, ‘Termination Report’, p.162. 
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country [a veiled allusion to those remaining abroad], 17 are in the military 
and the remaining 19 work as administrators in the RLG government and 
supplement their income with private practices in Vientiane”.67 
With few fully qualified Lao doctors, a high attrition rate [to the 
military and overseas] and constantly increasing staffing demands, the 
Ministry of Health relied heavily on international doctors and Lao assistant 
doctors. It employed significantly more assistant doctors than fully qualified 
doctors, who were assigned roles and responsibilities similar to those of 
doctors in other countries. Provincial hospitals and outreach services typically 
made do with assistant doctors, as fully qualified doctors were rarely assigned 
outside Vientiane. USAID was highly critical of this Ministry practice.  The 
narrative of an internal USAID document from 1975 hits out at the urban 
concentration of the RLG health services: 
 For many years the cooperating country’s [Laos’] efforts and interests 
could be categorized as “passive”. The Lao health officials were 
content enough to have USAID and OB do the hard (and sometimes 
dangerous) work in the countryside while the doctor leaders focused on 
Mahosot hospital … and a few urban centers.68 
 
 Expansion also occurred in other professional categories. True to its 
French foundations, the Ministry privileged midwives over nurses. At 
independence, there was already one Lao registered midwife (sage-femme 
d’état) who had trained in France. Additional graduates returned from France 
in the 1950s and Saigon in the 1960s. From the late 1960s the Ministry 
employed auxiliary midwives with two years of Lao-based training, and from 
the early 1970s, a new auxiliary nurse/midwife was introduced to “provide 
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primary health care with emphasis on MCH and Family Planning at the 
peripheral level”.69 At the bottom of the hierarchy were rural birth attendants 
(accoucheuses rurales), who provided basic assistance in their own localities. 
Despite their privileged position, the numbers of midwives increased more 
slowly than assistant doctors or nurses because, as in the colonial period, the 
low female education rates nation-wide presented a major obstacle to entry 
into professional training programs. 
 By contrast, the nursing cadre increased significantly, as it had the 
lowest educational entry prerequisite (completion of primary school). The 
RLG’s civilian nurses increased almost four-fold, from 220 in 1950 to 801 
general nurses and 29 registered nurses in 1973.70 Two developments in the 
nursing profession are noteworthy during this period. Firstly, the upgrading of 
nursing to a profession and the introduction of auxiliary and registered nurses 
offered an element of career progression. Secondly, the proportion of female 
nurses rose steeply from 23 percent in 1950 to 70 percent in 1959, a significant 
increase possibly hastened by the number of male nurses electing to join the 
military health service.71 
 While staff numbers increased, the quality of Lao medical staff, 
notably the colonially-trained médecins indochinois, was criticised repeatedly 
in the 1950s. Médecin-Colonel Benoit, Director-General of Health for Laos in 
1951, commented that few of the médecins indochinois were of much value,72 
while Oden Meeker, from the American NGO CARE, dismissed them as 
                                                 
69 WHO, WPR/RC25/3, 1974, p.14. 
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“often little more than glorified dressers [of wounds] and compounders [of 
prescriptions]”.73 Joel Halpern alludes to a possible scandal involving senior 
staff, which may explain the strong views, when he confides: “Several Lao 
doctors trained in Indochina have been accused of embezzling funds, selling 
medicines and not bothering to give conscientious treatment to their 
patients”.74 Criticisms were also directed at the strict observance of hierarchy 
within the Ministry, presumably at the expense of service delivery.75 
 The shortage of qualified Lao health staff proved to be an ongoing 
issue for the Ministry as well as international agencies, despite the real staff 
increases during the period. For instance, WHO reported that in one of its 
projects its technical advisors “mainly performed operational duties” due to 
the “shortages of national counterpart staff”.76 Put simply, the advisors had no 
staff to advise. Situations like this were a key reason why international staff 
continued to play a major role in the health sector after independence. 
 International doctors outnumbered Lao doctors in the RLG zone for 
most of this period, as did international registered nurses. The tiny numbers of 
Lao pharmacists and dental surgeons were also supplemented with 
internationals. Ironically, there were as many French medical staff in Laos 
after independence as there were at the end of the colonial period.77 French 
military rotations, however, ensured a frequent turnover of staff, and the 
unlikelihood of a group of ‘old timers’ establishing themselves. 
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Profession  195079 196680 197381 




Pharmacist  ‐ 2 6 
Assistant pharmacist  ‐ 2 9 
Dental surgeon  ‐ 1 1 
Assistant dental surgeon  ‐ ‐ 11 
Registered midwife  1 15 23 
Auxiliary midwife 4 9 178 
Registered nurse ‐ ‐ 29 
Auxiliary nurse  ‐ 505 801 
Basic nurse  220 ‐ ‐ 
Laboratory technician  ‐ 4 1 
Assistant laboratory technician  ‐ 18 27 
Radiologist  ‐ ‐ 1 
Radiologist aide  ‐ 3 11 
Public health worker  ‐ 22 42 
Anti‐malaria technician  ‐ 65 88 
 
The high proportion of international advisors working within the 
Ministry, and the project funds accompanying them, created a delicate 
situation that at times resembled the power relations of the colonial period. By 
the 1970s, the extent of foreign involvement and particularly the high level of 
international staffing seems to have become more sensitive for the Ministry of 
                                                 
78 These figures do not include staff employed by the Royal Lao Army, Operation 
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79 RSL, Box 12: ‘Rapport annuel de 1950’, p.6. 
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Health, as staffing demographics became a regular feature of annual statistical 
reporting. From 1970, the Ministry made overt efforts to show that the number 
of Lao staff outnumbered foreigners. It boosted the proportion of Lao doctors 
by statistically combining the numbers of civilian and military doctors, and 
merging the professional classifications of doctor and assistant doctor.83 This 
sensitivity is likely to have been linked more to the control rather than receipt 
of international assistance. For example, the opportunity to claim more 
decision-making power and control of international funds may be expected to 
increase once Lao doctors, or a combination of doctors and médecins 
assistants, could be shown to outnumber international doctors. 
 Finally, a dramatic change can be observed in geographical staff 
distribution between the colonial and post-colonial periods, with a heavy 
concentration of doctors and assistant doctors congregating in Vientiane 
almost immediately after independence. For most of the colonial period 
French authorities assigned senior French doctors and Lao médecins 
indochinois, including princes, to manage provincial infirmeries-ambulances, 
even rural dispensaries, for years at a time while Vientiane had no more than 
two or three more doctors than provincial locations at any time. 
From 1950 doctors and médecins assistants appear to have been 
extremely reluctant to serve outside of Vientiane. Seven of the 11 médecins 
assistants who joined the Lao Health Service in 1950 remained in Vientiane. 
In 1966, seven doctors, four assistant doctors, and an assistant pharmacist 
were based at Mahosot, and an additional four assistant doctors were assigned 
to public health functions in Vientiane. By contrast, each province was 
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allocated one médecin indochinois and at most two médecins assistants.84 By 
1973 a staggering 87.5 percent of all Lao doctors (civilian and military) in 
government service and 61 percent of all médecins assistants were based in 
Vientiane.85 The government appears to have been unable to encourage its 
own staff to work in smaller provinces or rural locations, possibly due to the 
strong, elite social networks which operated within the Ministry. This 
compromised its ability to provide healthcare to the rural population, elicited 
criticism from USAID concerning the Ministry’s “relative indifference to the 
health problems in remote areas”, and was undoubtedly a motivating factor for 
USAID to establish a parallel network of rural health facilities.86 
 The range of professional training on offer in-country expanded 
considerably from the basic nursing and midwifery training available in the 
colonial period. Training for assistant doctors became available in 1957-1958, 
followed by courses for assistant dental surgeons, assistant pharmacists, and 
auxiliary nurses in the 1960s. Curricula for fully qualified doctors, registered 
nurses and registered midwives were introduced in 1969. However, 
professional training for fully qualified pharmacists and dental surgeons 
remained unavailable until after 1975. Moreover, places were limited. 
Therefore, many Lao students continued to study abroad. Most scholarships in 
the 1950s were provided by the RLG, the French government and the WHO. 
The recipients of RLG and French scholarships tended to study in France,87 
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whereas the majority of WHO scholarship recipients studied at the French-
language Royal School of Medicine in Phnom Penh. WHO records highlight 
that Laos was the only country in the Western Pacific Region to receive WHO 
scholarships for overseas undergraduate medical study.88 Doctors, and small 
numbers of registered midwives, pharmacists and dental surgeons studied in 
France, whereas assistant doctors and assistant dental surgeons studied in 
Cambodia. By the late 1960s three nurses had trained as instructors in Canada 
and Australia.89 
 The first generation of fully qualified Lao doctors studied in France. 
Tiao Jaisvasd Visoutthiphong was the exception, pursuing his studies in 
Thailand in the 1950s.90 The sites for overseas medical training opened up 
from the 1960s as more international donors provided scholarships. By 1966, 
Lao medical students were scattered across seven countries: France (the 
majority), Soviet Union, Thailand, Czechoslovakia, Australia, Canada and 
Japan. In addition, there were nine pharmacy students and two dental surgery 
students in France, six dental students in Phnom Penh, five midwifery students 
in Saigon, and ten nursing students in Thailand.91 This marked the beginnings 
of a diverse, patchwork health sector that was to diversify even further after 
the change of regime in 1975. However, during the RLG period, France was 
the preferred destination for high-level medical education, and French the 
predominant language of instruction. 
 Medical training commenced at the newly opened Royal School of 
Medicine in Vientiane from 1957-58, under the direction of Frenchman, Dr 
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Laigret. 92  The school received technical and financial assistance from the 
French government and WHO, which provided equipment and many of the 
teachers. In the early 1960s, France provided 12 instructors: five from its 
MAET budget and seven from the MMF budget.93  WHO faced difficulty 
recruiting suitable instructors when the medical school upgraded to the 
Medical Faculty of the Sisavangvong University in the late 1960s because 
international medical professionals were unwilling to work in Laos, just as 
they had been in the colonial period. A WHO report from 1968 lamented: 
“The only assistance which it has been possible to give throughout the past 
year was the services of a 3-week consultant in preventative and social 
medicine”.94 Other teaching positions remained vacant. 
 Initially the medical school offered only a four-year course for 
médecins assistants, due to the limited amount of budget, teachers and 
students. Classes commenced in January 1958 with seven students, who 
graduated in 1961.95 By the 1960s, the average class size settled at around 30 
students. Of note, the gender distribution in 1959 was reported to be equal.96 
Curricula for assistant dental surgeons and assistant pharmacists were added in 
1965 and 1966 respectively. 97  Courses in nursing and midwifery at the 
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Mahosot-based Nursing and Midwifery schools were upgraded in the 1960s 
with WHO assistance, as part of the Maternal and Child Healthcare and 
Nursing Education projects. The gradual introduction of various courses, 
starting at assistant-level, made sense in the low-resource context of limited 
funding, few Lao with sufficient teaching qualifications and few eligible 
students.98 
In October 1969 the first cohort of 25 students embarked on a seven-
year doctorat en médecine course at the medical school. 99  Former RLG 
Minister of Health, Khamphaï Abhay reflects that this event, the localisation 
of professional-level medical training, was among the key contributions of his 
career. Dr Som-Ock Kingsada, now a Vice Minister in the Ministry of Health, 
graduated in this first cohort and is reportedly the only member of his class 
remaining in the Lao PDR. Cohorts in subsequent years numbered 
approximately 20.100 
Prior to the opening of the Royal School of Medicine, the only health 
training institutions in Laos were the Practical Nursing School and the 
Midwifery School at Mahosot. These schools taught six-month and two-year 
courses respectively. Rural birth attendants completed six-months of on-the-
job training at a provincial hospital before returning to work in their home 
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Conference of Health from 1-12 October 1979), p.4. 
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villages.101 In-country training expanded significantly with the establishment 
of auxiliary nursing and midwifery schools in the mid-1960s in Luang 
Prabang, Savannakhet and Pakse, with assistance from WHO, which offered 
two-year courses for auxiliary nurses and auxiliary midwives. A three-year 
course for registered nurses was added to the nursing school in Vientiane in 
1969. However, the quality of the nursing school, specifically the lack of 
qualified local teaching staff, was criticised by USAID advisors.102 
Despite operating a separate health network, USAID and OB offered 
summer internships in their hospitals for medical students, and short-term 
training overseas for Ministry staff. Training opportunities in Thailand and the 
Philippines proved unpopular, however, as Ministry staff perceived training in 
France to be superior. USAID also had difficulty recruiting sufficient numbers 
of appropriately qualified training candidates. Plans for 90 chief ward nurses 
to undergo short-term training were cut short due to the “lack of suitable 
candidates”.103 
 
Major projects supporting the RLG health service 
 Many of Laos’ health developments during this period were enabled by 
internationally-funded development assistance projects, including yaws 
eradication, malaria eradication, maternal and child health, and nursing 
education. The WHO-supported yaws eradication project in three southern 
provinces began in 1953. 104  It claimed to have reached approximately 94 
                                                 
101 Anonymous, Laos. 1950, p.100. 
102 USAID,‘Termination Report’, p.162. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Yaws, or endemic treponematosis (pian in French; khi moh in Lao) is: “a chronic infection 
that affects mainly skin, bone and cartilage. It is caused by a bacterium related to the one that 
causes venereal syphilis. However, yaws is an infection transmitted mainly through skin 
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percent of the population in the project area. Project activities were 
undoubtedly successful, but WHO overstated its achievements in claiming to 
have taken “medical care to many remote areas for the first time,” when in fact 
the project was preceded by 60 years of activity by the colonial AML.105 The 
field-based project concluded in 1959, and evolved into a laboratory support 
project which continued until 1975.106 A visit by a WHO monitoring team in 
1965 noted the limitations in the Ministry of Health’s capacity for continuation 
of activities promoted by the project. Re-surveys had not been feasible since 
project end, due to the withdrawal of WHO’s project staff, and the RLG’s 
“limitation in personnel and the demands of other health problems”.107 
 A six-year regional project in malaria eradication, co-funded by WHO 
and the USOM, began in 1956 to address what continued to be cited as the 
leading health issue in Laos. 108 In 1957, malaria accounted for 73.6 percent of 
all hospitalised cases, as well as 35.4 percent of hospital deaths.109 The malaria 
project relied heavily on technical advisors from the US and Thailand. It 
facilitated the establishment of the National Service for Malaria Eradication, 
and a number of provincial field stations. Like the yaws project, it required a 
large contingent of local field technicians, and some quite possibly transferred 
from the yaws project to the malaria project.110 DDT spraying commenced in 
southern Laos in 1957 and in the north in 1959. By then, the program claimed 
to have coverage of almost half the total population. However, the Ministry 
                                                                                                                                
contact with an infected person. It is rarely encountered in Laos any more, due to the 
successful eradication program of the 1950s. See WHO, 50 Years Working, p.5. 
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was unable to sustain the activity and spraying ceased in 1961, coinciding with 
the end of American funding and increasing rural insecurity issues. 111  A 
second WHO-supported malaria project, which also included DDT spraying, 
was initiated in 1969 in pilot sites around the Nam Ngum dam construction 
site, and in refugee camps on the Vientiane Plain.112 After 1973, the project 
expanded into a National Malaria Program with the support of the PGNU, and 
some former USAID medics were retrained to join the project.113 
 The commencement of a Maternal and Child Health (MCH) project in 
1959 marked a different type of development engagement, because it required 
long-term education and behaviour change rather than the more straight-
forward vaccination or spraying campaigns. The project, which extended until 
1976 with only a short hiatus in 1970 when the project brief was refocused 
towards the promotion of family planning, aimed to develop an effective MCH 
service as an integral part of Laos’ general health program.114 The project was 
complemented with a Nursing Education project from 1962. It supported the 
establishment of a National MCH Service in 1960, followed by a National 
MCH Centre which collaborated with the maternity and pediatric wards at 
Mahosot.115 MCH centres were progressively opened at the larger provincial 
hospitals. 116  The provincial MCH centres and maternity wings were 
constructed by USAID, and supported by four auxiliary nursing and midwifery 
schools in major towns. Vaccination rounds, a high-profile activity in the 
colonial period, became less of a feature and more of a routine activity 
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integrated into a more comprehensive set of basic rural healthcare services, 
alongside MCH services. 
 WHO’s redesigned MCH project, which from 1970 became the Family 
Health and MCH project, promoted contraception. It complemented the 
USAID-supported MCH and Family Planning project with a familiar division 
of labour: USAID handled infrastructure development, while WHO provided 
staff training for the Ministry’s MCH and family planning personnel. 
However, the USAID project also supported the establishment of 13 small 
family planning clinics operated by the Lao Family Welfare Association 
(LFWA), a local NGO affiliate of the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation. 117  Contraceptive use gained popularity in areas surrounding 
Vientiane and some provincial locations in the six years it was available, 
although overall numbers were modest and statisticians found errors in the 
LPWA’s reporting of the number of users, or ‘acceptors’.118 
 The conditions in RLG hospitals were quite basic, and international 
assistance seemed to skim over the surface. Before the proliferation of 
international assistance, Halpern observed of Luang Prabang, the second 
largest hospital in Laos, that “sanitation and antiseptic practice is in most cases 
fairly minimal. Some French claim this is because they can no longer give 
orders that needles be sterilized and floors scrubbed. The Lao officials are 
considerably more casual about these matters ….”119 Several years after the 
commencement of WHO’s first projects, an American advisor working in the 
pediatric ward at Mahosot hospital during 1962-1964 recalls: 
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 The Salle de Pediatrie had no running water or reliable electricity. The 
ward was always overcrowded except occasionally when a family 
member of a patient identified a “Phi Pop” [a kind of malevolent 
spirit], and all patients would flee. It was routine to see sharp knives 
poking between crib slats to ward off bad spirits. We were always short 
of medications and medical supplies such as IV fluids. Many children 
died from measles, pertussis, diphtheria, dysentery and malaria.120 
 
 WHO also piloted a Rural Development in Public Health Project from 
1961 to 1967, in cooperation with a larger rural development project 
implemented by the UN, UNICEF, UNESCO, International Labour 
Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization and the Colombo Plan. 
Efforts were made to improve the quality of public healthcare (now more 
commonly termed primary health care) provided by rural dispensaries, and 
WHO nurses and public health advisors stationed there performed health 
education, especially home sanitation, nutrition promotion, and MCH care. 
However, the ongoing political conflict in Laos “limited project activities and 
delayed the signature of an overall agreement”. 121  Therefore, rather than 
expand into more remote areas, the project contracted into a series of peri-
urban community health centres in the area immediately surrounding 
Vientiane in the early 1970s.122 
 
The emergence of a private health sector 
 In addition to its own practice, the Ministry of Health regulated a 
private health sector, which emerged in the first decade of independence and 
grew rapidly. It comprised a range of medical clinics, dental surgeries and 
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pharmacies, heavily concentrated in Vientiane. Interestingly, the Ministry’s 
sphere of regulation appears to have expanded to traditional medicine 
consultations and treatments, judging by the nature of approvals issued. 
The Journal Officiel du Royaume du Laos, the government’s official 
gazette, listed approvals to operate private medical clinics, pharmacies and 
dental clinics in the 1950s. Doctors, assistant doctors, and dentists, applied to 
open clinics and/or to treat patients privately, while nurses and merchants 
applied to open pharmacies. Some pharmacy applicants also requested 
permission to produce medicines. Medicines were classified as French, Lao, 
Chinese, Siamese, and Sino-Annamite.123 
 In 1957-1958, the journal lists the approval of 11 licences for private 
medical clinics and another 40 for dental clinics and pharmacies mainly in 
Vientiane, but also in provincial capitals. 124 Four years later, Khamsone 
Sassady reported a total of 14 private medical practitioners, of whom ten were 
Lao, three French, and one Vietnamese.125 By 1973, numbers had risen to 106 
private practitioners nation-wide, 87 percent of whom were located in 
Vientiane.126 Chinese were strongly represented in dental and pharmaceutical 
businesses.127 In a break from the colonial past, there appears to have been no 
requirement to serve in the government health services for a minimum length 
of time before applying for a licence to operate privately, as two médecins 
assistants applied for licences in 1958 while still Ministry interns.128 
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Lao and foreign commentators alike considered that the private sector 
placed pressure on the existing health service; the relationship between the two 
was effectively a zero-sum game. Khamsone Sassady observed in the early 
1960s that the Lao director of studies at the Royal School of Medicine was 
juggling his responsibilities between the school, the main hospital and his 
private practice. 129  Several years later, USAID officials commented in 
seeming frustration that most Lao doctors “devoted 80% or more of their time 
to private practice.”130 NLHX and later Lao PDR propaganda accused private 
doctors of “exploiting the population” by charging for services, though fees 
were not necessarily exorbitant.131 In a country with few doctors, and a large 
proportion of poor people who could not afford private medicine, this situation 
posed an awkward problem. 
 
The USAID-Operation Brotherhood (OB) health service 
 USAID, the international development agency of the US government, 
created a health service that functioned in parallel to the RLG’s service. It 
came about due to the US’ consideration of the “failings of the RLG in every 
field – economic, political and military,” which prompted its direct 
intervention. 132  Funded by USAID’s Public Health Division, this health 
service comprised facilities operated by the Filipino NGO Operation 
Brotherhood (OB), and others operated by USAID itself. It was managed by 
USAID’s Chief of Public Health Division under the Village Health Program 
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(VHP).133 The program almost matched the Ministry of Health in terms of the 
numbers of health facilities, Lao staff, and patients. However, it was based on 
American-style healthcare, used English rather than French as its working 
language, trained and employed local staff with at times minimal formal 
education, and strived to provide services in the more remote and ethnic 
minority-populated areas, which were of strategic significance to the US. 
As the war developed, VHP activities shifted from a focus on the 
health of military and para-military combatants to the large refugee 
populations caused by relentless bombing and land battles. This chapter does 
not address the American financial and technical assistance to military health 
facilities such as Sisavangvong Hospital (now known as Hospital 103), as 
many relevant sources remain classified. It is also unclear to what extent the 
military and civilian health services intersected.134 
The VHP consisted of two components: the OB project, which 
supported a rural hospital network run by OB under contract to USAID, and a 
network of rural dispensaries and some hospitals established and directly 
operated by USAID. The Maternal and Child Health and Family Planning 
Project was added to the USAID Division of Public Health portfolio in 1969, 
and a Narcotics Detoxification Project in 1971. 135  The MCH project, 
mentioned earlier, promoted the use of contraception and funded 
improvements in MCH infrastructure in both OB and RLG health facilities. 
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The USAID-OB health service began to take shape in the late 1950s. It 
was formalised in 1963 when USAID redesigned its program of development 
assistance to Laos. Assistance ended abruptly in June 1975, a month after anti-
American elements within the PGNU ordered USAID to depart. Looking 
back, USAID’s ‘Termination Report for Laos’ explained the initial rationale 
for establishing the VHP as providing immediate medical assistance to areas 
disrupted by war, compounded by: 
… the inability of the RLG through its rudimentary civilian health 
services to provide medical care and health support to areas disrupted 
by the insurgency; the near complete lack of an effective field military 
medical organization … and the … Geneva Accords which precluded 
U.S. military assistance to the health field.136 
 
A 1955 field trip by USOM officials based in Vientiane had confirmed 
the almost non-existent reach of RLG services into the countryside. A cable to 
Washington stated: 
 
Most popular items were the medical supplies, and it was obvious that 
the people had not received any (rpt. Any) for years. This first aid 
station at Vang Vieng … had only fifty diarrhea pills in its entire stock. 
This is particularly shocking in view of the large stocks of medical 
supplies in Vientiane.137 
 
 USAID’s VHP was funded entirely by the US government, although it 
likely had multiple government funding agencies. What attracted attention, 
and in some instances criticism, was the difficulty in identifying these 
agencies. As Castle’s study has shown, it was not uncommon for USAID 
projects in Laos to be co-funded by the Department of Defense and/or the 
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CIA. 138  A 1971 USAID document specifically mentioned that “DOD-
[Department of Defense] financed medical care for Lao civilians on behalf of 
USAID.”139 Moreover, during the 1971-72 enquiry of the US Government 
Accounting Office (GAO), it was disclosed that the OB contract was partly 
funded by the CIA: “The costs of the Operation Brotherhood Project since its 
inception in 1963 have been borne by USAID/Laos. Starting in fiscal year 
1972 the CIA is sharing these costs based on a predetermined formula”.140 
Castle cites high-ranking USAID officials describing USAID’s operations in 
Laos as “unprecedented” and “unique”. 141  While the cost-sharing 
arrangements investigated by the GAO focused on the political processes 
behind the provision of medical assistance, there is no evidence that partial 
funding of the OB contract by the CIA or Defense distorted in any way the 
quality of medical care provided. 
 OB worked in Laos from 1957-1975; from 1963 it was an integral part 
of USAID’s Public Health Program. Under the banner of ‘Asians helping 
Asians’, it transferred from the refugee camps of South Vietnam to Laos in 
1957, where its focus evolved from emergency relief to longer-term healthcare 
training, service provision, and community development.142 Its medical and 
community development teams made a significant impression on the local 
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population, and the term moh filipin (Filipino doctor) was almost a tautology 
in 1960s’ Laos.143 
 OB operated multiple health facilities in rural Laos. Initially, its teams 
worked from RLG dispensaries and small hospitals (infirmeries), as Dooley 
had also done, in locations that had experienced some level of healthcare 
during the colonial period. These sites (termed ‘stations’ by OB) tended to be 
in smaller provincial towns or army garrisons, with which OB coordinated 
closely. In the early 1960s, OB began to build and operate its own facilities, 
such as its hospital in Vientiane, known since the early 1970s as Setthathirath 
Hospital, which served as a teaching and referral hospital for the USAID-OB 
health service. Altogether, OB established a long-term presence in seven 
locations, and made shorter-term contributions in another 12 locations. 144 
Additionally, OB teams supervised and supported rural dispensaries in the 
areas surrounding its hospitals. 
 From 1967, USAID instructed OB to begin a phased transfer of 
administrative and financial responsibility for its facilities to the Ministry of 
Health. The transfer proved problematic due to the RLG’s insufficient funds 
and staffing levels. The GAO team visiting in 1971 observed: “The 
administrative function of the hospitals was transferred to the RLG, on paper, 
in 1967, however the Filipino personnel actually operate the hospitals”.145 The 
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 USAID’s health facilities were based in remote rural locations chosen 
for their strategic importance in the escalating conflict. Often, these sites had 
had no previous biomedical healthcare service provided by either the AML or 
the RLG. Many of the USAID facilities were accessible only by air or on foot, 
given the poor state of road transport and the ongoing fighting, which added 
considerably to the cost of replenishing supplies and supporting services. 
USAID operated fewer hospital-level facilities than OB, but considerably 
more dispensaries. The number of USAID dispensaries varied from month to 
month, as many of them were located in contested areas and were thus liable 
to be closed if the area passed out of RLG control. USAID reports indicate that 
it operated approximately 150 dispensaries in 1964, considerably more than 
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the 106 operated by the Ministry of Health in 1966, and 250 in 1972 compared 
to the RLG’s 148 in 1973.147 However, as the number of RLG dispensaries 
slowly rose, those of USAID gradually reduced from 1972. Some were 
captured by the NLHX, some were handed over to the RLG, and some closed 
because the Ministry was unable to support them.148 
 USAID directly ran its own hospitals under the VHP. In 1964 the 
agency reported that it operated nine “bamboo hospitals”, although they may 
have been glorified dispensaries.149 Larger USAID hospitals were established 
at several of the remote Lima Sites (LS), small landing strips which allowed 
for the air transport of people, equipment and supplies to remote locations for 
military and civilian purposes. The Sam Thong (LS20) hospital, established in 
1963, treated large numbers of Hmong and other ethnic minority groups near 
the fighting, and served as a medical training centre. At the time it was 
captured by NLHX forces in March 1970 it had 250 beds, and x-ray, 
laboratory and surgical capacity, placing it on a par with Mahosot in patient 
capacity if not in staffing terms. After its capture, staff and patients were 
transferred to the newly-built hospital at Ban Xone (LS 272). Additional 
USAID hospitals functioned for a time in northern Laos.150 
 The USAID and OB facilities worked hand in hand as an integrated 
network. USAID dispensaries referred patients to OB’s rural hospitals, which 
transferred serious cases to its main Vientiane facility or the military hospital 
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there. OB medical and nursing staff filled gaps in USAID facilities, and 
provided medical training for their Lao staff.151 
 OB began work in Laos with all-Filipino teams, and gradually added 
Lao staff to its payroll, initially because its own staff could not speak Lao or 
French. The Filipino staff consisted of doctors, surgeons, dentists, nurses and 
health administrators, as well as community development teams of social 
workers, nutritionists and agricultural extension workers. OB’s Filipino staff 
numbered 44 at the close of its first year of operations in Laos, and had almost 
tripled to 129 in 1974. 152  USAID advised OB in 1969 of the RLG’s 
requirement to phase-out and transfer its Lao staff to the Ministry of Health, 
but few were willing to transfer: Lao staff still numbered 550 in 1974.153 One 
informant explained that the reluctance to transfer stemmed from OB’s 
American-financed salaries which were substantially higher than government 
rates.154 
 USAID’s staffing structure appears to have been similar to OB, with a 
small core of international staff surrounded by a much larger pool of Lao 
trained by the two organisations. References to American doctors and nurses 
assisting the Lao teams at rural USAID facilities appear from the early 
1960s.155 In 1967, USAID’s health staff numbered 12 internationals and 420 
Lao, including one doctor, 67 nurses, 304 medics, and 48 non-medical 
                                                 
151 Ms Bounthanh Oudom, retired OB and Lao PDR nurse, interviewed in Vientiane, 3 
February 2012. 
152 See Bernad, Filipinos in Laos, p.5; and USAID, ‘Project Appraisal Report for National 
Health Development Project – Operation Brotherhood’, FY74, p.3. 
153 USAID, ‘Termination Report’, p.163. 
154 Ms Syphanom Viravong, former OB nurse, interviewed in Sydney, Australia, 25 July 2012. 
155 Dr Joe Westermeyer, former USAID doctor, interviewed by email, 13 June 2013. 
158 
 
personnel.156 By 1973, only USAID’s Public Works program employed more 
Lao than its Public Health program, which had approximately 650 Lao on its 
payroll in addition to OB’s 550.157 As such, the Lao staff employed by the 
USAID-OB network comprised nearly one half of the RLG zone’s total 
civilian health workforce. 
 The USAID-OB health service trained and categorised its Lao staff 
according to an American-style system. OB conducted training programs for 
its own nurses and nursing aides in Vientiane from 1959. At least 148 practical 
nurses were trained from 1961-69. At the time its training program began, OB 
produced the most highly qualified nurses in Laos.158 However, from 1969 the 
Ministry of Health with WHO support, offered superior education with the 
introduction of its three-year courses for registered nurses. From then on, OB 
ceased nurse training as its own hospital network was sleighted for integration 
into the RLG health service, and the Ministry was able to train nurses itself. 
OB continued, however, to offer on-the-job training for nursing aides and 
other health personnel. 
 USAID employed more medics than practical nurses. In USAID terms, 
‘medics’ were men with minimal education who performed simple tasks at 
rural dispensaries, while the majority but certainly not all of ‘practical nurses’ 
were female.159 Many ethnic minority medics, who did not meet the minimum 
educational level required under either the RLG or the OB services, trained at 
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the Sam Thong hospital.160 It is unclear to what degree OB assisted in training 
these USAID staff, but a 1975 report states that OB had “participated very 
effectively” in the training of almost 2,000 health workers to date, exceeding 
the number of practical nurses and nursing aides trained for its own 
facilities.161 
 Training activities under the VHP appear to have declined as plans to 
handover operations to the RLG gradually progressed. When US officials 
visited Laos in 1971 to gather information for the GAO report, they found 
very few obvious training activities taking place.162 The program’s phase-out 
plan was hampered not only by the reluctance of Lao staff to transfer to the 
RLG’s lower wages, but also by the lack of compatibility of staff training and 
skills. Their professional classifications of ‘practical nurse’, ‘nursing aide’ and 
‘medic’ did not accord with French-style classifications used by the Ministry, 
and furthermore, their technical training had emphasised use of English 
terminology over French.163 
 The main focus of the USAID-OB health network was curative 
medicine, although some aspects of public health were also addressed. 
Vaccinations were provided, as were MCH services, and from the early 1970s, 
family planning services. The Senate committee report of 1970 found that “A 
significant portion of USAID-funded medical supplies provided under the 
Village Health Program is made available to military combatants, paramilitary 
forces and their dependents, and other groups”, but USAID emphasised the 
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opposite.164 The devil is in the detail, because while the Senate committee 
referred to supplies, USAID specified consultations. Moreover, many non-
combatants could have also been classified as dependents of combatants, or 
within the vague classification of ‘other groups’. Such comments suggest the 
deliberate, although at times perhaps unintentional, obscuring of the situation. 
It is also interesting to consider why the USAID-OB network regularly 
claimed a larger share of patients than the Ministry of Health. For example, the 
GAO reports that in 1970 OB treated 20,831 in-patients at its seven hospitals 
and a further 26,887 in 1971.165 For the same years, the Ministry reported 
17,897 and 27,452 hospitalisations respectively. However, its figures purport 
to contain those of the OB hospitals, which were now at least on paper 
integrated into the RLG’s Ministry of Health.166 Such discrepancies suggest 
problems with statistics, but also hint at the lack of correspondence between 
the two health networks. 
 The US Senate enquiries of the early 1970s drew attention to USAID’s 
refugee relief and health programs and hastened the unraveling of the USAID-
OB health network. In retrospect, USAID officials confirmed in 1976 that 
their approach had not focused on development of a health service, but on 
more immediate political objectives: “From the inception … the [US] Mission 
was concerned about the severe lack of trained health personnel particularly at 
the professional and middle levels, but the urgent need for immediate medical 
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services caused by the expanding insurgency, had to receive priority 
attention”.167 The report continues: 
 
The Health Development Project despite its name was not a 
development project in the sense of building a lasting institutional base 
for a long-term health delivery system. It was created and expanded as 
an expediency in response to humanitarian military and political needs. 
In terms of providing acute medical care for insurgent and refugee 
areas, it was highly successful.168 
 
The GAO questioned the network’s focus and funding. Its 1971 report 
observed: “The statement of goals of the VHP are so vaguely worded making 
it practically impossible to show progress or the lack of progress”. Moreover, 
“Documentation of management decisions is virtually non-existent” and 
evaluation of USAID’s health activities impossible. 
 
 Public Health Division officials evaluate their program by citing the 
general absence of known catastrophies [sic] such as epidemics, large 
numbers of deaths in a particular area, or complaints from the Laotian 
people themselves. Because of the general lack of documentation, we 
cannot dispute the quality of medical care being provided the Laotians 
based on these criteria; neither, however, can we say that this care is 
being provided in the most efficient and effective manner possible ...169 
 
The GAO report also expressed the opinion that neither USAID nor the 
RLG could afford the “luxury” of an expedient medical program like the VHP. 
It recommended a shift in focus to more long-term training of personnel and 
institutional development. 170  The recommendations were not implemented. 
Later, after USAID withdrew from Laos it acknowledged the Ministry’s 
difficulties in attempting to integrate the large numbers of USAID-OB staff, 
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which may have been addressed if the US had been more mindful of 
institutional needs when designing its program of assistance: 
 
This total body of some 1,200 health workers …had been trained under 
a system which did not comply with [RLG] standardised qualifications 
... Many of the workers … were recruited from young people in the 
areas where they served. Many were from the tribal minorities and 
most had less than the required amount of preliminary education. The 
technical training and categories of health workers designed in 
response to the … war did not correlate with [Ministry] patterns.171 
 
Ultimately, the integration of USAID and OB staff and facilities into 
the RLG health service fell to the PGNU after the 1973 ceasefire, and was 
continued by the Ministry of Health post-1975. 
 
The NLHX’s Central Health Committee (Khana Sathalanasouk Sounkang) 
 The third health service to operate within Laos during the post-colonial 
period belonged to the NLHX. The Central Health Committee (CHC), or 
Khana Sathalanasouk Sounkang, split from the NLHX’s military medical 
service in the mid-1960s, and proceeded to establish civilian health 
committees at all levels of the NLHX administration. Compared to the RLG, 
the NLHX operated on a much lower budget, in remote, mountainous regions 
with lower population density, greater ethnic diversity, and even lower 
education levels. Moreover, it was located within a zone of escalating wartime 
conflict, in which the resistance leadership and rural communities were 
obliged to relocate regularly in order to escape aerial bombing and/or land 
battles. 
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 Despite unfavourable conditions, the NLHX managed to establish a 
basic health service with the assistance of friendly socialist donors, notably the 
DRV.172 It included a modest network of health facilities and village-based 
first aid, medical training schools and some elements of primary health care 
outreach. A large component was consumed with healthcare for Party cadres 
and combatants. Frequently it is difficult to distinguish in archival sources 
between the military and civilian health services in the Liberated Zone, 
suggesting that the distinction was neither clear nor consistent.173 
 The NLHX’s 1956 program of action contained a clear but very broad 
reference to health and social welfare: “to develop medical services to protect 
the health of the population and organise social assistance to support people at 
risk of famine, especially the infirm”.174 Key policies from 1967-68 onward 
were reported to include training of health staff, production and distribution of 
pharmaceuticals, rehabilitation of traditional medicine, control of contagious 
diseases, and promotion of mother and child health.175 From the early 1970s, 
the CHC reported statistics that seemed intent on proving its parity with the 
RLG’s Ministry of Health, reminiscent of Cuba’s competitive health policy 
vis-à-vis that of the US. 176  This sheds light on the political strategy and 
possibly the health ambitions of the NLHX administration. 
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 The NLHX health service divided into military and civilian services in 
the mid-1960s.177 Prior to the split, the military service provided healthcare to 
both combatants and civilians. After the split, the CHC was responsible for 
civilian healthcare, whereas the military service remained responsible for 
battlefield medics and rear-area military hospitals. The split coincided roughly 
with the move of NLHX leadership from Xieng Khouang to the cave complex 
of Viengxay after the disintegration of the second coalition government in 
1962, the formalisation of the NLHX administrative and technical services 
with DRV assistance, and the commencement of America’s air war in 1964. 
 The CHC was re-organised in 1970 with the assistance of Vietnamese 
advisors. At the time the Committee comprised four members: the Director, 
Apheuy Keobounheuang, a Deputy, the French-educated Dr Khamlieng 
Pholsena, and two committee members, Ke Panmalaythong and Somlith. 
Meeting minutes explain that the committee members with political 
responsibilities, Apheuy and Ke, were answerable to the Party Politburo, 
whereas those with technical responsibilities, Khamlieng and Somlith, were 
answerable to the general population to whom they provided healthcare 
services.178 
 The organisational structure called for health committees to be formed 
at each level of the administration, down to the village level. Health 
committees were also to be formed within workplaces, in accordance with the 
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socialist model where one’s workplace or work unit took care of all livelihood 
matters. A special department responsible for leaders’ health was formed, and 
staffed by Vietnamese doctors. Although the documentation does not provide 
details, this is almost certain to have been a military rather than civilian 
undertaking.179 
No budget details of the NLHX health service or its international 
donors are available. However, it likely had very low operating costs, as 
staffing and pharmaceutical expenses were kept to a minimum. NLHX cadres 
and soldiers received no salaries, although the administration had 
responsibility to meet the basic food, clothing and accommodation needs of its 
staff. In addition, the CHC emphasised the local production of basic 
pharmaceuticals, and promoted a revival of traditional medicines to 
supplement donated medications. Such practices also demonstrated 
compliance with the Party’s self-sufficiency policy. 
 NLHX health activities can be presumed to have relied heavily on 
assistance from fraternal nations. The DRV was the main donor to the 
NLHX’s health services, both military and civilian. Most international support 
is likely to have been received in-kind, in the form of technical advisors, 
scholarships construction materials, medical equipment and supplies, 
pharmaceuticals and fuel. It is reasonable to assume that the amount of 
assistance received by the NLHX was significantly less than that received by 
the RLG. A handwritten note in the Lao National Archives lists thousands of 
kilograms of pharmaceuticals received from the DRV, China, and several East 
                                                 
179 Nguyen Tien Dinh ‘Ten Years of Providing Healthcare for Leaders of the Lao Patriotic 
Front in the Anti-American Resistance (1966-1975)’, in History of Vietnam-Laos, Laos-




European countries in 1968-70.180 Cuba provided assistance in the final years 
preceding the establishment of the Lao PDR, when it sent a medical brigade to 
work in Viengxay.  
 
The NLHX health network and staffing 
 The CHC developed a formula for the distribution and size of health 
facilities. Ideally, each province was to have a 30-50 bed hospital, each district 
a 15-20 bed hospital, and each sub-district (tasseng) a small health facility of 
five to seven beds.181 By 1975, the NLHX claimed that the number of health 
facilities under its control rivalled that of the RLG, an impressive achievement 
given its limited resources, but it is not possible to determine the level of 
quality or the actual services provided. In one instance, a former NLHX health 
worker refers to a hospital (hong moh) consisting of only two beds, signalling 




Type of Health Facility  1970183 1973184 1975185 
Central hospital  ‐ 2 20 
Provincial hospital ‐ 16
District hospital (small hospital)  ‐ 81 69 + 7 
Tasseng hospital (paxasouk)  61 114 85 
Village drug kit  2,202 ‐ 3,064 
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 CHC reports cite rapidly rising numbers of health facilities throughout 
the Liberated Zone, although reported numbers differ and often make no 
distinction in terms of size or function. A report from 1970 lists 13 hospitals in 
1967, 51 in 1968 and 81 in 1969.186 In some provinces like Attapeu, the 
military and civilian hospitals were co-located, while in others they were 
separate.187  In an interesting departure from the RLG and OB services, a 
number of villages in the Liberated Zone received drug kits comprising basic 
medicines to compensate for the absence of a nearby health facility. 
 Before the CHC’s formation, the NLHX’s health network was a 
patchwork of facilities inherited from the colonial health service, those 
established by the NLHX itself or with DRV assistance, those captured from 
USAID, OB or the RLG, and those built by villagers. The regroupment area 
assigned to the Pathet Lao188 by the Geneva conference of 1954 contained two 
colonial infirmeries-ambulances and six rural dispensaries in Xam Neua and 
Phongsaly, although it is not known how many of these facilities continued to 
function after their handover to the Lao government in 1950.189 
 The NLHX constructed hospitals, dispensaries, small pharmaceutical 
factories and medical schools in areas under its control. The DRV forces also 
constructed facilities within Lao territory, which they operated themselves; 
these provided medical care for Vietnamese troops and civilian advisors, as 
well as training for Lao health staff and treatment of the local population. The 
Central Hospital in Xam Neua was staffed with DRV advisors and trainers as 
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early as 1954.190 In Xieng Khouang, a hospital operated by the DRV Red 
Cross was handed over to the coalition government in 1962.191 In addition, 
there was a complex network of small NLHX military hospitals.192  Three 
Vietnamese and two Lao “rudimentary” hospitals in Namtha were reported by 
a Vietnamese defector in 1966-1967, and another mentions a hospital and 
training school in Oudomxay.193 In southern Laos, sources mention a large 
hospital staffed by 30 (North) Vietnamese personnel at Houay A-lay and a 
joint Pathet Lao-DRV hospital in Houay Ta-Ngao operating near the 
Cambodian border in 1964,194 as well as a hospital and training school in 
Phine district and Hospital 48 in Nong district of Savannakhet, on the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail.195 
The status of NLHX health facilities, and the reliance on Vietnamese 
assistance for both construction and operation, becomes clearer after the 
CHC’s formation. Acknowledging Vietnamese assistance in numerous rural 
locations, a 1971 report complained that “some Vietnamese advisors do not 
have sufficient confidence in the abilities of their Lao counterparts, making 
plans and implementing health initiatives without consultation”.196 
A retired Lao surgeon who worked in the NLHX’s Liberated Zone 
recalls three types of hospital operating in the Viengxay area during the 1960s 
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and 1970s: for Party leaders, the military, and civilians.197 In 1969 an official 
order (Kham sang) advised that construction of the temporary Central Hospital 
(Hongmoh sounkang) was complete; patients would be accepted for midwifery, 
ear/nose/throat, internal medicine, pediatrics, laboratory and traditional 
medicine services. Patients were to bring with them medical referral papers, 
blankets, mosquito nets, clothing, a bowl and spoon, and 15 days of food 
rations. 198  The 50-bed hospital, also known as Hang Long hospital, was 
located in a cave for protection from American bombing. It was replaced in 
1972 by the Lao-Vietnam Friendship hospital, a 100-bed facility also known 
as Xieng Louang hospital, which had been carved from the rock walls of a 
large cave. Wards had doors at either end, but no windows.199 Dr Ponemek 
Daraloy, a medical graduate from Montpellier University, served as hospital 
director until the change of regime in 1975. 
 As the war progressed, the NLHX gained territory including RLG and 
OB health facilities. However, it is not known to what extent the CHC was 
able to staff and supply these newly acquired facilities beyond appropriating 
abandoned pharmaceuticals and basic medical equipment and supplies. 
The NLHX health service had its own categories of health workers. 
Professional classifications were reduced to a simplified three-level hierarchy 
of high, mid or low-level health workers (phet xanh soung, kang, tonh), often 
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with little reference to their specialisation. On occasion, some distinction was 
made between medical workers, pharmacists, midwives and traditional 
medicine practitioners, but little else. 
The number of health staff working in the Liberated Zone before the 
mid-1960s is unknown, but from the late 1960s NLHX statistics challenge the 
assumption that the RLG employed more staff (see Figure 4.4). In 1970 the 
CHC gave a breakdown of its staffing by profession and by region, but there 
was wide divergence in the figures. A total 2,093 staff were reported by 
profession, 53 of whom were responsible for politics (kane meuang), but only 
999 when calculated by region.200 It is not possible to guess which figures are 
more correct. 
Sources suggest that health staff were recruited and trained by the 
NLHX as early as 1954.201 As the war progressed, small numbers of RLG 
medical staff and graduating medical students also joined the NLHX; some of 
the latter were returning from France or the Soviet Union from scholarships 
made available to the RLG. The NLHX also recruited rural teenagers into the 
revolutionary movement from their villages.202 
Despite significant social, cultural and economic differences in the 
areas under their administration, the CHC’s professional distribution of staff 
looks very similar to that of the RLG’s Ministry of Health. In 1970 there were 
18 high-level doctors (similar to RLG’s docteurs en médecine) and one high-
level pharmacist employed by the NLHX, 117 mid-level doctors (similar to 
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médecins assistants, although their training appears to have been one year 
shorter) and a much larger group of 1,297 low-level health workers, who had 
similar (but not identical) training to the RLG’s base-level nurses.203 As in the 
RLG zone, the number of high and mid-level doctors shot up in the final years 
preceding the establishment of the Lao PDR. 
Due to the limited number of Lao doctors for most of this period, the 
NLHX relied upon international doctors like the RLG. Many of the clinical 
doctors and medical teachers were Vietnamese, some recruited from among 
sympathetic immigrants in Thailand and Laos, and others from the DRV.204 
By 1971 there were Vietnamese advisors in almost every CHC department.205 
This situation confirms that OB’s Filipinos were certainly not the only ‘Asians 
helping Asians’ in the Lao health sector. One account states that from 1954 
until 1957, the Vietnamese sent medical specialists to work in the NLHX 
regrouping area of Xam Neua, and that they later also sent surgical specialists 
– although he does not specify when.206 In later years, a team of Cuban doctors 
was posted to Viengxay, communicating with Lao and Vietnamese colleagues 
in French.207 
Like its rivals, the NLHX had localised lower level medical training to 
supply its health services. The schools taught rural teenagers with low 
education levels, and relied upon Vietnamese teachers who improvised with 
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teaching materials and learning styles. Bui Van Y, a medical instructor 
working in a small team of three in Attapeu, recounts a class he taught: 
 
… we carried rice from the village for food, wrote lesson plans and 
delivered lessons by ourselves. If visual aids were not available, we 
hunted forest animals and brought them to class. For example, for 
lessons on anatomy, physiology, we hunted animals and conducted 
surgery to explain from the skeleton, skin and flesh to organs. After 
having finished the lesson, these animals would be used as food.208 
 
He notes that because some students were barely literate, the classes had a 
strong focus on practical skills rather than theory: “When there were 
epidemics of malaria, diarrhea [sic], measles, the whole class visited villages 
to eliminate them and conduct real-life training at the same time. Taking notes 
was unnecessary”.209 
Several sources note that medical training began with political training. 
One NLHX health worker spoke of 18 months training at a medical school in 
Dak Cheung (now in Xekong) in a class of 30 Lao students and 30 young 
Vietnamese women taught by two Vietnamese women. Before beginning the 
training, all students studied social and political theory. He says they had to be 
willing to help other people, not be disgusted by injured patients, and work 
together and love the Vietnamese “as their siblings” (pen louk pho dio mae dio 
kan).210 The mix of family and politics arises again in one nurse’s memoirs; 
her medical training began with a question and answer: “Who are the patients? 
They are your brothers, sisters, fellow-Lao people. The state is your parents. 
We all live under the same roof”.211 
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Provinces were responsible for the training of their own low-level staff. 
The Centre (Sounkang) was responsible for training mid-level health workers, 
and high-level health workers were sent for training in the DRV.212 By 1970 
there were a reported 12 low-level medical schools and three mid-level 
schools in Viengxay, Oudomxay and Savannakhet. Most available information 
relates to the Viengxay school. A mid-level military medical school also 
operated nearby at Na Vit, staffed by Lao graduates of a DRV medical 
school. 213  The civilian, mid-level school in Viengxay provided three-year 
courses to nine cohorts of students, four cohorts of which graduated, with class 
sizes of 18 to 43. In addition, the mid-level school in Savannakhet produced at 
least 36 graduates.214 In 1970, 142 NLHX students were studying overseas 
(presumably in the DRV): 26 studying high-level medicine, 11 studying high-
level pharmacology and another 105 studying mid-level medicine.215 
An additional category of health workers swelling the NLHX ranks 
were low-level public health workers, including village-level nurses, ‘hygiene 
fighters’ (nakhop anamay), and mobile and village-based environmental health 
workers.216 The training provided young people with new knowledge, and new 
roles in their community. One young village woman recounts her experience 
as a village-level nurse in Xieng Khouang in the mid-1960s: 
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After six months, we were capable of preventing diseases and treating 
other typical illnesses. We then went out to practise what we had 
learned, dividing ourselves up among various villages. They told us to 
eat and live together with the people. Our duty was to take care of the 
ill and act in such a way that people would believe and support the Neo 
Lao [Lao Front] … we didn’t take payments for our medical 
treatments.217 
 
Healthcare services in the NLHX’s Liberated Zone 
The CHC provided clinical healthcare, as well as promoting 
pharmaceutical production, the use of traditional medicine, and preventative 
and environmental health. What stands out in the NLHX statistics is the high 
proportion of cadres receiving medical care, compared to other civilians. For 
example, in 1973 the CHC reported that one third of patients (285 of 1,064) 
treated in its health facilities were cadres.218 
The focus on pharmaceutical production and the use of traditional 
medicine was motivated by necessity, to keep costs as low as possible, and to 
avoid the difficulty of delivering pharmaceuticals to remote and potentially 
insecure areas. Pharmaceutical production also accorded with the NLHX’s 
policy of scientific development, while bringing traditional medicine 
practitioners into the official health sector swelled the numbers of health 
workers in the Liberated Zone. 
The training and employment of public health workers demonstrated 
the NLHX’s policy commitment to preventative and environmental health. 
The ‘Three Cleans’ (sam sa-at) campaign, of eating, drinking and living 
hygienically, was first practised at village level by health workers.219 When 
                                                 
217 Former NLHX nurse, quoted in Branfman, Voices from the Plain of Jars. p.51. 
218 LNAD, NLHX/CHC, 23-05: ‘Lay-ngane saloup … 6 deuane ton pii 1973’, p.11. 
219 The Lao PDR’s Ministry of Health continues in 2015 to implement the ‘Three Cleans’ 
campaign throughout the country with mixed success. 
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internal refugees began returning home after the ceasefire in 1973, the CHC 
instructed that they be encouraged to rebuild their villages in accordance with 
hygienic principles, by digging wells and locating latrines, rubbish pits and 
animal pens away from houses. An official report from 1974 paints a rosy 
picture of villages re-established in perfect accordance with hygienic 
principles – in contrast to the actual situations encountered by environmental 
health teams in the following decade.220 
In summary, the NLHX managed to create a network of health 
facilities across many provinces, establish low and mid-level medical training 
schools, and employ a cadre of health staff that worked cooperatively with 
DRV technical advisors. The ceasefire of 1973 and the formation of the PGNU 
marked the final chapter for the CHC before it assumed responsibility for the 
health of the entire nation. 
 
Uniting Laos’ divided health sector 
 The political situation leading up to the eventual announcement of the 
establishment of the Lao PDR in December 1975 was fluid. The 1973 
ceasefire was followed by the formation of the third coalition government, the 
PGNU, on 5 April 1974. The Ministry of Health was upgraded to a full 
ministry, with its own Minister, rather than a Secretary of State within a multi-
function ministry. The RLG’s Secretary of State for Health, Khamphaï Abhay, 
assumed the role. His Vice-Minister was Khamlieng Pholsena, Deputy Head 
of the NLHX’s CHC, in an arrangement stipulated by the ceasefire which 
                                                 
220 LNAD, NLHX/CHC, 23-05: ‘Saloup saphap sathalanasouk 1974’, p.2. 
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paired one RLG official with one NLHX deputy, or vice-versa, in each of the 
new government’s 12 ministries. 
 There is scant documentation about the internal changes to the health 
sector brought about by the coalition government. One must therefore turn to 
records of USAID’s Public Health Division and WHO. Behind the PGNU’s 
public presentation of unity, pro-NLHX staff within the Ministry of Health 
lobbied for the adoption of socialist-style policies. The provision of free 
healthcare for Ministry staff was one such example, documented in meeting 
minutes from 1974.221 In another example, NLHX health workers who had 
entered the major towns and were working alongside RLG staff were advised 
in 1975 that RLG hospitals were places where “the enemy has large amounts 
of modern scientific equipment. There are things that we do not yet know how 
to use. If we can remember how it is used, and take good care of it, it will be 
convenient for our future work in the health sector”.222 
An internal document from July 1975 reveals that the CHC was 
planning to assume responsibility for the entire health sector, in the context of 
the NLHX’s nationwide seizure of power, which was gradually gaining 
momentum over the course of the year. NLHX health teams had been 
despatched to Luang Prabang, Savannakhet, Pakse and Vientiane provinces to 
generate support for the NLHX movement among health workers and in the 
community at large. The document, titled a ‘plan’, assessed the political 
situation among health workers: 
                                                 
221 LNAD, PGNU/MOH, AF-03: ‘Bantheuk kane-paxoum khanakamakane phichalana kane-
pin-poua kharaxakane thi bo sia kha thang mot’, (Minutes of the committee meeting to 
consider free medical treatment of staff)’, No. 72/KS-TB, 2 July 1975. 
222 LNAD, NLHX/CHC, 23-03: ‘Phenekane khong sathalanasouk sapho nay khet yeud amnat 
kanebok-khong nay khet beuang nanh’, (Plan for health work only in the Seized [RLG] Zone 




Compared to the campaign to seize power the work of the health sector 
in [the RLG] zone is relatively weak. For example, some older doctors 
in some provinces have not yet studied [our theories] and changed their 
ways of thinking. And we have not yet entered some of the provincial 
hospitals where we have been invited to do so. In respect to the 
inspection and requisitioning of pharmaceuticals and supplies, this has 
occurred in a few instances only. In some localities they [health staff] 
are treating patients in the old manner, continuing to exploit them.223 
 
Looking ahead, the plan went on: 
 
Most [RLG technical health staff] are the children of [ordinary], 
exploited people, although some are from the wealthy class that has 
aided the enemy ... It is the capitalists and the American imperialists 
who have incited them to use their professional skills to seek income 
and thus exploit the people … In order to implement the policies of the 
Centre [Party leadership], we must clearly distinguish the different 
types [of staff], by mobilising them to study the Centre’s policy 
documents. If some of these staff are good, we should allow them to 
continue studying documents about the characteristics of revolutionary 
health workers (phet pativat), so that they can change their political 
thinking and use their technical skills once again for the service of the 
people … under strict Party leadership.”224 
 
 A separate but parallel process was the integration of the USAID-OB 
health network. The coalition government reiterated the need for integration, 
and so in 1974 the goal of the VHP was amended to: “helping the PGNU 
provide medical care to refugees and rural areas. Provide medical facilities and 
training and integrate them into the PNGU Medical Service”.225 The anti-
USAID demonstrations of May 1975, in the wake of the fall of Phnom Penh 
and Saigon the previous month, brought the “premature, abrupt, unplanned 
turnover of all health facilities” to the PGNU. All international personnel of 
                                                 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid. 
225 USAID, ‘Project Appraisal Report, VHP, 12 July 1973 to 20 July 1975’, p.3.  
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USAID and OB were required to depart before 30 June - a hurried departure 
for the international assistance agencies and staff who had assisted the Lao 
health sector for almost two decades.226 
 
Figure 4.7: Staff Comparison of RLG, NLHX and USAID‐OB, 1973 
Profession  RLG NLHX USAID‐OB 
TOTAL reported health staff:  1,402  2,010  1,200 











































Assistant lab technician  27  31  ‐ 







Traditional medicine doctor  ‐  134  ‐ 
 
The political situation changed rapidly. Minister of Health Khamphaï 
did not return to Vientiane from a scheduled WHO meeting in Geneva in May 
1975, and was granted political asylum in France.227 Tiao Jaisvasd, former 
Director of the Royal School of Medicine and the Department of Hospital 
Services, replaced him as Minister. He recalls hoping that Lao health 
                                                 
226 USAID, ‘Termination Report’, p.10. 
227 Dr Khamphaï Abhay, former RLG Minister of Health, by email, 10 October 2012. 
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professionals of all political persuasions would find a way of working 
together. However, from 29 September 1975 he was confined (theuk khouab 
khoum toua) with Crown Prince Vong Savang to the former USAID 
compound, and presumably unable to perform his role as Minister.228 Fearing 
possible deportation to a re-education camp, Tiao Jaisvasd fled to Thailand 
four days after the establishment of the Lao PDR in December 1975, and 
resettled in France as a refugee.229 
 
Conclusion 
 National independence did not remove the colonial-era problems of 
geographical, political and cultural marginality or afford Laos a degree of 
control of its own destiny. Instead, the newly independent nation plunged into 
several decades of armed conflict, divided along political and territorial lines 
as well as in terms of technical skills and services, which in turn consolidated 
its dependence on external assistance. While international assistance boosted 
budgets available for health development, the strength and coherence of the 
health sector was severely constrained by its high degree of fragmentation. 
 All three civilian health services made important achievements during 
this period.  The number of health facilities more than doubled, the number of 
Lao health staff increased more than tenfold, and the first Lao became fully-
qualified medical doctors, pharmacists, registered nurses and midwives. 
International assistance supported the implementation of a number of specific 
projects: the provision of medical care, yaws and malaria eradication, maternal 
and child healthcare, as well as nursing and medical education. The range of 
                                                 
228 Dr Tiao Jaisvasd’s curriculum vitae, kindly provided at interview in Torcy, France, 2 
December 2012. 
229 Dr Tiao Jaisvasd, interviewed in Torcy, France, 2 December 2012. 
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healthcare services broadened, and was supplemented by an emerging private 
sector. 
The quality of healthcare continued to struggle, however, because it 
relied on the availability and equitable distribution of trained staff, equipment 
and supplies. The RLG recruited the most highly qualified staff of the three 
services, but had difficulties with staff distribution. The USAID-OB and 
NLHX services had no choice but to adopt more flexible recruitment and 
training standards, and consequently their staff were more likely to remain in 
rural areas. All three services struggled to provide basic equipment, supplies 
and utilities to health facilities, especially in rural areas. Weak budgets and 
supply chains, compounded by poor roads and expensive air access, resulted in 
frequent gaps in the supply of pharmaceuticals and basic medical supplies, and 
health staff. Equipment was difficult to maintain, and utilities such as 
electricity and running water were often absent. Such limitations were 
characteristic of Laos’ international marginality as a geographically remote, 
extremely poor and now also, a war-torn country. In the words of a US project 
proposal from 1974: “Laos compares unfavourably with most of the 
developing countries by almost any yardstick of national development.”230 
Lao health sector development was not only limited by Laos’ poverty, 
but also, paradoxically, by its dependence on international assistance. The 
cultural and technical uniformity of the French colonial period was gone. The 
diversity of international donors, and their political motivations, resulted in a 
jumble of technical advice, scholarships, and training, as well as medical 
equipment and supplies which were not necessarily complementary or 
                                                 




interchangeable. The professional classifications and training curricula used by 
the three health services did not correspond, and health professionals working 
in the various services shared neither a common technical approach nor a 
common language of training. Finally, USAID’s departure signalled the exit of 
Laos’ largest international donor, and left the health sector without access to 









DOCTRINE AS CURE: 
THE ATTEMPTED CONTRUCTION OF A SOCIALIST HEALTH 
SYSTEM (1975-1990) 
 
… [we must] transform their thinking into that of revolutionary socialist 
health workers who serve the multi-ethnic people of Laos, that is, the workers.1 
 
Introduction 
The establishment of the Lao PDR on 2 December 1975 marked the end of 
the NLHX revolutionary liberation struggle and the beginning of the nation’s 
“march towards socialism”.2 The new leadership launched an ambitious plan to 
reshape Laos’ political system, economy and society based on Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine. The plan included the transformation of the existing health services into 
a single, government-managed socialist system tasked with the expansion of a 
nationwide network staffed by a cadre of revolutionary health workers providing 
healthcare and pharmaceuticals free-of-charge to all members of the population. 
Guided by political training, they were to promote equity, self-reliance and 
modernity inside and outside the workplace, and thereby contribute to the nation’s 
development under socialism. 
                                                 
1 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05, ‘Saloup saphap kane viak-ngane 1 pii 1978 lae phenekane to 
1979’, (Summarised Annual Work Report for 1978 and Work Plan for 1979), 11 December 1978. 
2 MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, ‘Laos 1979: Caught in Vietnam’s Wake’, Asian Survey, 
20 (2), (February 1980), p.109. 
184 
 
The administrative and technical work of government was powered by a 
unique combination of ideological optimism engendered by ‘political work’ (viak 
kane meuang), encompassing political training and ideological guidance, and the 
pragmatism of ‘policy work’ (viak nayobay), which promoted self-reliance as a 
means to deal with the economic hardships of the 1970s and 1980s. In a 
whirlwind of international meetings at home and abroad, high-ranking officials 
negotiated technical and financial assistance packages to support the 
government’s unfunded plans. The new regime termed this ‘international work’ 
(viak kane-tang-pathet), involving cooperation with friendly nations, a subtle 
change from the foreign aid received by the former regime. However, ‘political’, 
‘policy’ and ‘international work’ sapped the time and energy of health personnel, 
and redirected their efforts away from the Ministry’s ‘specialised’ or ‘specific 
work’ (viak saphoh) of healthcare provision, 3  and towards political training, 
participation in the activities of the Party’s mass organisations, communal 
gardening, livestock-raising, cultural displays and sporting competitions. 
 This chapter concerns the early Lao PDR period, which Grant Evans 
dubbed more colourfully as Laos’ period of “high socialism”.4 It spans the 15 
years from December 1975 until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nation’s 
major benefactor, in 1990-91. The demise of socialism in Eastern Europe 
                                                 
3 The term viak saphoh or sometimes visah saphoh could be translated as ‘specialised work’, as it 
is likely derived from the Vietnamese term chuyên ngành, which means something like ‘specialty’. 
I prefer to translate it as ‘specific work’, to avoid the connotations of specialisation in terms of 
advanced or higher level of technical competence, which would be misleading in the Lao context. 
Beyond the small cadre of well-trained staff at central level, most health workers possessed only 
basic qualifications and skill levels. 




significantly changed the profile of international development assistance to Laos, 
and forced a re-assessment of overall health policy and health financing, 
discussed in Chapter Six. 
 This chapter relies heavily on primary sources from the Lao National 
Archives to chart the interactions of ‘specific work’ with ‘political’, ‘policy’ and 
‘international work’ within the health sector. The sources show how the 
government set about re-shaping the health sector to make it, in its own words, 
“better than before” (dee koua kao), a line repeated time and again in official 
reports. The new regime reunified the health services, restructured the 
administrative framework of the Ministry of Health, expanded the health network 
deeper into rural areas, and trained significantly more health staff at all 
professional levels. 
 Health inputs and outputs were tempered by poor agricultural harvests 
brought on by floods and droughts, a reduction in the overall amount of 
international assistance received, and what has been described as “ideologically-
driven mismanagement” combined with corruption, a fate which reportedly also 
affected other sectors of the administration. 5  The weight of the Lao PDR’s 
political, policy and international work ate into the time and motivation available 
for the Ministry of Health’s primary responsibility, the provision of healthcare, 
and ultimately impacted on the quality and quantity of care provided. 
The few present-day references to the history of health and development in 
Laos often take 1975 as their starting point, as if little of substance occurred 
                                                 
5 Brown and Zasloff, ‘Laos 1979’, p.110. 
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beforehand.6 This supposition is not only misleading but incorrect. The year 1975 
did not mark the beginning of health services in Laos but rather a turning point in 
their development. 
 
Setting the Scene for Socialism 
The new regime embarked on a period of reforms and restructuring to 
build a socialist society with a one-party political system, a centralised, state-
managed economy that would bypass capitalism, and a socialist-inspired society 
designed to restore Lao pride and sovereignty following almost thirty years of 
conflict. However, as Stuart-Fox has remarked, its leaders “were not aware of the 
magnitude of the task that lay ahead, and the problems likely to be encountered”.7 
Certainly, its methods lacked nuance. The Lao king was pressured to abdicate, 
and in 1977 he and a number of immediate family members were detained in 
Houaphan province (formerly Xam Neua) until their deaths several years later. 
The new regime also despatched approximately 25,000 of Laos’ small, urban 
class of military officers, administrators and technical specialists to political re-
education camps within the first year of its administration, provoking caution and 
                                                 
6 A PhD thesis from 2009 is representative of this trend, presumably relying on politically-
motivated responses of Lao officials. It states: “The beginning of the PDR marks the veritable 
beginnings of public health in Laos. Before 1975, no modern and organised sanitary system 
existed: traditional medicine rituals and remedies (from medicinal plants and animal products) 
were the main forms of medical knowledge and remedies.” See Bochaton, ‘Pai Thaï, pai fang nan’, 
p.58. For other examples, see Jönsson et al, ‘Health Policy Evolution’, p.4; and Stephen Holland et 
al, Impact of Economic and Institutional Reforms on the Health Sector in Laos: Implications for 
Health System Management, (Brighton, Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. IDS Research 
Report 28, October 1995), p.22. 
7 Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, p. 169. 
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fear among many of the educated, technical staff who remained in the urban 
centres.8 
Several issues required the immediate attention of the Ministry of Health. 
The multiple health services of the former period had not been fully integrated by 
the short-lived PGNU, and many CHC staff from the former revolutionary base of 
Viengxay and other areas had not yet relocated to Vientiane or the provincial 
capitals. Moreover, economic problems impacted on government salaries and 
urban living conditions, and therefore staff morale, as well as limiting the funding 
available for health activities. 
Initially, the Ministry attended to the unification of the multiple health 
services. The blurred division between civilian and military services was 
preserved. The Ministry shared donated pharmaceuticals and medical equipment 
with the military’s medical service, and exchanged medical staff based on local 
needs. The unification process faced obstacles as professional categories and 
training curricula between the previous services were inconsistent. For example, 
Didier Sicard, a French instructor from 1974-1978 at the Medical University (the 
former Royal School of Medicine), described the US-trained medics in rural Laos, 
whom he understood to have had only three months of basic health training, as 
“unintegrated, unintegratable” into the Ministry of Health.9 In addition, Ministry 
reports indicate that former USAID health staff (presumably those from the 
USAID-OB network) had not been paid since USAID’s withdrawal, despite being 
                                                 
8 Lao People’s Army, Pavatsat Kongthap, p. 497. 
9 Sicard, Au nom de Marx, p.93. 
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incorporated into the Ministry at that time.10 Several years later, in 1979, a report 
prepared for the Minister of Health declared that former NLHX and RLG staff 
had been integrated, and that a good level of workplace cooperation had been 
achieved, although this was not always the case.11 One of my informants, resident 
in the United States since the 1980s, confided that her departure was prompted 
partly by poor workplace relations and what she considered as the privileging of 
staff from the former Liberated Zone.12 
Former NLHX health staff, medical students and technical advisors were 
stranded in Viengxay in the early months of the Lao PDR due to a lack of 
transport to convey them to Vientiane, and a lack of accommodation once they 
arrived. While NLHX staff and students remained in the countryside, many high-
ranking and/or highly-qualified Ministry staff fled into exile. The exodus had 
begun over the course of 1975, as the NLHX gradually asserted its power 
throughout the country. Sicard recounts five doctors fleeing after an ordinary 
morning’s work at Mahosot in mid-1975, an event he admits to having judged 
harshly at the time.13 A Ministry report in early 1976 states that between 49 and 
60 staff (the official figures are inconsistent) fled in the eight weeks following 2 
December 1975. Of these, 22 had doctorat en médécine qualifications or 
                                                 
10 A former OB nurse recalled staff demonstrations at the Setthathirat (OB) hospital in Vientiane 
in 1975 concerning unpaid wages. Ms Sivilay Sivongxay interviewed in Vientiane, Lao PDR, 14 
February 2014. The FBIS reports earlier staff demonstrations at Setthathirat in September 1974, 
concerning wage reductions and the treatment of Lao workers by foreign supervisors, presumably 
Filipino and Thai. See FBIS, ‘Strike at US-financed hospital in Vientiane ends’, 25 September 
1974. 
11 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Botlayngane saloup saphap viak-ngane sathalanasouk nay laya 
4 pii (1976-1979) to kongpaxoum sathalanasouk thoua pathet , nay van thi ... deuan peutsapha pii 
1980’ ([Draft] Summary Report on 4 years of health work 1976-1979 for the National Health 
Conference of … [sic] May 1980)), p.20. 
12 Former OB Lao nurse (anonymous) interviewed in San Diego, USA, 6 August 2012. 
13 Sicard, Au nom de Marx, p.97. 
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equivalent, and were therefore likely to have held senior positions.14 The Ministry 
requisitioned the houses of fleeing senior personnel to help meet its need for staff 
and student accommodation.15 
The Ministry of Health underwent administrative changes in the 
immediate and longer term. The health service was afforded its own ministry for 
most of the early Lao PDR period. The Ministry merged with Social Welfare to 
become the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare in 1988, but reverted to the 
Ministry of Health three years later when Social Welfare joined Labour.16 The 
Ministry was substantially restructured in 1980, and in 1987 was subject to a 
government-wide decentralisation process which allowed each province to set its 
own health priorities, and assume responsibility for its own staff training and 
operational budgets. One account has noted that decentralisation was not a well-
planned policy, occurring almost by default, due to the central government’s 
inability to effectively administer and support the provinces.17  
The new regime made a number of generic changes to the roles of 
ministers and vice-ministers across all ministries, of which there were initially 12, 
plus two ministry-equivalent committees.18 The former RLG positions of minister 
and director-general were combined, making Lao PDR ministers responsible for 
both political and technical matters. Most were members of the Party’s Central 
                                                 
14 A typographic or calculation error must have been made in the MOH report, because while the 
text states that 60 staff had fled, the statistical breakdown by level adds up to only 49. See LNAD, 
Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Lay-ngane saphap kane-kheuan-vay khong kasouang sathalanasouk nap 
tae sangtang latthabane may mah theung pachouban-ny: 25-1-76’ (Report on the situation of the 
Ministry of Health from the establishment of the new government until the present: 25-1-76). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Phongsavath Boupha, Evolution of the Lao State, p.109. 
17 Holland et al, Impact of Economic and Institutional Reforms, p.18. 
18 MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, ‘Laos in 1975: People’s Democratic Revolution - Lao-
style’, Asian Survey, 16(2), (February1976), p.197. 
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Committee, although they were not necessarily representatives in the Supreme 
People’s Assembly (SPA), the new Lao parliament which rarely met and operated 
as little more than a rubber stamp for Party decisions.19 The new arrangements 
located political functions very clearly within each ministry rather than the SPA. 
Vice-ministers first appeared during the PGNU in a role similar to that of the 
RLG position of Secretary of State. Central-level departments (kom) and 
provincial-level services (phanek) were now directed by committees rather than 
individuals. District health services, also directed by committees, were added to 
the official hierarchy. 
 The new regime appointed Tiao Souk Vongsak, a Luang Prabang-born 
relative of the Lao king, as its first Minister of Health. 20  Despite his royal 
pedigree, Tiao Souk was a member of the Party’s Central Committee, and had 
been a long-serving official in the Liberated Zone.21 He had no medical training. 
He was assisted by a single vice-minister, Dr Khamlieng Pholsena. 
 
                                                 
19 Former médecin indochinois, Khamsouk Keola, served as Vice-President and Secretary-General 
of the SPA from 1975-1989. Dr Ponemek Daraloy, Director of the Ministry of Health’s Cabinet 
Office, was also a member of the SPA’s first legislature. Vice-Minister Vannareth Latsapho was 
included in the SPA’s second legislature, 1989-1992, but Ponemek was not. See National 
Assembly of the Lao PDR/UNDP, The National Assembly of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic Directory, 1975-2002, (Vientiane: National Assembly of the Lao PDR/UNDP, 2000), 
pp.7, 9. 
20 Prince Souvanna Phouma, former RLG Prime Minister, is reported to have called Tiao (Prince) 
Souk Vongsak “nephew”. See Arthur J. Dommen,‘Towards Negotiations in Laos’, Asian Survey. 
11(1), January 1971, p.48. 
21 Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, p.179; and Institute of Historical Research, Bantheuk hetkane 
pavatsat lao lem II 1976-2006, (Notes on Events in Lao History, volume II, 1976-2006), 








Khamlieng hailed from an influential neutralist family, and had joined the 
NLHX in the 1960s on return from his medical studies in Bordeaux, France. He 
provided the continuity between the old and new regimes, having served as the 
NLHX-appointed Vice-Minister of Health in the PGNU administration under the 
RLG-appointed Ministers, Drs Khamphaï and Tiao Jaisvasd. A second vice-
minister, Professor Dr Vannareth Latsapho (Rajpho), French-educated and with 
13 years’ experience under the former RLG, was appointed in 1980. Vice-
ministers quickly multiplied: by 1990 four assisted the Minister.22 Khamlieng was 
promoted to Minister of Health in 1982 but replaced in 1988 by Khambou 
Sounixay, a Party man with no medical background. 23  Vannareth succeeded 
Khambou in the mid-1990s. 
                                                 
22 UNICEF, Children and Women in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, (Vientiane: UNICEF, 
April 1992), p.141. 
23 Khamlieng was reduced to President of the Lao Red Cross in 1988. Post-1975 the Lao Red 
Cross accepted a number of former high-ranking Ministry of Health personnel into its ranks, 
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 The Ministry of Health’s organisational restructure of 1980 separated its 
administrative (or political) functions from its technical functions. It now had 
seven administrative departments and 11 technical institutes (sathabanh), 
including the Medical University and the nursing school, renamed the mid-level 
health school. 24  The restructure formalised a new balance of power whereby 
administratively-focused departments were more politically powerful than the 
technically-focused institutes. Sicard had observed this shift occurring in the late 
1970s, prompting him to quip: “Patients lost priority to the ‘health workers,’ who 
in turn lost priority to the Marxist technicians [technocrats]”. 25  The move to 
favour technocrats over health workers is comparable to similar moves in 
neighbouring Vietnam and several years later, in the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea. Lao cadres had more power than their technical colleagues, but were 
unable to solve the entrenched problems of poor management and urban bias. 
 By 1990 the Ministry of Health comprised five administrative departments, 
four technical institutes, five technical centres, five national coordinating 
committees, and four hospitals at central-level. The structure had developed “from 
the top by the introduction of vertical programs,”26 and as such, was not well-
coordinated. A second key change was the 1987 decentralisation drive, summed 
up as follows: 
                                                                                                                                     
including the RLG’s Dr Oudom Souvannavong as Vice President and Koukeo Saycocie as 
Secretary, and later Vice President. See FBIS, ‘Red Cross Delegation Returns’, 2 November 1978. 
A former MOH staff member remembered the challenge of interpreting for Khambou, because 
first one had to translate into Lao, and then explain the technical concepts. Former Lao PDR health 
worker (anonymous) interviewed in Vientiane, Lao PDR, 17 December 2012. 
24 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup saphap viak-ngane 6 deuan ton pii 1980’, (Summary 
Report on Work for the First 6 months of 1980). 
25 Sicard, Au nom de Marx, p.98. 




 The technical and planning functions managed from the central level 
became separated from political and financial decision making at the local 
level and the ministry lost influence on the direction of health policy. The 
lack of coordination extended [downwards], resulting in little meaningful 
cooperation between district authorities and either the 
[Provincial/Municipal or District Health Offices] …27  
 
The absence of clear lines of responsibility for each level of the system or of 
individual job descriptions compounded the challenges of the decentralisation 
experiment. 
 
A Socialist Health Program of ‘Specific Work’ 
The Ministry of Health’s main role, or ‘specific work’ (viak saphoh) was 
the provision of healthcare. Symbolic representations of the health sector formed 
part of the regime’s depictions of new socialist society. Medical scenes featured 
on the Liberation Kip bills from 1968 were repeated in 1979. A series of stamps 
bearing health scenes was issued in 1988 to commemorate the 40th anniversary of 
WHO, and ‘Phet Pativat’ (Revolutionary health worker/s) was included in a 
recording of revolutionary songs. A Ministry report from 1977 asserted: 
 
The party and state have given special prioritisation to the work of 
healthcare. They have studied various models to ensure that doctors will 
have correct equipment and skills, are compassionate towards patients, and 
motivated to support the revolution with sincerity.28 
 
In fact, it is difficult to identify a sector of the administration or technical services 
that did not receive at least rhetorical prioritisation in official discourse, which 
                                                 
27 Holland et al, Impact of Economic and Institutional Reforms, p.19. 
28 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup saphap kane viak-ngane 6 deuan ton pii 1977’, 
(Summary Report on Work for the First 6 months of 1977), undated, p.2. 
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makes it difficult to determine which sectors were in fact given actual priority. 
Government budgets could be expected to reveal such prioritisation, but these 
were treated with utmost secrecy during the early Lao PDR period. 
The new regime’s socio-cultural agenda was pro-rural and pro-ethnic. In 
the education sector, policy included the eradication of illiteracy and the 
promotion of general education.29 In the health sector, it aimed to close the gap in 
health status and resource allocation between urban and rural areas through a 
socialist health system. 
Official reports and speeches shied away from an explicit specification of 
the characteristics of a socialist health system in the Lao context. Reading 
between the lines, it meant the provision of free healthcare within a single, 
government-managed health service, by politically-trained and motivated health 
workers. Key aspects of the policy were the provision of Primary Health Care 
(PHC), the promotion of the integration of traditional medicine with biomedicine, 
and the use and, to a lesser extent, the production of pharmaceuticals. 
In 1976 the WHO confidently announced that the Lao PDR was 
“organizing a system of primary health care, with supervision provided by local 
health committees and services at the periphery by village health workers … a 
handbook for … health worker[s] is being developed.”30 PHC was defined in the 
1978 Declaration of Alma-Ata as “essential health care” focused on health 
education and promotion, nutrition and food supply, provision of safe water 
supply, maternal and child health including family planning, immunisation against 
                                                 
29 Lockhart, ‘Education in Laos’, p.26. 
30 WHO, WPR/RC27/3, Manila: WHO, 1976, p.5. 
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major diseases, prevention and control of local endemic diseases, appropriate 
treatment of common diseases and injuries and provision of essential drugs, all 
services to be provided “as close as possible to where people live and work”.31 
Some of the most successful PHC systems in the late 1970s were found in 
communist countries such as Cuba and China which were, at that time, providing 
assistance to the Lao health sector. 
The Lao PDR’s adoption of PHC enjoyed international prominence when 
Vice-Minister Khamlieng was elected one of the vice presidents of WHO’s Alma 
Ata International Conference on PHC, but the real challenge was to move from 
policy to implementation. A nationwide PHC network required a significant 
increase in the number of rural health facilities to serve an estimated 11,000 
villages, and a corresponding increase in trained personnel. These efforts required 
construction budgets, matched by funds to equip and supply the facilities, a 
nationwide logistics system and a supply of trained staff. 
In addition to PHC, Lao socialist medicine moved to formalise linkages 
between traditional medicine and biomedicine, echoing developments in Vietnam 
and China, and paralleling those in Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea. 32 
Traditional medicine hospitals were to be established in every province and most 
districts, and practitioners to be included within the state-managed health service. 
These moves complemented PHC policy by boosting the number of beds and 
health personnel recorded in the more remote regions. 
                                                 
31 WHO and UNICEF, Primary Health Care: Report of the International Conference on Primary 
Health Care. Alma-Ata USSR. 6-12 September 1978, (Geneva: WHO, 1978), pp.1-2. 
32 Ovesen and Trankell, Cambodians and their Doctors, p.87. 
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While many forms of traditional medicine are practised in Laos, only the 
more botanical aspects (as opposed to the underlying spiritual beliefs) were to be 
incorporated into the government-managed health system. 33  Opinions were 
divided on the policy’s merits: French-educated Khamlieng was upbeat about the 
potential of traditional medicine, while his colleague Vannareth was reportedly 
“implacably hostile”, condemning it as “superstition”. 34 Ten traditional medicine 
hospitals nationwide were listed in a 1979 Ministry document, which also stated 
there were one or two traditional medicine practitioners in each tasseng, and five 
to ten in each district.35 Many appear to have been village-based healers drafted 
into the official health sector, in a bid to quickly swell the numbers of staff, while 
hoping to ‘reform’ them with socialist science to steer them away from the more 
‘magical’ aspects of their practice, considered to be unscientific, superstitious, 
even backward. 
Traditional medicine was publicly acknowledged as a cost-saving 
alternative to biomedicine, as the ingredients did not require importation. 
Additionally, it was celebrated as a national form of medicine which enhanced 
self-reliance. One source listed 163 items of traditional medicine material as 
having marketable properties if produced by the state-owned pharmaceutical 
                                                 
33 Strigler et al, ‘Situation nutritionnelle’, pp.126-127. 
34 Sicard, Au nom de Marx, p.94; and Grant Evans, The Politics of Ritual and Remembrance. Laos 
since 1975 (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1998), p.73. Evans confirmed Vannareth was the vice-
minister in question, in personal communication, September 2013. 
35 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Khampaxay khay kongpasoum khong sahay Souk Vongsak, 
kammakane sounkang pak paxaxon pathivat lao, latthamonty-va-kane kasouang sathlanasouk, thi 
kongpaxoum khanengkane sathalanasouk thoua pathet khang tham- it, laya 4 pii (1976-1979)’, 
([Draft] Opening Speech for Comrade Souk Vongsak, Central Committee member of the Lao 




factories;36 but later reports suggest that the Ministry concentrated on only 12. 
Other documents reveal that interest was not confined to botanical materials; one 
source identified geckoes, monkeys and tiger bones as potential medical 
commodities for exchange or export to socialist nations.37 
 The new regime embraced the use and production of pharmaceuticals, 
possibly to compensate for their short supply in the Liberated Zone during the war 
years, and as evidence of socialist science and technology. One government report 
stated: “A medical doctor without pharmaceuticals is like a gun without bullets”.38 
Most pharmaceuticals were dispensed through government-managed health 
facilities and pharmacies, although some private pharmacy shops remained.39 In 
1987, with the easing of the Lao PDR’s socialist economy, trained health staff 
were authorised to re-open private pharmacy shops, which supplemented their 
meagre government salaries.40 
 The Lao PDR received shipments of pharmaceuticals, some expired, from 
bilateral, multilateral and NGO donors.41 Many were shipped through Vietnamese 
ports to avoid a Thai embargo on 273 items, including medicine, in the 1970s and 
                                                 
36 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05, ‘Saloup saphap kane viak-ngane 1 pii 1978’. 
37 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Khampaxay khay kongpasoum’. The text does not specify 
whether live animals or their by-products were intended for exchange or export. 
38 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Lay-ngane saloup viak-ngane 6 deuan ton pii 1979 lae phene-
kane 6 deuan thay pii 1979’, (Report on work achievements for first 6 months of 1979 and work 
plan for second 6 months of 1979), undated. 
39 One informant decided to flee the Lao PDR in the mid-1980s because the government was 
attempting to seize his pharmacy business. Former Lao pharmacy owner (anonymous) discussion, 
in San Diego, USA, 5 August 2012. 
40 Strigler et al, ‘Situation nutritionnelle’, p.129. 
41 An international volunteer at the Ministry of Health from 1986-1990 remembers lobbying 
French President Mitterand’s wife to ensure pharmaceuticals donated by France were within their 
use-by dates. Doug Handisides interviewed in Vientiane, Lao PDR, 22 December 2012. 
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1980s.42  Official reports meticulously list the number of crates, kilograms or 
tonnes of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies received, but rarely state the types 
of pharmaceuticals, their expiration dates or distribution details. For example, a 
draft report from 1979 announced that 153,654 kilograms of pharmaceuticals had 
been received from international donors since the change of regime in 1975.43 The 
problem of expired pharmaceuticals, reportedly provided by the Soviet Union, 
North Korea, Poland and France, was compounded by poor storage and 
distribution systems. 
 The regime also publicised its efforts to domestically produce 
pharmaceuticals and traditional medicines as a demonstration of self-reliance and 
scientific capability, despite equipment and many of the raw materials being 
imported. Pharmaceutical Factory Number 1 in Viengxay closed in 1988,44 but 
production continued in Vientiane at Pharmaceutical Factory Number 2 (the 
former Liberté facility, owned pre-1975 by Khamphaï Abhay) and from 1986, 
Factory Number 3, constructed with Japanese assistance.45 The Ministry formed a 
state-owned enterprise in 1977 to oversee the production and sale of the modest 
range of pharmaceuticals produced, which included basic items such as 90 percent 
proof alcohol, saline solution, aspirin and chloroquine.46 UNICEF estimates that 
by 1990 approximately 20 percent of national requirements for basic medications 
                                                 
42 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup viak-ngane deuan 1/1978 khong kasouang 
sathalanasouk’ (MOH monthly report for January 1978), 2 February 1978; and Stuart-Fox, History 
of Laos, p.178. 
43 Anonymous, ‘Hang lay-ngane saphap viak-ngan sathalanasouk’, insert between p.14 and p.15. 
44 I thank Audrey Bochaton for sharing the details of her interview with Dr Sananh Chounlamany, 
Director of the Pharmaceutical Factory No. 2, in Vientiane, Lao PDR, 18 May 2014. 
45 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-12: ‘Khamsang nae-nam kieo-kap kane-chat-tang hong-ngane phalit 
yah lek 3’, (Explanatory Order concerning the Establishment of Pharmaceutical Factory Number 
3), 4 June 1986. 
46 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup saphap … 6 deuan ton pii 1977’. 
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were manufactured domestically at Vientiane’s two pharmaceutical factories, and 
a third in Pakse.47 
 In a curious aside, a group of Lao health staff was sent to Czechoslovakia 
in the early 1980s to work in a pharmaceutical factory, possibly in anticipation of 
the expansion of Lao production. This is a rare case of Lao workers providing 
cheap labour in the factories of Eastern Europe, a pursuit more common for 
Vietnamese workers. The staff concerned were disappointed (and perhaps 
surprised) not to be undertaking formal training courses, which was the common 
experience of Lao officials at that time. Some were given the opportunity to 
upgrade their qualifications on their return to the Lao PDR, in what may have 
been a gesture of apology from the Ministry which had either misunderstood the 
deal with Czechoslovakia or had not adequately explained it to the participants.48  
Socialist health policies were managed for maximum political gain and 
were provocatively contrasted to the situation under the former RLG, when 
doctors were alleged to have demanded exploitative fees and “traded [blood] at 
the highest prices.” One mischievous explanation from 1979 claimed that blood 
banks in capitalist countries were so named because of their commercialisation.49 
Sicard observed that “almost all” Lao doctors engaged in “very lucrative” medical 
practice in the old regime, but that the new regime’s ban on private medicine did 
not stamp out the practice but instead forced it underground.50 
 
                                                 
47 UNICEF, Children and Women, p.136. 
48 Former Lao PDR health worker (anonymous) interviewed inVientiane, Lao PDR 17 December 
2012. 
49 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Khampaxay khay kongpasoum’. 
50 Sicard, Au nom de Marx, p.109. 
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The Lao PDR’s Expanded Health Network 
 The nationwide roll-out of PHC, announced by the PGNU in the mid-
1970s and embraced by the Lao PDR required the rapid construction and/or repair 
of numerous rural health facilities to demonstrate that the new health service was 
indeed “better than before”. Many district and tasseng-level facilities were built 
with international support, as were some show-case facilities at central and 
provincial level. Where international assistance was unavailable, the Ministry of 
Health undertook to construct facilities itself or encouraged villagers to pool local 
resources to construct simple structures reminiscent of the wave of community 
construction experienced in the 1920s. 
 The structure of the new regime’s planned health network was formulaic. 
Every province and district was to have its own hospital, and every tasseng a 
health centre (hong moh tasseng, later souksala). At village level, every grouping 
of five to ten houses was to have a health volunteer, termed a ‘hygiene fighter’ 
(nakhob-anamay), armed with a drug kit and hopefully some rudimentary training 
in its use. Each province and district was also to have a traditional medicine 
hospital. This mirrored the specifications of the health network in the pre-1975 
NLHX zone, although the war conditions had made it impossible to ever approach 
the comprehensiveness embodied in its theory. 
 The number of district hospitals increased from 96 in 1976 to 115 in 1990, 
or just short of one per district.51 The increase in sub-district facilities was steeper: 
                                                 
51 State Planning Committee, 1975-2000. 25 [sic]. Basic Statistics of the Lao PDR, (Vientiane: 
State Planning Committee, 2000), p.133. 
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from 294 in 1976 to a peak of 1,362 in 1987,52 before declining in line with a 
decrease in Soviet assistance. In 1980, only ten percent (60) of such facilities were 
of brick and concrete construction. Another 62 were planned for construction in 
the next five years to replace the hospital beds ‘lost’ when existing bamboo and 










1976  4 12 96 294 
197954  4 13 98 494 
1980  4 13 102 610 
1985  4 18 107 994 
1987  4 16 112 1,362 
1989  5 15 110 1,190 
1990  8 17 115 937 
 
At central level, Mahosot continued to be Laos’ largest health facility, but 
it was no longer the most exclusive or the best-equipped. It was displaced by 
Hospital Number 1, a Soviet-built, state-of-the-art, 30-bed facility in the former 
USAID compound at Km6 as the most exclusive. Opened in May 1978, it was 
staffed with a team of Soviet specialists, and served the Party elite. And the 150-
bed Lao-Soviet Friendship Hospital, opened in the late 1980s after almost ten 
years of on-and-off construction plagued by shortages of funding and materials, 
                                                 
52 For the figures for 1976 and 1990, see State Planning Committee, 1975-2000. Basic Statistics, 
p.133. For the peak figure in 1987 see, UNICEF, Children and Women’, p.136. 
53 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘PHC’, 1980. The discussion of PHC appears to have been 
excerpted from a larger report to which it was no longer attached. 
54 Ibid., p.11. 
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rivaled Mahosot as the best-equipped. 55 Other changes included the transfer of 
Setthathirat Hospital (formerly OB-run) from central control to the Health 
Department of Vientiane prefecture, and the opening of a Traditional Medicine 
hospital in Vientiane. The new regime also opened district-level hospitals in 
Vientiane prefecture, a financially inefficient move because the districts were 
located within the same town, but one that coincided with the formulaic approach 
of having a hospital in each district nationwide, regardless of its needs or location  
At provincial level, the Lao PDR approached the Chinese government to 
build a new provincial hospital in Oudomxay.56 A 60-bed hospital was built in 
Phonesavanh with Mongolian assistance in the early 1980s, and a similar-sized 
one in Salavan by NGO, Terre des Hommes. Vietnam funded a new district 
hospital in Nong Het and another in Xepone on the Lao-Vietnam border. 57 
UNCHR funded the construction of several district hospitals; the Mekong River 
Commission funded another, while UNICEF provided funds and equipment for 
new tasseng-level health facilities constructed by the Lao government or local 
communities. For villages without local health facilities, drug kits, health 
volunteers, and visits from mobile medical teams were planned. However, it is 
unlikely that budgets were sufficient for such teams to make regular visits to 
many remote localities. 
 While the statistical growth in the number of overall health facilities was 
impressive, standards were often extremely low, especially at district and tasseng-
                                                 
55 Anonymous, ‘Hang lay-ngane saphap viak-ngane sathalanasouk’, p.11 bis. 
56 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup viakngane deuan 1/1978 khong kasouang 
sathalanasouk’, (Ministry of Health summary of work for 1/1978), 2 February 1978. 
57 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-17: ‘Bot-neua-nay tob kham-samphad nak-khao tang-pathet’, 
(Notes on responses to foreign journalists interview questions), 11 March 1985. 
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level. Buildings constructed by villagers were often made of bamboo and thatch, 
and few had electricity or water connections, which significantly impacted general 
hygiene and the ability to sterilise medical equipment and store vaccines. 
UNICEF found that of 110 district-level hospitals reported by the Ministry in 
1989, only 20 were actually providing healthcare services. Among tasseng-level 
facilities, “most … have not been in regular operation for two or three years and 
the others may be opened only a few days each month”.58 As such, an increase in 
the number of health facilities alone was no guarantee of a health service that was 
“better than before”. 
 
Ministry of Health staffing, professional education and training 
 Four key changes to staffing occurred in the Lao health sector under the 
new regime. First, staff were merged into a single, united government-managed 
health service, discussed above. Secondly, staffing classifications were simplified 
into three basic categories of high, mid and low-level, and French and English-
language titles were abolished. Thirdly, staffing numbers increased across all 
classifications with the expansion in both overseas medical scholarships and 
domestic education. Finally and most influentially, the time and energy of health 
staff was divided between the provision of healthcare, the specific technical work 
of the Ministry, and the doctrine-based tasks of ‘political work’, ‘policy work’ 
and ‘international work’. 
The various professional classifications of the three former health services 
were aligned and simplified based on the extremely simple hierarchy used in the 
                                                 
58 UNICEF, Children and Women, pp.135-136. 
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NLHX Zone: low-, mid-, and high-level health workers for those with fewer than 
three years, three to four years, or more than four years of training respectively. 
Staff numbers in 1976 are reported to have consisted of only 86 high-level doctors 
and 12 high-level pharmacists, 456 mid-level doctors, an unlisted number of mid-
level pharmacists, and 4,000 low-level health staff, mainly nurses.59 The health 
workforce increased to approximately 9,392 staff in 1985 and 12,551 in 1990.60 
According to UNICEF, 57 percent of the health sector workforce was female by 
1990, the second highest in the Lao PDR behind the obscure-sounding sector of 
“trade and material supply”, a possible reference to retail/sales work in a socialist 
setting.61 The number of staff employed at each classification level rose rapidly in 
the early years of the new regime. This was due as much to the relatively high 
numbers of both RLG and NLHX students already undergoing health and medical 
education in 1975 (who began work after graduation) as to Lao PDR increases in 
staff and student numbers. The vast majority remained clustered at the bottom of 
the professional hierarchy, and had undergone ad hoc training in one of the 
former health services. Traditional healers whom the new regime had convinced 
to ‘join the revolution’ were added to the mix of low-level staff in rural areas. 
 Lao health staff were supplemented with international technical advisors, 
who now worked mainly at central level facilities. Many but not all were from 
socialist nations. The Soviet Union provided a full team of 20-25 specialists for 
Hospital Number 1 from 1978 until its closure in the early 1990s, dispensing 
                                                 
59 Anonymous, ‘Hang lay-ngane saphap viak-ngane sathalanasouk’, p.10. 
60 State Planning Committee, Ten years of socio-economic development in the Lao PDR, 
(Vientiane: SPC, 1985), p.175; and UNICEF, Children and Women, p.138. 
61 Ibid., p.100 
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medical care and training Lao counterparts. Soviet advisors were also assigned to 
the Lao-Soviet Friendship Hospital. Vietnam provided technical advisors for the 
malaria program in Champassak and Vientiane provinces, the Medical University 
and health schools, and a food safety laboratory. Cuba provided a medical brigade 
of approximately 15 persons, on rotation since the early 1970s. The brigade was 
initially based in Viengxay, but moved to Vientiane and other provincial towns 
after 1975. 62  Brigade members assisted various health programs, including 
hospital management, medical school curriculum, leprosy treatment and primary 
health care.63 Soviet and Cuban advisors were contracted through WHO, which 
also assigned advisors from other nations to its projects. 
 
Figure 5.3: Ministry of Health staff numbers by level, 1976‐198964 
  1976  1977 1978 1980 1985  1989 
High‐level staff  86  94  129 175 551  1,247 
Mid‐level staff  456  547 717 846 2,088  3,566 
Low‐level staff  4,000  4,523 5,457 4,991 6,753  8,271 
Total  4,542  5,164 6,303 6,012 9,392  13,084 
 
 Many workplaces required interpreters, because only long-term advisors 
developed fluency in Lao. Lao graduates from overseas were called upon to 
interpret, in addition to performing their own work. It would be foolish to think 
                                                 
62 FBIS, ‘Pasason Article Views Lao-Cuban Ties’, 4 November 1989. 
63 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Saloup layngane deuan kolokot (7) 1978 [lae] phenekane 
deuan singha (8) 1978’, (Summary report for July (7) 1978 [and] work plan for August (8) 1978). 
64 For 1976-1978 statistics, see Anonymous, ‘Hang lay-ngane saphap viak-ngane sathalanasouk’, 
p.10. For 1980 and 1985 statistics see: State Planning Committee, Ten years of socio-economic 




that nothing was lost in translation, especially as it is highly unlikely that such 
staff had formal training in interpreting or translating. 
 The professional education and training of Lao health staff increased 
apace. Many Lao students continued to study abroad. 65  Domestic education 
options also expanded, in terms of the range of courses offered and the number of 
student places available. A disproportionate number of scholarships were for 
study in socialist countries: approximately 1,000 to 1,500 students were sent to 
study overseas each year from 1980, mainly to the Soviet Union and Vietnam,66 
although medical students also studied in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria and Mongolia and elsewhere. More than 17,000 Lao students received 
education and training at universities in the Soviet Union from the early 1960s 
until 1991, although it is not possible to say how many of these studied 
medicine.67 A UNICEF report mentions that more than 50 fellowships per year 
were provided to Lao doctors until 1989. 68  In addition, many Lao students 
upgraded their qualifications (nhok ladab) overseas, presumably from medical 
assistant to doctor, or from doctor to post-graduate specialist.69 Some ‘patriotic’ 
Lao students who returned from France in 1977 before having graduated were 
                                                 
65 I do not have statistics for medical students who obtained international scholarships. Archival 
sources indicate that the Ministry of Health was involved in selecting candidates for professional 
upgrading courses overseas, but not in selecting secondary school graduates to undertake 
university courses. 
66 Ng Shui Meng, ‘Social Development in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic: Problems and 
Prospects,’ in Laos: Beyond the Revolution, ed. Joseph J. Zasloff and Leonard Unger, Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1991, p.164. 
67 Elshad Talybov, First Secretary, Russian Embassy to Lao PDR (by telephone) on 19 June 2012. 
68 UNICEF, Children and Women, p.138. 
69 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup saphap kane viak-ngane 1 pii 1978’. 
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among those given the chance to complete their studies under the technical 
upgrading program.70 
 The poor standard of general education in the Lao PDR had a knock-on 
effect to the health sector, and created pitfalls for students abroad. Stuart-Fox 
notes that students returning from overseas “too often possessed diplomas, but 
little or no knowledge,” resulting from their low educational base and their lack of 
mastery of the foreign language of instruction. 71  Another scholar noted 
specifically of medical students that they “reported, not without some bitterness, 
that they went through their entire practical medical training courses without 
being allowed to handle certain medical equipment and patients because of 
inadequate background or skills”.72 
 An additional problem was the lack of a common professional language 
among returnees. In a “socialist bloc analogue to the Tower of Babel” doctors and 
other professionals returned home fluent in Russian, German, Hungarian or 
Vietnamese, for example, but without a common technical Lao vocabulary or 
lingua franca like French.73 
 Professional education opportunities in Laos also expanded considerably 
in the post-1975 period, and had the advantage of being mainly taught in Lao. The 
network of education institutions comprised the Medical University; mid-level 
health colleges in Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Pakse; and low-level health 
schools in every province nationwide. Ministry of Health institutes, including the 
                                                 
70 Lao PDR Ministry of Health administrator (anonymous), discussion, in Vientiane, October 2013. 
71 Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, p.193. 
72 Ng, ‘Social Development’, p.166. 
73 Evans, Politics of Ritual, p.161. 
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Traditional Medicine Institute, also offered short and longer-term upgrading 
courses. The Medical University provided high-level courses in medicine, which 
had commenced in 1968-69 under the RLG, and from 1981 for pharmacists. It 
also offered courses in mid-level pharmacy and dentistry, and low-level dental 
mechanics. Cohorts of medical students increased from 20 to 100 or more in 1978 
in response to the Ministry’s ambitious targets for its PHC network. Without a 
corresponding increase in the number or quality of teachers, facilities or learning 
materials, standards invariably fell.74 
The three mid-level health colleges were reincarnations of those 
established in the RLG period as low-level schools. (The NLHX mid-level college 
in Viengxay was handed over to the Army and no longer trained civilians.) The 
Luang Prabang and Pakse colleges re-opened in the late 1970s. In 1985 the mid-
level courses on offer included nursing, pharmacy, dentistry, laboratory analysis, 
prosthetics and orthotics, and physiotherapy. 75  The mid and low-level dental 
courses ceased in 1989, presumably due to funding shortages.76 
Large numbers of mid-level doctors or medical assistants (phet xanh kang 
or phet xouay) continued to be trained. Their course was reduced from four to 
three years, to speed their training and help fill vacancies in provincial and district 
locations. However, the WHO-supported course for registered nurses appears to 
have lapsed in the late 1970s, and was not re-introduced until the mid-1980s. 
                                                 
74 This point is acknowledged in a Ministry-produced human resources assessment in 1998 which 
states that pre-1990s the health development plans had focused on quantity at the expense of 
quality. See Ponemek Dalaloy et al, ‘Analysis on Health Manpower Management in Lao PDR’, 
December 1998, p.1. Also, MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, Apprentice Revolutionaries. 
The Communist Movement in Laos, 1930-1985, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 
University, 1986), p.240. 
75 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-17 ‘Bot-neua-nay… nak-khao tang-pathet’. 
76 Strigler et al, ‘Situation nutritionnelle’, p.129. 
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Finally, each province was responsible for establishing a low-level medical school 
and training its own nurses (phet xanh tonh). There was rhetorical commitment to 
standardising the curriculum – copies of curricula were prepared in the late 1970s, 
even though there was no budget or transport system to distribute them to each 
province, let alone monitor and support their implementation.77 
 Other plans, such as training in public health and midwifery, proved 
difficult to get off the ground. A Ministry report from early 1976 mentioned 
preparations for a School of Public Health (hong hian anamay).78 UNICEF was 
clearly frustrated the school had not opened by 1990, and listed the major 
obstacles: 
 
 … the structure and program of the school have only been drafted and still 
need approval; the delay is mainly linked to the difficulty in finding 
trainers at the top level who have the appropriate background and capacity, 
particularly in pedagogy. Other problems include: the unavailability of 
specified and agreed-upon profiles for each category of personnel; the 
scarcity of good translators; and the shortage of a well-supplied library. 79 
 
There was a similar delay in training midwives, despite the key role of Mother 
and Child Health in PHC programming. The 1976 report mentioned preparations 
for their training, but a course did not begin until 1987. 80 It ended abruptly five 
years later. Traditional medicine was added to the medical curriculum as early as 
1976,81 and political theory was incorporated into the curriculum at all levels from 
                                                 
77 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Lay-ngane saphap kane-kheuan-vay’. 
78 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Lay-ngane saphap kane-viak-ngane nay laya thi phane ma – 
phene-kane 3 deuan (deuan 4-5-6)’, (Report on the work situation for the previous period [and] 3 
month work plan (April-May-June)), 29 March 1976. 
79 UNICEF, Children and Women, p.139. 
80 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: Lay-ngane saphap-kane viak-ngane’. 
81 WHO, WPR/RC27/3, 1976, p.13 
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the late 1970s, in the hope that it would reduce the number of students fleeing into 
exile. 
 Professional education and training, as with staffing, continued to depend 
on international technical advisors. French instructors lectured at the Medical 
University until 1978, when a diplomatic dispute (discussed below) required all 
French advisors to depart. From 1979, they were replaced with technical advisors 
from the Soviet Union’s Techno-Export Company under contract to WHO.82 A 
Lao media release advises that the Soviet Union provided 20 instructors to the 
Medical University over the ten year period from 1979 until 1989. They assisted 
in the training of high-level doctors and pharmacists and mid-level dentists, and 
made preparations for the future introduction of a high-level curriculum for dental 
surgeons (stomatologists). Soviet advisors wrote lesson plans and wrote or 
compiled texts on 26 different subjects, of which more than 1,000 were printed. In 
addition, they supported the professional development of Lao instructors. They 
reported training 42 Lao instructors in the basic sciences, and sending another 
seven to the Soviet Union to complete four to five year courses, although their 
specialisation was not stated. 83 Vietnamese and Cuban advisors also contributed 
to professional education at the Medical University and the mid-level health 
colleges. Post-1975 in-country medical education was taught (mainly) in Lao, as 
more qualified Lao were now available to work as instructors. Textbooks and 
course notes began to appear in Lao, although French-language curricula persisted, 
and Lao-language notes sometimes relied heavily on French technical vocabulary. 
                                                 
82 WHO, WPR/RC32/3, 1979-1981, p.78. 




The Politics of Socialist Health: ‘Political Work’ 
 Marxist-Leninist doctrine held that personnel would transform the health 
service into one with socialist characteristics, requiring political as well as 
technical training. The Ministry of Health’s annual report for 1978 stated that staff 
were to be of good character (khounsombat) and have “good enough technical 
skills” (khouam samat dee pho khouan) and an understanding of the Lao PDR’s 
political aims and methods. 84  While perhaps alarming that high technical 
standards were not prioritised, the main focus rested on transforming the thought 
of health staff “to that of revolutionary socialist doctor/health workers (hay kay 
pen phet-moh pativat sangkhom-niyom) serving the people of all ethnic groups, 
[that is,] the workers”.85 
 In stark contrast with the old regime, political training and ideological 
guidance (viak-kane-meuang, seuksa-ob-hom lae nam-pha-neo-khit) were 
accorded important roles within the new regime’s Ministry. Significant time and 
effort was invested in exposing health staff to the foundations of socialist political 
theory and rooting out ‘enemies’. The presumption was that by training them in 
Party and State policies and resolutions, staff would be committed to their work 
and less likely to flee into exile. 
 The Ministry of Health’s Party cell managed the ‘political life’ (xivit 
kanemeuang) of its staff. Regular monthly, six-monthly and annual reports 
suggest that its political work was primarily concerned with monitoring ‘enemy 
activity’ (kane-kheuanvay khong satou) within the Ministry and its hospitals and 
                                                 




schools. Political training for staff and medical students; and the monitoring and 
reporting of staff motivation and attitudes towards their work and the new regime 
more generally, appear to have taken a secondary place. 
 References to ‘enemies’ feature frequently in internal Ministry reports 
through the early 1980s. In 1978 the Ministry suspected it was a special target of 
‘enemies’ due to its technical functions and high numbers of well-educated staff 
compared to other ministries. 86  Nearly every monthly report begins with a 
paragraph on enemy activity, although little hard evidence is cited beyond staff 
being ‘incited’ to flee overseas. Approximately 50 Vientiane-based health staff 
fled each year from 1976 until 1980, 35 in November 1979 alone.87 The Ministry 
claims that not all fled because of opposition to the new regime: some allegedly 
fled to join spouses, others to escape from family problems. 88  Stuart-Fox 
estimates that approximately ten percent of the population fled following the 
change of regime, including the vast majority of Laos’ tiny educated, urban 
population.89 
 Rare examples of overt ‘enemy’ activity are afforded by the reported 
sabotage of a pharmaceutical factory in 1976, presumably in Vientiane, and the 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Lay-ngane saloup yo deuan phachik (11/79)’ (Summary report 
for November (11/79)), 24 November 1979. 
88 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup viakngane deuan 1/1978’. 
89 Martin Stuart-Fox, Buddhist Kingdom, Marxist State: The Making of Modern Laos, (Bangkok: 
White Lotus, 1996), p.168. The monthly refugee flow was approximately 1,000 per month at the 
start of 1977 rising to 1,500 by year end; approximately 4,000 per month by year end in 1978; and 
in 1979 a peak of 6,000 in July. See MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, ‘Laos 1977: The 
Realities of Independence’, Asian Survey, 8(2), February 1978, p.167; Brown and Zasloff, ‘The 
EBB and Flow of Adversity’ Asian Survey, 19(2), February 1979, pp.98-99; and Brown and 
Zasloff, ‘Laos 1979’, p.107. 
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capture of seven ‘spies’ (nak seup) on Ministry premises in 1978.90 It is not clear 
who sabotaged the factory – the report simply states that the incident halted serum 
production, although medicines in tablet form continued to be produced.91 Nor do 
official reports identify the spies, who were handed over to the police and did not 
reappear in further reports. 
  The Ministry conducted mass political training sessions for staff and 
students to study key political documents. Comparisons between the old and new 
regimes and petty punishment of former RLG staff may also have been made, as 
hinted in the comments of a retired nurse: 
 
 They said the French surgeons [in Laos until 1978] exploited us, but they 
didn’t. They used to get angry/impatient, but that concerned the 
regulations. They were strict. They wanted us to follow the regulations … 
After Liberation, we all had to collect rubbish. Even though I was a 
doctor’s wife, I led the staff in collecting rubbish. I was a manager, so I 
had to lead the staff. We had to clean toilets. I led the way, I did it. I 
washed away shit and piss …92 
 
 Political training absorbed time and energy, and at times Ministry reports 
confessed that personnel had not read the entire policy documents, as they had to 
attend to their ‘specific work’ of healthcare provision. Senior Ministry staff were 
sent for political training, removing them from their duties for sometimes months 
at a time. A 1978 report noted that in some workplaces, no staff remained to 
                                                 
90 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup saphap kane viak-ngane 1 pii 1978’. 
91 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Lay-ngane sapharb kane-kheuan-vay’, p.6. 




provide healthcare as all were involved in training courses.93 Similar scenarios 
played out in other ministries. 
 Political training differed from re-education (tat sang), which included 
punishment. Some former RLG Ministry staff were despatched for political re-
education (sammana), although official sources do not dwell on this fact. A report 
from early 1976 states that 14 unnamed personnel who had been the subject of 
complaints were sent for political re-education in Viengxay in 1975. The same 
report mentions vaguely that some were sent to the Dong Dok university campus, 
and others re-educated on-site (presumably at the Ministry or Mahosot).94 Sicard 
mentions seven medical students arrested in October 1975 with no explanation, 
and never seen or spoken of again.95 In 1979, two Cabinet Office staff were 
detained and subsequently sent for re-education. The report gives neither names 
nor positions of the staff, nor any indication of their crimes or ‘mistakes’ (khouam 
phit-phat).96 
 Finally, ‘political work’ involved the close monitoring of staff attitudes 
and motivation. Morale had dropped by 1979 and 1980 due to ongoing economic 
problems, but possibly also due to problems in the politically-determined 
management system. In addition to overseas flight, there were resignations, 
requests for transfer and general lack of motivation in the work place. In 1980, 
after the launch of new currency and salary packages, it was observed that several 
                                                 
93 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup saphap kane viak-ngane 1 pii 1978’. 
94 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Lay-ngane saphap kane-kheuan-vay’. 
95 Sicard, Au nom de Marx, pp.110-111. 
96 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Hang lay-ngane saphap-ngane viakngane lae botbat khong 
hongvakane kasouang sathalanasouk’, (Draft report on the function and role of the Cabinet Office, 
Ministry of Health). 
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Ministry staff had turned to pushing barrows in the nearby fresh food market for 
extra income, causing them to arrive at work late, presumably physically fatigued 
and less motivated to perform their medical tasks.97 
 
The Economics of Aid and Self-Reliance: ‘International’ and ‘Policy Work’ 
The Lao PDR’s self-reliance policy was an awkward fit for the health 
sector, as it neither produced goods nor generated income. There was little 
funding for the Ministry, exacerbated by its ideologically-driven abolition of fee-
for-service healthcare. ‘International work’ was meant to attract development 
assistance to help expand and diversify the sector, and ‘policy work’ to 
supplement the low and irregular salaries. The domestic production of 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment and supplies, and the integration of 
traditional medicine contributed to the self-reliance policy. A subtle distinction 
between self-reliance and the acceptance of international development assistance 
appears in at least one Ministry document, which describes self-reliance (pheung 
ton-eng, koum ton-eng) as taking care of oneself, while international funding 
support provides a way to improve oneself “with the sincere assistance from 
fraternal (ay-nong) socialist nations”.98 
 ‘International work’ was an important strategy to keep the Ministry 
financially afloat. Despite strident criticism of RLG dependence on foreign aid, 
                                                 
97 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Layngane saphapkane lae viakngane deuan 1/1980 khong 
kasouang sathalanasouk’, (Ministry of Health monthly status and work report for January 1980), 1 
February 1980. 
98 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup saphap kane viak-ngane 6 deuan ton pii 1977’, 
(Summary Report on Work for the First 6 months of 1977), undated, p.8. 
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the new regime was equally dependent on external assistance.99 ‘International 
work’ was crucial to secure cooperation and assistance. Figures are not available 
for the percentage of health expenditure covered by international assistance 
during this period. However, one report estimated that 42 percent of 1988 
government health spending was covered by foreign aid.100 
 External assistance to the health sector was secured by senior Ministry 
staff who attended a heavy round of international conferences organised by 
agencies such as the socialist Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), WHO and the International Red Cross, and received official delegations 
from overseas. Cooperation agreements for assistance to the health sector were 
signed with a number of socialist nations, for example, the Soviet Union, 
Vietnam, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany.101 Agreements included 
the construction and upgrading of health infrastructure; provision of 
pharmaceuticals and medical equipment and supplies; provision of medical 
teachers and/or technical advisors, overseas medical scholarships and training; 
and treatment of Lao patients abroad. Agreements were generally short-term (one 
to two years), and subject to bilateral review and renewal at periodic intervals. It 
is important to note that a significant proportion of socialist assistance consisted 
of concessional loans rather than grant aid, which posed a significant change from 
the pre-1975 period when US assistance consisted overwhelmingly of grant aid. 
                                                 
99 No ready-analysed statistics are available to show whether the Lao PDR was more, or less, 
dependent on international development assistance than the former RLG. 
100 Report titled ‘Health Sector’ and likely to be written by WB, WHO or ADB in 1990, p.1. 
101 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-07: Lao-Czechoslovakia Cooperation Agreement (1977); and Lao-
Soviet Union Cooperation Agreement (1978); and 23-08: Lao-Hungary Cooperation Agreement 




 Development assistance was also received from multilateral donors such 
as the WHO and UNICEF, which had previously assisted the RLG. They were 
joined by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which 
assisted the resettlement of internal refugees displaced by the decades of fighting 
(and subsequently, Lao returning from Thai refugee camps), UNFPA, and a 
handful of non-socialist donors such as France, Japan and Sweden. The Soviet 
Union displaced France as the most influential donor to the Lao health sector, a 
position it maintained until its withdrawal in 1991. While the USSR was leading 
health development efforts in Laos, its own health sector was criticised by one 
scholar as “one of the most backward and neglected sectors of the country’s 
economy”.102 
 Impoverished, post-war Vietnam was the second most important donor to 
the Lao health sector, continuing the technical assistance it had begun in the 
Liberated Zone and proving that a nation does not have to be wealthy to provide 
development assistance. Vietnam constructed health facilities, provided shipments 
of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, contributed technical advisors to 
central and provincial-level health services, and offered scholarships for medical 
students. It also exchanged numerous official health delegations as part of 
national and provincial-level cooperation agreements. 103  It assisted Laos to 
                                                 
102 Marina Hepburn, ‘Review of Doctors and the State in the Soviet Union by Michael Ryan’, 
Soviet Studies, 42(4) (October 1990), p.823. 
103 Carlyle A. Thayer , ‘Laos and Vietnam: The Anatomy of a “Special Relationship,” in 
Contemporary Laos. ed. Stuart-Fox, pp.259-260. 
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conduct basic surveys of common diseases and local traditional medicine 
resources,104 and established a food safety laboratory in Vientiane.105 
 France continued to provide assistance to the health sector, mainly 
technical advisors to Mahosot and the Medical University, until 1978 when a 
diplomatic dispute compelled the advisors to leave.106 Japan returned as a major 
donor to the Lao health sector by the mid-1980s. In addition to funding the 
purchase of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies and equipment, Japan 
supported the construction of health infrastructure and purchase of medical 
equipment. Sweden became active in the health sector in the late 1980s, adding 
health, water supply and sanitation to its aid program for 1988-1990.107 
 WHO’s five-year health development program with Laos continued 
despite the change of regime. In 1976 there were 15 WHO-supported projects 
within the Ministry of Health, including Health Service Development, 
Organisation of Medical Care, Health Laboratory Services, Nutrition Services, 
Disease Prevention and Control, Application and Control of Pharmaceuticals, 
                                                 
104Ibid., p.260. 
105 Former Lao PDR health worker (anonymous), interviewed in Vientiane, Lao PDR, 22 June 
2012. 
106 Surprisingly scant information about the nature of the diplomatic dispute is available. 
Phongsavath Boupha offers perhaps the most complete explanation, stating: “… France staged 
hostile acts against the Lao Government through its Embassy in Vientiane which encouraged 
French and Lao citizens, academics and intellectuals to flee the country. In Paris, the French 
Government with its support to exiled Lao living in France waged a political campaign against the 
Lao PDR.” A Lao source which lists key dates in Lao history states that Lao diplomats were 
expelled from France on 3 July 1978 “for no reason,” eliciting an official complaint from the Lao 
government to the French Ambassador to Laos on 21 August 1978. Diplomatic relations between 
the two nations were upgraded more than three years later on 5 December 1981, and a Lao-French 
cooperation agreement was signed in Paris in 1989. See Phongsavath Boupha, Evolution of the 
Lao State, pp.137-138; and Institute of Historical Research, Bantheuk hetkane, pp.29, 31, 87, 191. 
107 Mark McGillivray et al, Evaluation Study of Long-term Development Cooperation between 
Laos and Sweden. (Stockholm: Sida, 2012,) p.68. 
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Family Health, Health Manpower Development, and Nursing Education.108 The 
WHO assistance budget ranged from USD 800,000 to 1 million per year in the 
late 1970s rising to approximately USD 1.4 million per year in 1986-87, and 
approximately USD 1.8 million per year in 1990-91.109 While these are not huge 
figures in themselves, they are expected to have represented a significant portion 
of the Lao health budget. UNICEF supported nutrition, immunisation, and water 
and sanitation activities, including the construction of wells and latrines in 
selected provinces. More modest assistance was received from international 
NGOs, notably the International Development Association from the Netherlands 
and Terre des Hommes. 
 The financial burden of being in the right place to secure international 
assistance was heavy, as was management and coordination. On return from an 
International Red Cross conference in 1986, a delegate reported: “The Lao and 
Vietnamese delegates pleaded repeatedly as instructed for the IRC to cover the 
costs of our hotels and per diems, but they refused despite our best efforts. They 
would only pay our airfare”.110 
The diverse spread of international donors exacerbated the management 
dilemma. It led one Lao official to remark in 1977 that it would be better if all 
international assistance to the health sector could be channelled through one 
                                                 
108 Projects are listed in WHO’s biennial WPR committee reports. 
109 The figures are drawn from WHO budget estimates rather than expenditure figures, and so do 
not reflect actual expenditure in Laos. See WHO Budget Estimates documents, WPR/RC27/2 
(1976), WPR/RC31 (1980), WPR/RC33 (1982), WPR/RC35/3 (1984) and WPR/RC37/5 (1986). 
110 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-21: ‘Bot-saloup kane-pay-houam kong-paxoum-sakon ka deng 
khang thi 25 you nakhone Geneve pathet Savit tae van-thi 23 ha 31 toula 1986’, (Report on 
participation in the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross in Geneva, Switzerland from 
23-31 October 1986),17 November 1986. 
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organisation.111 This was a pipe-dream. In 1979 the Lao PDR planned to approach 
at least 13 nations for assistance: Albania, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, 
Romania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam.112 The assistance requested in 1977 
reveals the extent of the Ministry’s dependence. The list included not only big-
ticket items such as the construction of hospitals, research laboratories and health 
schools, but items as seemingly minor as fabric to make bed sheets and 
uniforms.113 It also reveals the uncertainties the Ministry faced concerning the 
likelihood of securing international assistance: 
 
… we must request [assistance] from every country. We have to do it like 
this because we have based [this list] on our needs for both the short and 
long-term. But we don’t know who will agree to actually help us. 
Therefore, we must request assistance from every country. Take 
pharmaceutical factories, for example. 1 or 2 factories would be enough 
for us (if they were medium or large-sized factories) but in reality we need 
to request [a factory] from many countries because we don’t know who 
will help us. If we only request assistance from one country at a time, and 
we are not successful, we will have wasted a year [before we can resubmit 
the request]. Definitely there is a risk in requesting [the same thing] from 
many countries, because if many agree [to provide this assistance], from 
whom will we accept it? We will have to solve such a problem by 
following the line (neo thang) of the Party-state. 114  [emphasis in the 
original] 
 
While cooperation agreements spoke diplomatically of exchanging 
technical knowledge and experience, in nearly all circumstances cooperation took 
the form of a one-directional flow of assistance. This was a source of 
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embarrassment for some health officials, particularly in the first years of the Lao 
PDR.115 An official reasoned in the late 1970s that if the Ministry produced a 
small range of pharmaceuticals for export, it would have something to exchange 
rather than merely requesting assistance. The suggestion hints at the concern to 
preserve Lao dignity (kiad) in relations with fraternal nations, regardless of the 
country’s ability or otherwise to produce a surplus of pharmaceuticals for its own 
needs. The document reveals more than intended, though, when it lists the 
pharmaceuticals able to be produced domestically, and proceeds to assure officials 
in the Prime Minister’s Office: “This matter is not just a dream. On the contrary, it 
is a capability we really do have”. [my emphasis] Such comments suggest that 
official documents during this period may have at times grossly overstated a 
ministry’s actual skills, experience or available resources.116 
‘Policy work’, contrary to its connotations in English language, concerned 
the promotion of comprehensive staff well-being and livelihood, as well as 
socialisation. Policy work had a broader brief than the areas of salaries, working 
conditions and pensions. It also involved the promotion of membership in the 
Party’s mass organisations: the Lao Youth Union, the Lao Women’s Union, and 
the Lao Federation of Trade Unions. These organisations helped organise and 
motivate staff to participate in the regime’s wider policy agenda: the 
                                                 
115 Rare examples of Lao medical assistance to other countries include the largely symbolic 
provision of one set of surgical equipment to the newly established People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea; sending successive medical teams to work in Stung Treng province of Cambodia 
(which contains a significant ethnic Lao population, and borders the southern Lao province of 
Champassak) throughout the 1980s; and donating a shipment of traditional medicine to the Soviet 
Union following an earthquake in Armenia and Azerbaijan in December 1988. Dr Vanliem 
Bouaravong, Lao PDR doctor and administrator, interviewed in Vientiane, Lao PDR in July 2014; 
and photograph 91-5251 in the Khaosane Pathet Lao (Lao News Agency) archives, Vientiane, Lao 
PDR. 
116 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-03: ‘Phenekane kho kanesouay-leua pii 1979’. 
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establishment of a purchasing cooperative within the Ministry, which also 
distributed rationed goods; the establishment of an agricultural cooperative and 
the drafting of staff labour; participation in education upgrading, or in the 
Ministry’s arts and culture troupes or its various sporting teams; and guarding 
rosters at the Ministry’s various premises. 
Within the first months of 1976 the Ministry established a cooperative 
(sahakone) that made bulk purchases of meat, fish and vegetables from the market 
for staff, and opened a staff canteen. Both initiatives were intended to reduce the 
costs of food, fuel and time, dispensing with the need to visit the market, and to 
travel between work and home at lunchtimes. Moreover, staff were encouraged to 
raise livestock and grow their own vegetables.117 Another immediate ‘policy work’ 
plan was the provision of childcare facilities for staff, but the Ministry had to wait 
five years for an international donor to provide funding and building materials to 
construct its nursery/crèche. The Ministry soon took a sharp agricultural turn. A 
monthly report from 1977 juxtaposes Ministry tasks: in May it would send a 
representative to attend the World Health Assembly in Geneva, and raise ten more 
pigs.118 By 1978, in an effort to support agricultural production and the Party’s 
overall policy of agricultural self-reliance, the Ministry’s cooperative received 
increased attention. 
The Ministry’s various mass organisations rostered staff for agricultural 
and other forms of physical labour (ork heng ngane) in addition to their regular, 
                                                 
117 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Lay-ngane saphap-kane viak-ngane’, p.1. 
118 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-05: ‘Saloup-laygnane-hobetane khong kasouang sathalanasouk 
samlap deuan mesa 1977’, (Comprehensive monthly report of the Ministry of Health for April 
1977), 26 April 1977. 
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health-related work. Staff helped dig a dam reservoir and two irrigation canals at 
Nam Moun and Nam Xouang, within a 10-25 kilometre radius of Vientiane. For 
some staff, the agricultural labour requirements proved tough. One woman, a 
young mother at the time, recounted bitter memories of being sent to the 
countryside for one or two weeks at a time to dig irrigation canals or plant 
vegetables, leaving her children in their grandparents’ care. 119  Other staff 
reportedly enjoyed the camaraderie of communal labour, treating it as a physical 
competition that also earned one valuable political points (phon-ngane).120 
 By 1979, the Lao PDR’s peasant-style socialism was pushing the limits of 
the Ministry of Health’s agricultural prowess. Ministry reports displayed a strong 
agricultural focus. The various departments and hospitals each cultivated plots of 
land, to which all staff were required to contribute labour. For example, in 
September 1979 Mahosot staff planted rice fields, fruit trees and seasonal 
vegetables. The hospital was reported to have two buffaloes, 26 cattle, two horses 
(and a cart for market trips) and 280 ducks and geese, as well as six fish ponds. 
The Rehabilitation Centre’s rice fields were reported to contain “excellent rice” 
(khao ngame thi sout).121 Much of this agricultural produce made its way to the 
Ministry’s canteens, where staff were encouraged to eat communally to save time 
and money. Other produce was distributed as rations by the Ministry’s 
cooperative. The agricultural focus became so pronounced that during 1979, the 
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three staff members were sent to study agriculture and forestry, and another to 
study agricultural cooperatives. 
 ‘Policy work’ also promoted participation in social and cultural activities. 
Education upgrading was offered at a variety of levels: basic literacy training, the 
opportunity to complete lower secondary school, and for those who already had a 
higher education, foreign language classes in French, English, Russian and 
Vietnamese, which might increase one’s chance of a foreign scholarship.122 The 
Ministry’s arts and culture troupe organised singing contests and performed for 
international guests, as well as at important political occasions. Sporting 
competitions were often organised to celebrate the same events. 
 
Healthcare Services in the Early Lao PDR Period 
 Minister of Health Khamlieng informed foreign journalists in 1985 that 
comparing the RLG health service to the present one was like “comparing the 
earth with the sky”.123He provided no real basis for comparison, though, only a 
list of current achievements. And while the Ministry’s statistical improvements 
looked promising at first glance, there were the familiar, underlying problems of 
inadequate budgets, poor education and skills levels, and weak management and 
monitoring systems. Frequently the Lao PDR claimed to have introduced 
healthcare services that could more accurately be described as re-introductions of 
services that existed under the French, the RLG, or even its own forerunner, the 
NLHX. In this vein, the Ministry of Health launched an Expanded Program of 
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Immunization around 1982,124 a ‘pilot’ MCH Program in the 1980s, and a Water 
and Sanitation Program with assistance from UNICEF. The AML and the RLG’s 
Ministry of Health had run similar programs, but official rhetoric suggested these 
were completely new. One genuinely new function was the establishment, in 1988, 
of a National AIDS Committee. 
 MCH received less attention in the early Lao PDR period than under the 
RLG, despite the adoption of PHC policy. Somewhat bizarrely, a strong element 
of the MCH program became the construction of nurseries and crèches for the 
children of health staff, an activity more aligned with women’s participation in the 
workforce than with MCH.125  Moreover, the government characterised family 
planning as an immoral, un-Lao practice, despite it being a standard element of 
both MCH and PHC programming internationally. It would seem that the 
leadership worried about territorial incursions by larger and politically stronger 
neighbours, and was therefore preoccupied with increasing the population, 
regardless of the health effects on women. As a direct consequence, fertility and 
maternal mortality rates in Laos remained among the highest in the world 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Family planning returned in the late 1980s under 
the guise of ‘birth spacing’ in a WHO/UNFPA-supported project. It was approved 
not because it would potentially lower the birth rate, but rather because it 
promised to increase the survival rate of infants and mothers. Indicating that the 
                                                 
124 Dates are conflicting. The WHO website states 1984, but other sources cite 1979 and 1982. 
125 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-17: ‘Bot neua-nay …  nak-khao tang pathet’. 
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obsession with population numbers remained, one document referred to it as the 
“population increase” project.126 
 The water and sanitation program was delivered as part of the Lao PDR’s 
‘three cleans’ campaign (continued from the Liberated Zone), which encouraged 
people to eat clean food, drink clean water, live in a clean house/environment. 
Village-based ‘hygiene fighters’ told people to wash their hands, construct and 
use latrines, dig rubbish pits, and to pen animals away from their houses. The fact 
that the same campaign continues nowadays with the same basic messages 
demonstrates that the desired behaviour changes have proven difficult to achieve, 
and raises questions about the effectiveness of the communication methods. 
The use and production of pharmaceuticals were showcased as evidence of 
the regime’s technical and scientific advancement, but did not approach national 
coverage or sustainability. UNICEF was highly critical of the Lao pharmaceutical 
system: 
 
 Essential medical supplies are lacking and some drugs are in short supply 
at peripheral levels, while being kept shelved under bad storage conditions 
at upper levels, and expiring because of bad management and planning. 
Others are inadequately supplied or are inappropriate according to WHO 
guidelines on the rational use of essential drugs.127 
 
 The assessment of health sector performance through the early 1990s was 
often similarly unfavourable. The Ministry of Health failed to meet the targets of 
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its Five Year Plan for 1980-1985,128 and performance in the second Plan fared no 
better. Despite the impressive increase in district level health facilities, only 20 of 
the reported 110 facilities were actually delivering healthcare in 1989.129 Despite 
15 years of socialist heath policy, Laos continued to have some of the worst health 
indicators worldwide with life expectancy at birth averaging 46 years in 1990, and 
an infant mortality rate of 159/1,000.130 
A UNICEF publication concluded that “… despite quantitative 
improvements, the quality of the [Lao] health care system remains low …”. It 
revealed that the policy of PHC promotion had not been matched by a 
corresponding budgetary commitment. Only three percent of the Ministry’s 1988 
budget had been spent on PHC, compared to 75 percent on curative care. “The 
general picture”, UNICEF concluded, “seems to be that the construction of a 
nationwide primary health care system has totally failed [my emphasis], 
especially at community level, for financial, organizational and political 
reasons”.131  NGO CCL hinted at similar shortcomings, citing the “mediocre” 
quality of university training, “insufficient” base-line medical skills, and the 
frequent lack of supplies and equipment.132 
The new regime ascribed blame for poor performance to the effects of 
war, the maladies from the old regime, reactionism and international 
                                                 
128 Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, p.193. 
129 ADB, ‘Performance Evaluation Report. Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Primary Health 
Care Project’, Project No: PPE LAO 25109, Loan No: 1348-LAO (SF), May 2006, p.3. 
130 UNICEF, Children and Women, p.135. 
131Ibid., pp.135-137. 
132 Jean-François Favarel-Garrigues, ‘L’appui au service d’anasthésie-réanimation de l’hôpital 
Mahosot’, in Le Laos doux et amer. Vingt-cinq ans de pratiques d’une ONG, ed. Dominique 
Gentil and Philippe Boumard, (Paris: CCL-Karthala, 2005), p.284. 
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imperialists.133 Unsurprisingly, the authorities were reluctant to accept that their 
new policy approaches had not arrested the health sector’s poor performance but 
had in fact contributed to it. ‘Political work’ and ‘policy work’ undoubtedly took 
their toll, as did hospitality for the frequent international delegations. Added to 
these obstacles was the decentralisation period from 1987 to 1991. As UNICEF 
explained: 
 
… each level lacks the technical and financial resources necessary to 
support the level(s) below  it in training, supervision, technical 
assistance and specialised care for cases which are referred upwards. At all 
levels the system lacks planning and managerial skills which result in poor 
financial, budget and personnel management, inefficient supply of 
materials and drugs and very weak information and control systems.134 
 
The ultimate irony is that while government rhetoric boasted of the major 
steps in advancing the reach and effectiveness of the health service, high-ranking 
Party cadres sought healthcare at the exclusive Hospital Number 1, or in the more 
developed socialist nations. The Soviet Union, Vietnam, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany all offered free medical treatment in their 
countries for a quota of Lao patients each year, outlined in their assistance 
agreements. Even the Minister of Health, Tiao Souk, spent a month convalescing 
in East Germany in 1979.135 
 
  
                                                 
133 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Lay-ngane saloup viak 6 deuan ton pii 1979’. 
134 UNICEF, Children and Women, p.142. 
135 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-04: ‘Saloup lay-ngane yo deuan 9 1979’, (Summary report for 




The new regime made changes to the Lao health sector but few sustained 
improvements. It re-united the health service, expanded its network into new rural 
and workplace locations, and increased the number and diversity of its staff. The 
range of professional education and training available locally expanded 
considerably, allowing Lao to increasingly become the language of the workplace, 
although high-level staff and specialists trained overseas still struggled to find a 
common technical language. 
However, many of the new regime’s policies did not progress far beyond 
the realm of theory because the health service’s improvements lacked substance 
and could not be sustained without external development assistance. Large 
numbers of facilities, especially in the marginal rural and predominantly ethnic 
minority areas, offered no or low-quality health services due to insufficient 
budgets, equipment and supplies, and staffing. An unknown proportion of 
international and in-country health graduates possessed poor understanding of 
their technical field (visah saphoh) due to their rudimentary command of a foreign 
language, the low quality of their basic education, or the poor teaching skills of 
their instructors. The PHC policy was given considerable lip-service but little 
constructive support. The integration of traditional medicine with biomedicine 
suffered a similar fate, with grand rhetoric but little follow-through, and 
pharmaceutical use and production continued to be inconsistent. When 
international assistance levels declined in the late 1980s, many health facilities 
and education programs effectively closed. This situation highlighted the 
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contradiction inherent in the new regime’s policy of self-reliance, because little 
progress was achieved and/or sustained without ongoing external assistance. 
The Lao PDR’s quest to build a socialist health system that was ‘better 
than before’ outpaced its technical and management capacity to do so, as well as 
its implementation budget as the nation was listed as one of the poorest in the 
world. While some improvements were made to the sector, the overwhelming 
verdict is that the health service remained limited in coverage, poor in quality and 







THE POST-SOCIALIST TRANSITION TOWARDS  
MARKET-BASED HEALTHCARE (1991-2000) 
 
Introduction 
The 1990s was a transformative decade for Laos and the wider 
international community, as the collapse of the Soviet Union and regime 
changes in much of Eastern Europe ushered in the post-socialist period. These 
international political events deprived the Lao PDR of its major ideological 
guide and source of development assistance. They prompted wide-ranging 
changes in Lao government policies and practices which had been foreseen by 
‘new thinking’ (chinthanakane may), the Lao version of perestroika, and the 
market-oriented New Economic Mechanism (NEM) announced at the Fourth 
Party Congress in 1986, but which were still very much works in progress at 
the end of the 1980s.1 These changes led to significant diversification in the 
international development agencies supporting the health sector, the increased 
localisation of health-related professional education and training, and a range 
of policies, regulations and legislation which formalised the partial 
privatisation of healthcare services. 
The World Bank and the ADB filled the void in the Lao health sector 
left by the departing Soviet Union and several other socialist nations, as their 
policies broadened from economic development to focus also on social 
                                                            
1 For a discussion of the meaning behind chinthanakane-may, see: Norihiko Yamada, ‘Re-
thinking of “Chinthanakan-mai” (new thinking): New perspective for understanding Lao 
PDR’, Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) Discussion Paper No. 393, March 2013. 
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development. A plethora of smaller multilateral organisations, international 
NGOs and foreign universities also flocked to assist the health sector. The 
multilateral development banks approved multi-million dollar loans in the 
mid-1990s for projects intended to rehabilitate, modernise and improve the 
health network. Funding of this scale assisted health staff to make the 
ideological about-turn required by the NEM, discarding the principles of 
socialist health and embracing in its place a market-oriented system which 
allowed partial privatisation of healthcare services and the (re-) introduction of 
user-fees. 
The deluge of international donors clambering to support the Ministry 
of Health created special dilemmas. While the increased volume of funding 
promised opportunities to improve the health sector on a scale never before 
possible, is also placed heavy demands on the time, efforts and skills of the 
Ministry’s small pool of multi-lingual technocrats who were tasked with 
managing, coordinating and capitalising on these opportunities. The 
‘international work’ of the early Lao PDR period mushroomed into a full-time 
occupation for dozens of Ministry staff in the 1990s. What had previously 
comprised a steady stream of attendance at overseas conferences, hosting of 
visiting international delegations, and partnering with technical advisors from 
a limited number of nations became a whirlwind of interpreting, translating, 
policy-dialogue, project negotiations and fielding of counterparts, all standard 
requirements for effective cooperation with international development 
agencies. 
As in previous decades, ‘specific’, health-related work continued to 
jostle for position with the all-important external relations function of the 
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Ministry of Health, as the nation itself continued to be unable to cover the 
costs of its health sector. Only through international development assistance 
and cooperation could it secure the funding and technical assistance to support 
the operation of its under-funded, under-developed health service. The heavy 
reliance on securing and servicing international assistance meant that 
healthcare provision was still unable to be the Ministry’s primary focus. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the policy changes that took 
place within the Lao health sector in the 1990s. It contextualises the increasing 
role of multilateral and non-socialist bilateral development agencies, and their 
cooperation with the Ministry at central and local levels, and concludes by 
examining actual healthcare delivery and health indicators, as reported and 
assessed by international organisations. Data has been drawn primarily from 
Government of Lao PDR official plans and reports, as well as from 
multilateral and bilateral development assistance agencies. This chapter is also 
informed by personal experience, as I began working in the Lao development 
sector in 1998. 
 
Post-socialist structures and policies 
Lao PDR government ministries experienced considerable structural 
and policy change in the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union and regime 
changes across Eastern Europe resulted in an abrupt end to the relatively stable 
flow of socialist development assistance to the Lao PDR for the past 15 years. 
At the same time, the NEM began to filter down to the level of actual 
implementation. By the Fifth Party Congress of 1991, the outlined economic 
changes were comprehensive: a new economic structure, new management 
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techniques, cost accounting, investment, productivity, improved distribution of 
goods, greater recognition of the private sector, new tax and salary policies, 
recognition of the importance of foreign investments in national economic 
development, and the role of overseas Lao in the development of the national 
economy.2 
The Ministry of Health was restructured at least twice in the 1990s, 
first in 1993 and again in 1999, although it is not known to what degree the 
restructures were linked to the broader political and economic changes taking 
place nationally. The Ministry also added specialist functions to its structure, 
for example, centres for ophthalmology, tuberculosis and a Food and Drug 
Management Office between 1987 and 1991.3 
The 1993 restructure removed the Social Welfare function from the 
Ministry of Health, as well as Minister Khambou Sounixay, who transferred to 
a role at the National Assembly. He was succeeded in turn as Minister by two 
French-educated doctors, Vannareth Latsapho and Ponemek Daraloy. Both 
possessed the cultural, linguistic and technical skills required to serve as 
effective interlocutors in the emerging post-socialist environment. Vannareth, 
a Vice-Minister since 1980, was elevated to the position of Acting Minister of 
Health (latthamonty phang) in 1993, but may not have been ever appointed to 
full ministerial rank, judging by Lao media reports which referred to him 
alternately, and inconsistently, as Acting Minister and Minister from 1993 to 
1996.4 The reticence to appoint him as a full Minister may have been due to 
                                                            
2 Chou Norindr, ‘Laos in the Deadlock. Would Socialism Survive?’ Indochina Report, 
Singapore: Information and Resource Centre Pte Ltd, January-March 1992, p.2. 
3 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-46: ‘Saloup phon-ngane 5 pii tane sathalanasouk (1987-1991)’, 
(Summary of health achievements over 5 years (1987-1991), p.7. 
4 Senior staff from the Ministry of Health and the University of Health Sciences indicated they 
were unable to confirm the names and dates of service of the various Ministers and Vice-
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his RLG past, and his high-level technical and educational skills being 
overshadowed by his weaker political credentials. The rumoured persistence 
of bourgeois habits which sat uncomfortably with the public displays of 
socialist frugality required of the Lao PDR ruling elite at that time may have 




Ponemek’s revolutionary credentials outstripped those of Vannareth. 
He was appointed Minister of Health in 1996 following Vannareth’s 
premature death in office, and served as Minister until his retirement in 2011. 
After studies in France, he had served in the NLHX’s Liberated Zone as 
Director of the Central Hospital (Hongmoh sounkang) in Viengxay, and post-
1975 was appointed Director of the Cabinet Office in the Lao PDR’s Ministry 
of Health.6 He served in diplomatic postings to Cuba in 1989-1992 and China 
                                                                                                                                                           
Ministers at a seminar in Vientiane in June 2014. The WHO faced a similar dilemma when 
preparing a commemorative book on the organisation’s 60 years of cooperation with Laos in 
2012, with a request to the Ministry of Health unanswered. References to Vannareth in 
Ministry documents, radio broadcasts and press releases collected in the FBIS from 1993-1996 
alternate between according him the title of Minister of Health and Acting Minister of Health. 
The lack of uniformity suggests that he was officially Acting Minister of Health, even though 
he in fact performed the role of Minister. 
5 Khaosane Pathet Lao (Lao News Agency) photographic archives. 
6 An English language source suggests that Ponemek cared for American Prisoners of War 
(POW) in the Lao PDR after 1975, but there is no reliable evidence to substantiate this claim. 
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in 1992-1996 while waiting his turn as Minister. Ponemek scraped into the 
Party’s Central Committee in 2001 as its lowest-ranked member, after serving 
as Minister of Health for five years. Despite the differences in the political 
careers of the two men, both were well-qualified to lead the Ministry of 
Health’s process of policy change and international donor negotiations 
throughout the 1990s. 
 
The abandonment of socialist health policy 
The 1990s witnessed the abandonment of much of the socialist health 
policy introduced in the early Lao PDR period. Its key elements had been the 
elimination of private healthcare providers, the free provision of healthcare 
and pharmaceuticals, the promotion of traditional medicine and its integration 
with biomedicine in government health facilities within a PHC model. Stuart-
Fox argues convincingly that the Lao PDR was only ever in transition towards 
socialism, before deciding to take a policy step backwards towards a market-
oriented capitalist-style economy.7 The health sector was caught up in the 
overall policy transition. The Ministry of Health’s vision of a comprehensive 
socialist health system was still a work in progress at the time that the party 
and government adopted the NEM and market-based economics. The policy 
changes paved the way for the official endorsement of private pharmacies and 
clinics, and ultimately, the re-introduction of user fees, which was anathema to 
socialist health. Paradoxically, while these key elements of socialist health 
                                                                                                                                                           
See Bill Hendon and Elizabeth A. Stewart, An Enormous Crime. The Definitive Account of 
American POWs Abandoned in Southeast Asia, (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2007), 
pp.239-241. 
7 The LPRP did not abandon socialism altogether. It rationalised that its final goal remained 
socialism, but it was necessary to pass through a phase of capitalism (of indefinite duration) in 
order to reach it. See Stuart-Fox, History of Laos, pp. 194-195. 
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policy were dismantled, much of the socialist rhetoric endure, making for 
strange juxtapositions in the health system in future years.8 
The official authorisation of private pharmacies and clinics in the late 
1980s and early 1990s respectively signalled the first steps in the 
dismantlement of socialist health policy, paving the way for what Jönsson 
describes as a “partially privatised” sector.9 In 1987 the Ministry of Health 
allowed current or retired pharmacists, doctors and assistant doctors to own 
and operate pharmacies selling a regulated list of pharmaceutical items and 
medical products outside of government working hours. Pharmacies were 
categorised as Class One, Two or Three, depending on the owner’s level of 
pharmacology training. Official authorisation of private clinics followed in 
1992.10 Similar to pharmacies, clinics were allowed to be owned by current or 
retired government health workers, and operated outside of government 
working hours. For the most part, they were individual businesses run from 
small shop-fronts erected in front of the health worker’s own home or a room 
inside the home.11 
The number of private pharmacies multiplied rapidly. They increased 
nearly 60-fold in the first decade, from approximately 32 in 1986 to 1,850 in 
1995. 12  Most were located in Vientiane, and the remainder in the larger 
provincial towns, and overwhelmingly in the lowest, Class Three category, 
                                                            
8 A translation of MOH’s Seventh Five-Year Health Sector Development Plan (2011-2015), 
talks of focusing on “a contribution to reach the IXth Party resolution’s major targets 
including the 4 breakthroughs (Ideology, human resource, management and poverty 
eradication), the fast track change to industrialization and modernization in the direction 
towards socialism and the reaching [of] all [the] MDGs targets including the targets for health 
sector and for others”. See Ministry of Health, ‘Seventh Five-Year Health Sector 
Development Plan (2011-2015)’, (Vientiane: MOH, October 2011), p.3. 
9 Kristina Jönsson et al, ‘Health Policy Evolution’, p.5. 
10 Strigler et al, ‘Situation nutritionnelle’, pp.124-125. 
11 Lao ‘clinics’ were modest versions of what would be called a ‘surgery’ in Australia, or a 
‘cabinet de médecine’ in France. 
12 Jönsson et al, ‘Health Policy Evolution’, p.4. 
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that is, shops owned by health workers (not necessarily trained pharmacists) 
permitted to sell a limited range of pharmaceuticals. The tendency was for 
pharmacies to remain open all day, often staffed (illegally) by an unqualified 
relative or shop assistant. The growth in private clinics followed a similarly 
rapid trajectory. Most clinics did not offer access to high quality diagnostic 
equipment, due to its high capital costs. The selling point was guaranteed 
access to a doctor’s time and attention, services not guaranteed within 
government health facilities. Following the authorisation of private pharmacies 
and clinics, the Ministry issued a Decree on the Establishment of Private 
Hospitals in 1998. However, until 2012 the WHO reported that no private 
hospitals operated in the Lao PDR.13 
The policy change to support privatised healthcare signalled a 
potentially awkward development in party/state rhetoric, which from the early 
Lao PDR period had represented the private clinical work of RLG staff as 
being symptomatic of personal greed, class-based exploitation and absence of 
revolutionary spirit. Despite the inconsistency in policy and rhetoric, the 
about-turn was accepted by the Lao public without major ado, perhaps due to 
the woefully low condition of government healthcare services in the 1980s. In 
addition, Jönsson suggests that many private establishments had been 
operating unofficially before their authorisation, and that therefore the policy 
move was as much about regulating an existing practice as it was about 
introducing a new one.14 
                                                            
13 WHO/Ministry of Health, Health Service Delivery Profile. Lao PDR 2012, p.1, available on 
the WHO’s regional office website, 
http://www.wpro.who.int/health_services/service_delivery_profile_laopdr.pdf 
14 Jönsson et al, ‘Health Policy Evolution’, p.4. 
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The re-introduction of privatised healthcare provided many 
government staff with an economic side line to supplement their modest 
salaries. It did not represent, however, the formation of a medical cadre 
separate to the government cadre – as those who operated private clinics also 
worked within the Ministry or its local branches. However, it is interesting to 
note that even though the public and the private health systems were staffed 
with the same health workers, patients with the ability to pay often chose the 
private over the public option. 
The government made its most decisive step in moving away from 
socialist healthcare in 1995, when it introduced user-fees in government health 
facilities. Prime Ministerial Decree 52 authorised fees for treatment and 
diagnostics tests, as well as the sale of drugs through Revolving Drug Funds.15 
The ADB and the World Bank reasoned that revenue earned from user-fees 
would help to finance the recurrent operating costs of health facilities and 
therefore improve the quality of basic service delivery. Alain Noël, a medical 
advisor with international NGO, CCL reasons that the Lao government was 
forced to consider the alternative of user-fees based on the very poor 
performance of the health service in the 1980s. With some of the lowest levels 
of per capita health spending in Laos witnessed in the 1980s, and staff salaries 
comprising an increasing proportion of the health budget, there were virtually 
no funds for maintenance, medicines or supplies. Noël observes that this 
situation resulted in degraded and under-equipped health facilities and staff 
with low levels of motivation. User-fees were understood as a pathway out of 
                                                            
15 Prime Ministerial Decree 52/PM of 26 June 1995; cited in Christophe Jacqmin and 
Marianne Beseme, ‘Le recouvrement des coûts de santé: expériences locales et politiques 
nationales’, in Le Laos, doux et amer. Vingt-cinq ans de pratiques d’une ONG, ed. Dominque 
Gentil and Philippe Boumard, (Paris: CCL-Karthala, 2005), p.303. 
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the mess.16 Unfortunately, official records made available for consultation in 
the National Archives reveal little of the internal discussions that took place in 
the lead up to this policy decision and resulting decree. 
In fact, the Ministry of Health had experimented with user-fees for 
some years prior to the issuance of Prime Minister’s Decree 52. The Ministry 
had approached CCL to develop a “paying hospital” in 1988-1990, and the 
two organisations trialled the practice in the relatively isolated district hospital 
of Pakkading in Bolikhamxay province from 1989 until 1994. CCL assisted 
the Ministry to expand cost recovery to Bolikhamxay provincial hospital in 
1992,17 while NGOs Médecins sans Frontières Belgium (MSF Belgium) and 
Médecins sans Frontières France (MSF France) are reported to have 
conducted similar user-fees trials in Champassak and Salavan provinces at 
around the same time.18 
The policy provided for fee exceptions for current and retired 
government staff and party cadre, army veterans, Buddhist monks, students 
and the poor.19 Problems were encountered with fee exemptions for the poor, 
mainly because the method of deciding who was poor and therefore entitled to 
an exemption was highly subjective. Regardless, the Ministry maintained in 
2000 that “the introduction of a cost recovery system has improved equity”.20 
Jönsson observes that problems arose in part because of the pressure for each 
health facility to raise sufficient funds to cover its own operating budget. In 
addition, it proved difficult to identify the genuinely poor. Initially, it was 
                                                            
16 Ibid., pp.293-306. 
17 Ibid., pp.294-297. 
18 Ibid., p.301. 
19 Ministry of Health, ‘Health Strategy up to the Year 2020. A Discussion Paper Prepared for 
the Donor Round Table Meeting’, (Vientiane: MOH, May 2000), p.27. 
20 Ministry of Health, ‘Policy of Primary Health Care’, p.8. 
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thought that one’s local village chief would issue a certificate attesting to 
one’s poverty, but it quickly unravelled into a system of nepotism, where 
friends and relatives were classified as poor and received free treatment.21 The 
situation observed by CCL in Bolikhamxay provides some insight. It noted 
that in many instances the poor were required to pay fees, whereas exemptions 
were granted for health staff and their “ever-expanding families”.22 To correct 
the problems of Decree 52, the Ministry began preparing a replacement Health 
Care Law in 1997. However, eight years elapsed before the law was 
promulgated in 2005.23 One of the main points picked up in the Health Care 
Law, and not addressed in the original decree, was the need for health 
insurance to assist the poor in paying for healthcare.24 
The profile of traditional medicine, another hallmark of socialist health 
policy, subsided from its immediate post-war heyday. Traditional medicine 
practice in Laos was less formalised than it was in either China or Vietnam, 
and had therefore proved more difficult to integrate into the formal, 
biomedical sector. Staff with traditional medicine expertise continued to be 
included on Ministry of Health staff lists into the 1990s, although they were 
often located in the more remote districts and at the lower rungs of the 
professional hierarchy. This pattern suggested many had been recruited locally 
rather than from the pool of health graduates. Their employment could well 
                                                            
21 Kristina Jönsson, ‘Policy making in transitional economies: Poverty reduction and health 
care in Cambodia and Laos’, Studies in Health Services Organisation and Policy, 23, 2008, 
p.173. 
22 Jacqmin and Beseme, ‘Le recouvrement des coûts’, p.299. 
23 Jönsson et al, ‘Health Policy Evolution’, p.6. 
24 Articles 44-50 of the Health Care Law (2005) address health financing and in particular, the 
various health insurance schemes available; eg: community health insurance funds, civil 
servants health insurance funds, enterprise health insurance funds, private health insurance 
funds and public welfare health insurance funds. Article 50 addresses Public Welfare Health 
Insurance Funds, which are said to be “established by the State to assist the poor and people 
with low incomes, who are unable to pay their membership contributions in any other health 
insurance fund.” See Government of Lao PDR, ‘Health Care Law’, 2005. 
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have been motivated as much by the Ministry’s policy imperative to have 
health workers stationed in as many remote locations as possible, as by its 
promotion of traditional medicine.25 
 
Primary Health Care policy 
Primary Health Care (PHC) was one of the few tenets of socialist 
health policy retained by the Lao PDR in the post-socialist period. It was 
overhauled, though, in the wake of scathing performance reviews in the 1980s. 
The growing number of international donors, and their support for PHC, seems 
to have been a factor in the Ministry’s ongoing PHC endorsement and 
continued implementation efforts nationwide. From the mid-1990s, PHC was a 
central component of internationally-funded health projects of the ADB, the 
World Bank and Save the Children Fund Australia, among others.26 By 2000, 
a total of 16 international organisations, comprising multilateral and bilateral 
donors as well as international NGOs, were assisting the Ministry to deliver 
healthcare services through a PHC framework.27 
The Ministry of Health launched a formal PHC policy in 2000, after 25 
years focus on PHC. The Ministry confirmed that it “endorses Primary Health 
Care as the first priority of the health sector, in order to expand basic health 
services to the grassroots.” It went on to state that the PHC policy was: 
 
                                                            
25 For example, an extensive listing of provincial and district health staff in Khammouane 
province, prepared by JICA consultants in 1994, shows only nine staff employed in the 
provincial traditional medicine division, and another three staff in the poorest and most remote 
district, Boualapha. No other districts were reported to employ traditional medicine staff. See 
O. Sumiko, ‘JICA PHC Project, Data on PHC Implementation 1993-1994, Thakhek, 
Khammouane, Lao PDR’, 1994, pp.5, 8. 
26 Save the Children Fund Australia has since merged into the federation of Save the Children 
International. 
27 Ministry of Health, ‘Policy on Primary Health Care’, p.18. 
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... an important and essential guide to as well as a management base at 
the macro level of the Health sector, It defines clear direction, 
principles, strategies, components, the organization, actual activities, 
role [sic] and responsibilities, and relationship among each levels [sic] 
of the health services, village, sub-district health center, district, 
provincial and central levels.28 
 
New donors encouraged the Ministry of Health to go beyond the 
construction and/or rehabilitation of rudimentary village-level health centres 
(souksala) and appointment of poorly trained, poorly supervised low-level 
staff, to also focus on improved delivery, monitoring and support. PHC 
activities broadened to include basic management skills in planning, 
implementing and reporting on project activities for district and village-level 
health staff, and funding for outreach work. Central-level Ministry staff were 
involved in project activities, often as trainers or intermediaries between 
international technical advisors and Lao health staff in rural areas. Despite the 
Ministry’s all-encompassing policy statement and directives on PHC, it seems 
that it was well aware of the gap between policy and practice. It conceded that 
its performance left much to be desired, stating: 
 
Coverage of the network of basic health services is not yet complete. 
Many areas in the country have no coverage, and services do not reach 
ethnic [minority] populations in the remote regions where the services 
are most needed.29 
 
The reach of the health service continued to be a challenge throughout the 
1990s. The most highly-trained health staff were reluctant to work in rural 
areas, and staff and potential students from remote areas rarely had the 
opportunity to train or upgrade their skills, or to benefit from supportive 
                                                            
28 Ibid., p.2. 
29 Ibid., p.7. 
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supervision from higher-ranking staff based in the urban centres. Moreover, 
the limited transportation network (roads, rivers, and expensive air transport) 
made it difficult to keep health facilities adequately supplied. 
 
Pharmaceutical policy 
Pharmaceuticals, the fetish of the early Lao PDR period, underwent on 
a process of standardisation. Formal pharmaceutical policies and regulations 
were prepared and formalised with assistance from SIDA, the Swedish 
government’s international development agency and the Karolinska Institute. 
The small number of state-owned and joint-venture pharmaceutical factories 
continued production, but under new economic conditions brought about by 
the NEM. 
Official concern at the influx of counterfeit drugs into the country and 
the rapid increase in private pharmacies prompted the Ministry of Health to 
request donor support to construct and outfit a drug quality control laboratory. 
Technical advisors from SIDA convinced the Ministry to formulate wider 
policies and practices to regulate the pharmaceutical sector rather than rely 
solely on a new laboratory. A policy development process was begun in the 
early 1990s, before the entry of many other international development 
agencies placed conflicting demands on Ministry staff. The project bore quick 
results, with a National Drug Policy issued in 1993. SIDA assistance 
continued for a decade to embed the implementation of the policy within the 
health and administrative environment. 30  
                                                            
30 Jönsson et al, ‘Health Policy Evolution’, p.5. 
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Lao pharmaceutical needs were met by a combination of local and 
imported supplies. The production capacity and range of the state-owned 
factories, Pharmaceutical Factory No. 2 and No. 3 and the military-owned 
Factory 104, were unable to meet local demand, and so imported 
pharmaceuticals, both legal and illegal, filled the gap. 31  A complicated 
management arrangement existed between the state-owned factories, the 
Ministry’s Department of Pharmacy and a state-owned company in charge of 
marketing the products. From available documents in the National Archives, it 
is not possible to understand how the roles and responsibilities of the factories, 
the company and the Ministry were divided, and where accountability and 
decision-making was located. 
 
Other legislative and regulatory developments 
In addition to the PHC and the National Drug policies, a number of 
other health-related policies and laws were formulated during this decade, 
including the National Reproductive Health Policy (1995), the National Policy 
on Population and Development (1999), and the Law on Drugs and Medical 
Products (2000). Policies and laws were often drafted by international 
technical advisors in English to satisfy donors who required such 
documentation as a condition of their funding, and translated into Lao 
afterwards. In such circumstances, the extent of the involvement of Ministry of 
Health staff is unclear. In my work as an international development 
practitioner, it appeared that some Ministry staff had minimal awareness 
and/or understanding of the many health-related policies, guidelines and laws, 
                                                            
31 I thank Audrey Bochaton for sharing information on her interview of Dr Sananh 




which could have been due to the narrow involvement of only those staff who 
spoke foreign languages. 
 
The World Bank, ADB and other new donors 
Lao government funding for health hovered around five percent of the 
national budget throughout the 1990s, and a smaller percentage of GDP, 
according to the ADB.32 Government budgets covered little more than basic 
administrative costs and the modest salaries of health staff, which eroded 
towards the end of the decade as the Asian financial crisis brought about 
triple-digit inflation in the Lao PDR. If 42 percent of government health 
spending was estimated to have been covered by foreign aid in 1988,33 the 
figure had risen to almost 56 percent in 1992-93.34 The Ministry of Health 
itself estimates that throughout the 1990s, approximately 75 percent of public 
expenditure on health was funded by international assistance.35 
International development assistance agencies attempted to plug the 
funding gap that resulted from the low levels of government investment in the 
health sector. Whereas most technical and financial assistance in the previous 
15 years had come from the Soviet Union and other socialist nations, the new 
donors constituted a more diverse group. They included newcomers such as 
the World Bank, the ADB, the European Union (EU), Australia, Belgium and 
Luxembourg, who joined existing donors France, Japan and Sweden, as well 
                                                            
32 ADB, ‘Performance Evaluation Report’, p.8. 
33 Report titled ‘Health Sector’ and likely to be written by World Bank, WHO or ADB in 1990, 
p.1. 
34 The World Bank estimated total health expenditure for 1992-93 as follows: 19 percent 
domestically financed by Lao government; 24 percent externally financed by aid (through Lao 
government), and the remaining 57 percent financed by out-of-pocket by Lao households 
themselves. World Bank, Lao PDR Social Development Assessment and Strategy, 
(Washington DC: World Bank, 15 August 1995), pp.35-36. 
35 ADB, Performance Evaluation Report’, p.4. 
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as Vietnam, Cuba and China. In its Five Year Health Plan of 1996-1999, the 
Ministry chose to highlight the generosity of Japan above other donors.36 The 
technical and financial contributions of international NGOs to directly support 
the Ministry of Health also played an increasingly important role over the 
decade, many of them funded by bilateral donors. 
Meanwhile, the role of UN agencies subsided as the 1990s progressed, 
despite the increased profile of human development within the UN’s global 
programming. WHO and UNICEF were arguably the most influential donors 
to the Lao health sector, despite their relatively modest financial contributions. 
WHO funded a range of activities under project titles that became increasingly 
generic, and therefore difficult to interpret externally, within a country 
program of approximately USD 1.25 million to 1.75 million per year. In 1991-
1992 the WHO’s projected funding for the Lao PDR topped USD 3.8 million 
over two years, its highest amount to date.37 UNFPA expanded its support to 
reproductive health and population policy, education and service delivery, and 
UNICEF continued its long-term support to the Ministry’s water and 
sanitation activities, as well as MCH, along with separate activities supporting 
education and gender-sensitive development, although budget estimates and/or 
expenditure figures are not available.38 
By the end of the decade, the World Bank and the ADB had displaced 
the United Nations agencies as the key donors and coordinating agencies 
within the sector. The multilateral banks provided low-interest concessional 
                                                            
36 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, KS/Satha 09-100.2: ‘Saloup kane-patibat phene-kane 
sathalanasouk pii 1996-1999 lae thit-thang nay to-nah’, (Summary of health implementation 
1996-1999 and future directions), Vientiane, 1999, p.2. 
37 Figures collated from WHO budget projections (not expenditure) in the following reports: 
WPR/RC39; WPR/RC41; WPR/RC43; WPR/RC45; WPR/RC47; and WPR/RC49. 




loans, whereas the EU provided grant-aid. The banks and the EU all launched 
large health projects in 1995, after several years of preliminary feasibility 
missions and studies. The Lao Health Reform and Malaria Control Project was 
the World Bank’s first concessionary loan to the Lao health sector. It planned 
to operate over six years from 1995 to 2001, but was ultimately extended until 
2004 due to slow disbursement and low government management capacity. 
The project consisted of a low-interest loan worth USD 19.8 million, 
supplemented by a financial contribution from the Lao government.39  The 
project received parallel funding from the Belgian government’s development 
cooperation agency, Belgian Technical Cooperation. Project components 
consisted of basic health service provision in the southern provinces of 
Savannakhet and Sekong, pilot activities in Champassak and Xaysomboun 
Special Zone, malaria control activities in eight provinces, and health 
education activities nationwide.40 
The Primary Health Care Project was the ADB’s first foray into the 
Lao health sector. At USD 5.8 million over six years, its loan was smaller and 
less ambitious than that of the World Bank. The project design was also 
simpler, focusing on PHC-related activities, including construction and repair 
of infrastructure, training staff and supporting outreach services and the 
establishment of revolving Drug Funds to ensure a supply of essential drugs to 
district hospitals and villages. The project was designed as a pilot, and 
operated in Xieng Khouang and Oudomxay provinces only, but with the 
                                                            
39 World Bank, ‘Implementation Completion Report (IDA 26740) on a Credit in the Amount 
of USD 19.2 million to the Lao People’s Democratic Republic for the Health Systems Reform 
and Malaria Control Project’, June 30, 2005, p.1. 
40 Ibid., p.2. 
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intention to scale up when a workable model was up and running.41 
The introduction of these large projects funded by loans, plus the 
introduction of myriad smaller grant-funded projects quickly made 
coordination of health activities very complex. For example: the EU initiated a 
multi-year, nationwide Malaria Control Programme designed to complement 
the World Bank’s effort. The Swedish government’s support for the three-
phase National Drug Policy Program began in 1992 and extended until 2003. 
In 1997 the Australian government’s development cooperation agency, 
AusAID, initiated a Health and Social Development Project focusing on basic 
health service delivery in the northern provinces of Houaphan and Phongsaly. 
Another government development agency, Luxembourg Development (Lux-
Dev) began support to the health sector in the same year. International NGOs 
tended to support smaller implementation sites, and engage less 
comprehensively with the government health service than bilateral 
development agencies. Save the Children Fund Australia was an exception. It 
commenced a PHC project in 1992 in two districts of Xayabouly province, 
providing technical and financial assistance to provincial and district-level 
health services, and over the next decade gradually expanded to cover all ten 
districts of the province. In 2007 the project expanded to include the 
neighbouring province of Luang Prabang within its mandate.42 
By the close of the 1990s internationally-funded projects dominated the 
health sector, and extended across the nation in a patchwork manner, covering 
dissimilar selections of health activities in some but not all provinces and/or 
                                                            
41 Asian Development Bank (ADB), ‘Performance Evaluation Report. Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic. Primary Health Care Project.’ Project No: PPE LAO 25109, Loan  No: 
1348 (LAO-SF), May 2006, p.v. 
42 Carol Perks, Advisor to Save the Children International, interviewed in Xayabouly, Lao 
PDR, 17 February 2012. 
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districts. A Steering Committee for Monitoring International Assistance was 
established by the Ministry of Health in an effort to keep tabs on the high 
degree of donor activity, and the increasing size and complexity of 





























1992    8.4m45 8.61m 20.68m 38.18m  8.54 
1993   
1994    16.3m 8.43m 26.21m 50.68m  11.26 
1995   
1996       
1997    8.31m 22.05m 42.09m 72.45m  14.94 
1998   
1999    5.55m 21.69m 34.3m 61.63m  11.81 
2000   
 
The Ministry’s coordination efforts could only achieve so much. It was 
not possible to produce increased numbers of qualified staff required for 
‘international cooperation’ overnight, nor was it possible to streamline the Lao 
government’s unwieldy bureaucratic processes. As such, many internationally-
funded health development projects operated at glacial pace. Speeding the 
pace would have meant bypassing engagement – and therefore development 
processes – with the limited numbers of Lao government counterparts. 
 
Contraction and consolidation of the health network 
                                                            
43 Ministry of Health, ‘Health Strategy up to the Year 2020’, p.18. 
44 ADB, ‘Performance Evaluation Report’, p.8. 
45 Health expenditure figures for 1992-93; 1994-95; 1997-98; and 1999-2000 are from Audrey 
Bochaton, ‘Pai Thaï, pai fang nan’, p.60. 
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The health network contracted and consolidated throughout the 1990s, 
mainly at the local level, after its growth spurt in the previous decade. 
Supported by the various international development agencies, attention shifted 
from the construction of new health facilities to supporting their actual 
operation. Concerns included the poor equipment and supply of facilities, the 
low level of maintenance and the Ministry’s inability to staff them 
appropriately. 
Operational problems were found throughout the health network. Much 
of the health infrastructure inherited from the former RLG regime, particularly 
at central and provincial-level, was aging and in need of maintenance and/or 
upgrading. At local level, most district hospitals and tasseng-level souksala 
lacked pharmaceuticals and medical supplies at the beginning of the decade, 
and few facilities had electricity connections or running water, even at decade 
end.46  Many souksala established in the early years of the Lao PDR had 
quickly fallen into disrepair due to poor construction, insufficient 
maintenance, and the neglect of management staff at higher levels within the 
health service. Poorly trained health staff provided low quality healthcare, on 
the occasion that they actually attended the workplace, which in turn 
contributed to the very low usage rates recorded for government health 
facilities. In response, the Ministry and international donors attempted to 
improve the standards of infrastructure, equipment and supplies, the staffing, 
and healthcare delivery at all levels of the network, but with particular focus 
on the local level, in accordance with the Ministry’s ongoing PHC policy. 
                                                            
46 Asian Development Bank, Health and Education Needs of Ethnic Minorities in the Greater 
Mekong Sub-Region. Lao PDR Country Report, (Manila: ADB, June 2000), p.5. 
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Statistically, the overall numbers of both health facilities and hospital 
beds declined throughout the decade as attention belatedly turned to quality 
rather than purely quantity of facilities. The numbers of central and provincial 
health facilities remained reasonably stable, and district hospitals increased 
slightly from 115 in 1990 to between 121-126 in 2000. The most dramatic 
change occurred at sub-district level, where souksala, the cornerstone of the 
PHC network, reduced by 42 percent, from 937 in 1990 to between 524- 566 
in 2000.47 
The PHC approach continued to place high importance on souksala, 
but it was clear that poor quality buildings with absent staff and no supplies 
served no purpose other than to boost statistics. The development banks were 
keen to apply economic and demographic logic to the location of future 
facilities. The ADB loan project included funds for the construction of 73 new 
souksala, in addition to three district hospitals, and renovation of additional 
facilities.48 It noted that previously souksala had been constructed in areas 
where population density was too low to ensure the facility’s viability. From 
the project’s second phase it recommended that each souksala needed a 
surrounding population of at least 3,000 to 4,000 people to be “practical and 
affordable”.49 Recommendations of this nature created an awkward situation 
for the Ministry which since the change of regime had promised healthcare 
services for all rural communities regardless of size or location. However, Lao 
promises could only be realised with external funding, and without financial 
                                                            
47 The 1990 figures are provided by the State Planning Committee, whereas those for 2000 are 
from the Ministry of Health and the State Planning Committee. See State Planning Committee, 
1975-2000. p.133; and Ministry of Health/State Planning Committee, Health Status of the 
People in Lao PDR, (Vientiane: MOH/SPC, January 2001), p.1. 
48 ADB, ‘Performance Evaluation Report’, p.v. 
49 Ibid., p.16. 
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support from the ADB or other international donors, the Ministry was unable 
to build new or revive existing facilities. 
While the Ministry of Health claimed that support to local-level health 
facilities was its major focus of activity, given its ongoing rhetorical support of 
PHC, in actual fact it was distracted by assistance to central and provincial-
level infrastructure. International donors funded the construction of a number 
of new hospitals during the 1990s, sometimes displaying poor coordination 
between themselves and the Ministry. 
In 1999 the Japanese government agreed to fund construction of a new 
hospital at Done Koy on the outskirts of Vientiane Capital to replace 
Setthathirat hospital, built by Operation Brotherhood in 1960.50 A team of 
Japanese technical advisors trained Lao health staff in the management and 
use of the Japanese-funded equipment provided in the hospital construction 
package.51 More difficult to explain, in the late 1990s two hospitals were 
constructed within 10 kilometres of each other in Vientiane province, one 
supported by Thailand and the other by Luxembourg. The Thai government 
funded construction of a hospital at Phonehong, while the Luxembourg 
government funded construction of the Maria-Teresa Hospital in nearby 
Viengkham district. The Luxembourg-funded hospital was designated as the 
provincial hospital while the Thai facility served the district. The case raised 
questions about the management and coordination capacity of the Ministry of 
Health, and its motivations. Was it a textbook example of weak management 
                                                            
50 The administrative area known as Vientiane Municipality (Kampheng-nakhone Vientiane) 
in the 1990s was renamed Vientiane Capital (Nakhone-louang Vientiane) in the early 2000s. 
This is in contrast to Vientiane province, which is a separate entity whose territory does not 






of international donor funds, highlighting poor coordination on the part of the 
Ministry and the Lao government more generally, or was it a cynical 
manipulation of international development assistance? Certainly, other 
provinces were in need of newly constructed hospitals as much, if not more so, 
than Vientiane province. Whether accidental or deliberate, the construction of 
two facilities virtually side-by-side was a case of mismanagement and missed 
opportunities. 
The Ministry was tasked not only with coordinating construction, but 
also with equipping its internationally-funded health facilities. A wide range of 
international development agencies and individuals donated equipment for this 
purpose to supplement the Ministry’s disparate collection of medical 
equipment, in various states of repair, supplied from France, the United States, 
the Soviet Union and other nations of Eastern Europe based on its recent 
history of development cooperation. New or donated equipment was not 
always compatible with existing equipment as it was sourced from so many 
different donors. In addition, some state-of-the-art equipment proved too 
expensive for the Ministry to operate, let alone maintain, such as surgery lights 
from Japan whose expensive globes had to be replaced after several hours’ 
usage. One advisor observed that Soviet equipment was often more 
appropriate for Laos’ limited health budgets. For example, Soviet surgery 
lights used globes that were interchangeable with those of car headlights, 
whereas expensive surgery lights from Japan had to be changed after only a 
few hours use.52 
                                                            
52 Doug Handisides, former volunteer in the Medical Repair Workshop, Ministry of Health, 
1986-1990, interviewed in Vientiane, Lao PDR, 22 December 2012. 
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Donated second-hand equipment caused problems of compatibility, 
and was not particularly appreciated. One former doctor, no longer in 
government service, expressed disgust at the donation of second-hand 
equipment by some smaller international donors: “It’s junk”, she said. “It 
should be thrown away. They should give us new equipment”.53 But while it 
may have been wiser to discard much of the second-hand equipment received, 
her comment overlooks the Ministry’s poor track record in equipment 
maintenance, and supervising staff usage practices, which could turn even new 
equipment into junk within a relatively short space of time. 
 
Health staffing 
With the departure of Soviet medical advisors from Hospital Number 1 
and the Lao-Soviet Friendship Hospital in the early 1990s, health staffing 
became comprised almost exclusively of Lao nationals for the first time since 
the establishment of biomedical health services in Laos. The overall number of 
health staff decreased from 12,551 in 199054 to 11,665 in 2000,55 as many of 
the smaller health facilities closed and the Lao government shed staff based on 
recommendations from the IMF. Staff no longer fled across the Mekong as 
refugees as was the practice in the 1970s and 1980s, but several opted to leave 
government service in order to ‘take care of their families’, a euphemism for 
making money in the private sector or joining the payroll of the increasing 
numbers of NGOs, as the Lao economy underwent changes prompted by the 
economic restructuring of the NEM. 
                                                            
53 Former Lao PDR health worker (anonymous), interviewed in Vientiane, Lao PDR, May 
2014. 
54 This figure includes only doctors, medical assistants and nurses, but no other health-related 
staff. See UNICEF, Children and Women, p.138. 
55 Ministry of Health/State Planning Committee, Health Status, p.1. 
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By the 1990s, the Ministry of Health aimed not only to increase the 
overall numbers of high-level health staff, but also to increase their proportion 
of all health staff. It did so by providing upgrading opportunities for mid- and 
low-level staff, and training more high-level staff. The policy was modestly 
successful, as the proportion of high-level staff in the workforce did in fact 
increase vis-à-vis mid- and low-level staff. 56  High-level health staff now 
included doctors, dental surgeons and pharmacists. 
The Ministry acknowledged there were problems with the quality of its 
staff and staffing systems. It saw low capacity, in terms of both management 
systems and skills, and the technical skills of its staff as limitations to the 
provision of healthcare services. In a discussion paper circulated to donors in 
2000 it concedes: 
 
There is little clinical supervision or in-service training. And this, in 
combination with low utilisation of services, has resulted in gradual 
deterioration of skill. Health personnel generally lack management 
skills and few staff have received training in interpersonal 
communication or in counselling. Health personnel are not 
appropriately trained for the tasks they are expected to perform, and are 
not provided with the equipment and supplies they require.57 
 
Another ongoing problem was that of staff distribution. The Ministry 
appeared powerless to address the high concentration of high-level staff in 
Vientiane and the large provincial towns, a problem that had persisted since 
the early years of the RLG period. Despite the Ministry’s PHC policy 
requiring much larger numbers of skilled staff to be deployed at the local 
level. Few doctors or even mid-level assistant doctors were willing to be based 
in rural areas. There, they would have to accept poor communications, lack of 
                                                            
56 Strigler et al, ‘Situation nutritionnelle’, p.128. 
57 Ministry of Health, ‘Health Strategy up to the Year 2020’. 
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electricity and running water, low educational opportunities for their children, 
and limited chance to operate a profitable private clinic out of hours. The 
Ministry provided few if any incentives for health staff to be deployed in rural 
areas, and there appear to have been few consequences for staff who 
abandoned their posts. The ADB Primary Health Project concluded: 
 
Attractive salaries alone would not be enough to keep the health 
workers in the remote areas. The provision of housing near the health 
center [souksala] and land near their workplace that they could farm 
and live on was an important incentive.58 
 
Professional Education and Training 
The sudden cessation of scholarships from many socialist nations in the 
early 1990s affected the tertiary education and training of the Lao 
government’s bureaucrats, technocrats and other professional classes.59 The 
unexpected situation forced medical and health-related professional education 
and training to take two divergent paths: the search for new overseas locations 
for education and training, as well as the increasing localisation of 
professional formation of Lao health staff. Vietnam was one of the few 
socialist countries to continue providing high numbers of scholarships at high 
and mid-level. Other nations began to offer more education and training 
opportunities, including Thailand, Australia, Japan, India and France. France 
was often the destination of choice for candidates in the health and medical 
fields, many who were still competent in French after less than a 15-year 
                                                            
58 ADB, ‘Performance Evaluation Report’, p.vi. 
59 Evans, Short History, p.258. 
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hiatus in the teaching of medicine in French language.60 Scholarships at this 
time also began to offer specialisations, and so Ministry of Health staff took 
up graduate diplomas and/or Masters scholarships in a range of topics such as 
public health, community health, epidemiology and nutrition studies, which 
added to their background in general medicine. Thailand leveraged its 
influence, based on the similarity of its language and culture to Laos. 
Universities such as Khon Kaen University in Thailand’s north-east 
established cooperation arrangements with the Lao Ministry of Health to 
provide education and training opportunities in Thailand, and perhaps to open 
up research opportunities for themselves in the Lao PDR.61 In another link up 
with Thai universities, UNFPA sent significant numbers of Lao students for 
post-graduate studies to Mahidol University in Bangkok, and Chiang Mai 
University. 
As international scholarships focused increasingly on post-graduate 
studies, it became more common for medical students to undertake their 
undergraduate education in the Lao PDR. By the 1990s, the bulk of medical 
graduates completed their professional education in Laos, taught by Lao 
instructors in Lao language. International donors directed renewed support to 
improve the teaching quality at the University of Medical Science and the 
mid-level Technical Health College (the former nursing school) in Vientiane. 
The French government, both directly and through French NGOs, assisted the 
medical university, as did the Thai government and WHO. The Japanese 
                                                            
60 The Annuaire 2008 lists alumni from the Lao Ministry of Health who have completed 
professional education or training in France. See Embassy of France, Annuaire 2008, 
(Vientiane: Embassy of France, 2008), pp.107-144. 
61 LNAD, Lao PDR/MOH, 23-19: Letter re: ‘Kho anoumat sen kho-phouk-phanh lavang 
mahavitthayalay phet-sat lae mahavitthayalay khone-kene pathet thai’, (Request approval to 
sign an item concerning a relationship between the University of Medical Science and Khon 
Kaen University, Thailand), 23 January 1991. 
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government and WHO re-initiated nursing education projects in the health 
colleges of Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Pakse, Savannakhet and Thakhek, in a 
move that was reminiscent of the long-running nursing education project 
conducted by the WHO in the 1960s and 1970s. Personal accounts from 
nursing staff suggest that curricula were developed anew, rather than building 
on those existing or previously used.62 
The University of Medical Sciences consisted of three faculties in the 
early 1990s: medicine, pharmacy and dentistry. All offered high-level courses, 
with high-level dentistry commencing in 1991-1992. Medicine and dentistry 
were six-year courses, pharmacy five years.63 The Technical Health College in 
Vientiane offered seven courses at mid- and low-levels, consisting of three 
year and less than three year curricula. The number of courses on offer 
reduced throughout the 1990s: midwifery ceased in 1989-90, medical 
assistants in 1992, and orthotics and prosthetics in 1994. No clear explanation 
for the cessation of courses emerges from archival documents. One plausible 
explanation is that discontinuation of Soviet assistance in the early 1990s 
prompted the decisions. Another explanation is that ambitious Ministry policy 
intended to replace all mid-level medical assistants with doctors, making their 
continued training redundant. The remaining courses were mid-level nursing, 
physiotherapy and laboratory studies.64 
In 1995 the University of Medical Science was transferred to the newly 
created National University of Laos (NUOL) under the Ministry of Education, 
                                                            
62 Personal communication with Lao nursing specialists (anonymous), Vientiane, Lao PDR, 
July 2014. 
63 University of Health Sciences, ‘55 pii chak honghian phet xou mahavitthayalay vitthayasart 
soukhaphap’, (55 Years from Medical School to University of Health Sciences), (Vientiane: 
UHS, 2013), p.6. 
64 University of Health Sciences, ‘55 pii chak honghian phet’, pp.7-9. 
260 
 
where it became known as the Faculty of Medical Science. The transfer 
created an awkward division between the high-level courses, now under the 
purview of the Ministry of Education, and the mid-level courses, which 
remained under the Ministry of Health’s Technical Health College. The 
transfer was badly received within the Ministry of Health, and led to a decade 
of lobbying before it was reassigned to Health. It also demonstrated the 
inability or reluctance of the two ministries to work together in a 
complementary manner. 
Large-scale French government assistance returned to support medical 
education in the mid-1990s after a hiatus of almost twenty years. In 1997 the 
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed to establish the Fonds de solidarité 
prioritaire (FSP) for education and training in the health sector, known as the 
Programme d’enseignement médicale (PEM). Its purpose was to establish 
standards and specialisations for health professions in Laos; organise trainings 
in priority areas; introduce management training for Ministry staff, and 
establish a national training plan. The technical areas prioritised for 
development were surgery; anaesthesiology; emergency medicine; obstetrics 
and gynaecology; and public health. The NGO, CCL was responsible for 
surgery, anaesthesiology and public health. The anaesthesiology training was 
centred at Mahosot, but involved staff at the main central (Vientiane-based) 
and provincial hospitals. The public health training was delivered through the 
newly-established National Institute for Public Health.65 An additional priority 
area, not mentioned in the Lao-French agreement, was the development of a 
                                                            
65 Odile Cochetel et al, ‘D’une formation continue au master national en santé publique’, in Le 
Laos doux et amer. Vingt-cinq ans de pratiques d’une ONG, ed. Dominque Gentil and 
Philippe Boumard, (Paris: CCL-Karthala, 2005), p.288. 
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specialist curriculum in paediatrics. This task was conducted by American 
NGO, Health Frontiers.66 Karen Olness, who established the NGO, states that 
the work began on the training curriculum in 1991, and the University of 
Health Science reports it was finalised in 1997.67 
The French government also established a regional Institut 
Francophone pour la Médecine Tropicale (IFMT) in Vientiane in 1997, which 
drew modest student numbers from Vietnam, Cambodia and Madagascar. It 
was located within the same compound as the National Institute of Public 
Health, which had finally opened after more than two decades of plans and 
frustrations. CCL developed and delivered the Masters of Tropical Health 
qualification at the Institute, through the PEM in 1997-2000. Reminiscent of 
the courses at the medical school in the 1960s and 1970s, 15 of the 32 teachers 
were French, and the remaining 17 Lao.68 The course was taught initially in 
French, and in a combination of French and Lao language once sufficient Lao 
teachers were trained. However, the Ministry of Education did not recognise 
the course until 2004, because it was conducted under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Health rather than Education. Once recognised, it became the first 
Masters-level qualification in any discipline in the Lao PDR.69 However, CCL 
observed that while students had “good memories”, their command of some 
concepts was quite weak.70 An evaluation of the course published in 2005 
recommended that the NIOPH collaborate with the Faculty of Medical Science 
                                                            
66 Health Frontiers is a NGO established by Karen Olness, who worked as a pediatrician at 
Mahosot in the early 1960s, and as an employee of USAID’s Public Health Division in Laos 
in the late 1960s. 
67 Dr Karen Olness, interviewed by email, 24 June 2013, and University of Health Sciences, 
‘55 pii chak honghian phet’, p.7. 
68 Cochetel et al, ‘D’une formation continue’, p.291. 
69 Ibid., pp.287-289. 
70 Ibid., pp.290-291. 
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to conduct future courses, which was envisaged to require ongoing external 
pedagogical and financial assistance.71 
 
Healthcare services and outcomes in the 1990s 
Modest improvements to the general health of the Lao population were 
registered in the 1990s amongst policy changes and increased funding to the 
health sector. While it should be acknowledged that the collection and 
publication of statistics was sometimes unreliable and slow, statistics do give 
some indication of the health of the population, and the relative efficacy of 
health services. For example, life expectancy was reported to have increased 
from 51 in 199072 to 54 in 200073. The infant mortality rate reduced from 137 
per 1,000 live births74  to 99 75  over the 10 year period, and the maternal 
mortality rate reduced from an estimated 1,200 per 100,000 live births in 1990 
to 790 in 2000.76 The total fertility rate also started to fall after peaking in the 
early 1990s at an estimated 7.1, one of the highest rates in the world.77 
Whether these improvements were directly or even indirectly attributable to 
the performance of the health sector is debatable. CCL, working in the health 
sector throughout the 1990s, considers improvements in health status to have 
                                                            
71 Cochetel et al, ‘Évaluation du programme d’enseignement médical en santé publique 2002-
2004 au Laos,’ Santé publique, 2005, 17(1), p.96. 
72 Ministry of Health/WHO, ‘Human Resources for Health’, (Vientiane: Ministry of 
Health/WHO, 2007), p.10. 
73 World Bank, World Development Report 2003. Transforming Institutions, Growth and 
Quality of Life. (New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), p.234. 
74 Ministry of Health /WHO, ‘Human Resources for Health’, p.10. 
75 Ministry of Health ‘Health Strategy up to the Year 2020’, p.3. 
76 MMR rates are estimated at 750 in 1990 and 530 in 2003. See WHO/Ministry of Health, 
‘Human Resources for Health’, p.10. However, in 2011 UNFPA revised the 1990 figure to a 




77 UNICEF, Children and their Families’, p.103. 
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been driven by general economic improvements rather than by improvements 
in the health system.78 
The Ministry of Health stated in 2000 that malaria presented the “most 
serious public health problem” in Laos. The Lao Social Indicator Survey 
(LSIS) of 1993 found that 85 percent of villages nationwide reported the 
disease as their greatest health issue.79 The survey estimated there were 1.4 
million malaria cases and 14,000 deaths annually attributed to the disease in a 
nation of approximately 4.5 million people, 80  with pregnant women and 
children most at risk. A study by Médecins Sans Frontières found that malaria 
accounted for 44 percent of all hospitalisations in Savannakhet and Bokeo 
provinces, placing a strain on hospital resources.81 
The initiation of malaria-related projects by the World Bank, the EU, 
and the ADB in the mid-1990s helped ramp up what had been until then a 
limited program of public health and operational research conducted by the 
Ministry’s Centre for Malariology, Parasitology and Entomology assisted by 
Vietnamese technical advisors in the late 1970s and 1980s. National coverage 
was not achieved, even with the new levels of increased international support. 
For example, the World Bank project operated in only 24 districts in a total of 
eight provinces, leaving another 11 provinces and many more districts outside 
the program.82 The new programs promoted standard treatment protocols and 
net usage. Other standard malaria control activities such as the impregnation 
of bed nets with Delametrin, and the promotion of their use began in 1998-
                                                            
78 Strigler et al, ‘Situation nutritionnelle’, p.132. 
79 Ministry of Health, ‘Health Strategy up to the Year 2020’, p.6. 
80 The Lao PDR population census of 1995 recorded a nationwide population of 4.6 million 
people. 




1999. Subsequent research by Dr Mayfong Mayxay found there was a high 
resistance to chloroquine in the Lao PDR, prompting a revision of malaria 
treatment protocols in 2005.83 
MCH services remained weak, despite renewed assistance from WHO, 
UNICEF, UNFPA and a number of NGOs. They were also poorly integrated 
into the wider PHC program, which included immunisation, nutrition 
monitoring and promotion activities, and family planning. A high burden of 
diseases that would be easily treatable in a well-functioning health service also 
continued to plague the population, especially in rural areas. The main causes 
of child mortality were reportedly malaria, acute respiratory illnesses, and 
diarrhoea. 84  Childbirth occurred overwhelmingly outside medical facilities, 
and in 1993 only seven percent of infants were delivered in a health facility.85 
Only rarely was a trained health worker in attendance, partly due to the few 
midwives employed within the Ministry and the discontinuation of midwifery 
training in the early 1990s. Few pregnant women sought the three ante-natal 
check-ups recommended by the Ministry, and even fewer went for post-natal 
check-ups. Moreover, as with other health services and health behaviours, 
significant differences were observed between urban and rural areas. In such 
circumstances, the assessment of a visiting WHO technical advisor in 1991 is 
not surprising: 
 
Clearly, there is a lack of competent maternal services in most of the 
country, and people have no confidence in the public health services. 
The few obstetric wards in provincial hospitals are largely 
underutilised, particularly by rural women ... the root of the problem is 
the insufficient attention given to pregnancy-related issues at all levels. 
                                                            
83 Dr Mayfong Mayxay, interviewed in Vientiane, Lao PDR, 24 December 2012. 
84 Ministry of Health, ‘Health Strategy up to the Year 2020’, pp.6-8. 
85 State Planning Committee et al, National Human Development Report 1998, p.12. 
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Midwives in particular have been neglected both in their status and in 
their practical training: there should be more of them in the districts, 
with more support, more equipment, more appropriate training and 
more supervision.86 
 
Technical advisors from United Nations agencies convinced the Lao 
government that renewed attention to MCH was required, and that 
reproductive health services had the potential to address the high levels of 
maternal and infant mortality by lowering the fertility rate. The Maternal and 
Child Health including Birth Spacing Project, a UNFPA/WHO-supported 
project, commenced in 1989, gathered momentum in the 1990s and promoted 
ante-natal visits, safe delivery, exclusive breastfeeding of infants, and tetanus 
vaccination of pregnant women. Parallel programs in the treatment and control 
of diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections also aimed to make positive 
impacts on infant and child health. Government documents suggest that the 
Birth Spacing Program was “launched” in 1994, and followed by the issue of a 
National Reproductive Health Policy in 1995.87 
Among the project components of the UNFPA/WHO project was 
support for family planning methods, repackaged as ‘birth spacing’, after a 
government ban of more than a decade. The project’s activities involved the 
operation of a limited number of birth spacing clinics, staff training, and the 
gauging of public acceptance and demand. Policies included recommending 
pregnancies between the ages of 18 and 35, and discouraging families of more 
                                                            
86 Catherine Spring, ‘Maternal Mortality in Lao PDR. Population Study, 1991’, (Vientiane: 
WHO, 1991), p.12. 
87 Bounfeng Phoummalaysith et al, ‘Health and Social Welfare Report in Lao PDR’, Paper for 
Third ASEAN-Japan High-level Officials Meeting on Caring Societies, 29 August – 1 
September 2005, p.3. 
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than five children. 88  Birth spacing clinics at two of Vientiane’s major 
hospitals, Mahosot and Setthathirat, began service provision in February 1991, 
followed a few months later by selected district hospitals in the peri-urban 
area, including those in Hatsayfong and Xaythany. Initially the clinics 
provided services only one day per week, and offered contraceptive pills, 
condoms and injectables, but even in its early stages, international advisors 
observed high local demand for birth spacing services.89 
Birth spacing services expanded quietly into the provinces and larger 
district towns, in an effort to avoid attracting the attention of aging 
conservative leaders who may have objected to its continuation. However, 
even limited access to contraception produced a significant drop in the total 
fertility rate from 7.1 in 1993 to 4.23 in 2000.90 The maternal and infant 
mortality rates also fell, although the maternal rate was still extremely high. 
The lifetime risk of dying in pregnancy in Laos was calculated to be a 1 in 49 
chance, one of the highest rates in the world.91 This high rate has proved 
difficult to budge. It is expected that the reduction in the fertility rate will have 
more influence on reducing this figure than possible improvements in other 
maternal health services. 
Overall, improvements in the health sector fell short of expectations. 
By the end of the millennium the Lao health system had improved marginally 
from what UNICEF had described as “one of the worst [health systems] in the 
                                                            
88 Nenita Balbuena, ‘Assessment and evaluation of pre-project activities, Project: Maternal 
and Child Health including Birth Spacing’, (WHO: LAO/MCH/003; UNFPA: LAO/89/PO1) 
WHO Mission Report, 20 January 1992, p.3. 
89 Ibid., p.2. 
90 UNICEF, Children and their Families, p.103; and Ministry of Health/UNFPA, Lao 
Reproductive Health Survey,2000 (Vientiane: MOH/UNFPA, 2000). 
91 Anna Scopaz, Liz Eckermann and Matthew Clarke, ‘Maternal Health in Lao PDR: 
repositioning the goal posts,’ Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 16(4), 2011, p.600. 
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world,” but it was still burdened with the legacy of its past.92 The Ministry of 
Health’s poor management and coordination contributed to lower than 
expected health and management outcomes. But international development 
agencies should also be held to account, given that they furnished the grants 
and loans that provided the bulk of public funds (as opposed to out-of-pocket 
expenses) for health activities in the country. Despite the Ministry’s formation 
of a Coordination Committee, coordination between health programs and the 
various international development assistance agencies became increasingly 
complex throughout the 1990s as the number and diversity of international 
donors mounted. Many international donors channelled their funds to specific 
health programs rather than to integrated services, which influenced not only 
the development of structures within the Ministry of Health and its provincial 
and district branches, but also the way in which funds were allocated and 
reported on. These external funding flows, therefore, played a key role in the 
way that Ministry of Health programs became (or remained) delinked. 
These new difficulties compounded the health sector’s long-term 
shortages of staffing and funding, and produced a cyclical catch-22. The 
coordination and management of international funding, a vital supplement to 
the very low levels of domestic government funding, required significant 
numbers of Lao staff possessing solid technical, management and foreign 
language skills. This requirement put a strain on the Ministry of Health as the 
number of donors mounted, as it had a pre-existing shortage of both general 
and skilled staff even before the arrival of new donors. Paradoxically, while 
the Lao health sector received more international development assistance than 
                                                            
92 UNICEF, Children and Women, p.135. 
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ever before, the results of that funding were countered by the limited 
‘absorptive capacity’ of the Ministry and its staff at central, provincial and 
district levels to maximise the potential benefits of the funding opportunities. 
Internationally-funded projects were established against the backdrop 
of specifically identified weaknesses within the Lao health service, but few 
projects themselves were assessed as being truly successful. Sweden’s multi-
year support to the National Drug Policy was one of the more successful 
projects, in part because it began before many other health projects, which 
allowed it to gain the attention and support of several key personnel within the 
Ministry. Once the deluge of donors began, the Ministry’s modest group of 
well-trained, English and French-speaking staff were quickly snapped up and 
projects had to make do with whichever Ministry staff had yet to be allocated 
as project counterparts. 
The World Bank assesses its own Health Systems Reform and Malaria 
Control Project as having produced mixed results. The project was intended to 
run for six years but extended to nine years due to the slow disbursements by 
the Lao government, reflecting a weak and overloaded management system, 
but also unrealistic planning and expectations from the World Bank. At project 
end, the Bank assessed outcomes as being “modest” and “satisfactory”, but 
also concluding that the project design had been too complex for an initial 








A donor deluge swept over the Lao PDR and its health sector in the 
1990s following the disbanding of the Soviet Union, attempting to address the 
nation’s ongoing poverty and socio-economic marginality within the 
international community. The end of the Cold War, and the withdrawal of 
Soviet development assistance marked the entry of new international donors 
and the abandonment of key aspects of socialist health policy. A partially 
private sector emerged, consisting of private pharmacies and clinics, and the 
introduction of user-fees signalled the end of socialist medicine. At the same 
time, a much larger proportion of medical and health-related education and 
training was conducted in the Lao PDR, as education places dried up in the 
former Soviet Union. 
A large and diverse group of donors increased their development 
assistance programs to the Lao PDR during the 1990s. Relatively quickly, the 
Ministry of Health was swamped with loans, for the first time, from the World 
Bank and the ADB, and large grants from the EU Sweden, Japan, France, 
Australia, Luxembourg and Belgium. Their funds filled the gap that opened up 
with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and Eastern European donors, but 
created new problems of management and coordination. The Ministry was 
poorly prepared to deal with the donor influx, which highlighted its inefficient 
administrative processes and staffing practices. The pressing financial 
problems of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, which crippled Lao 
government activity for several years, especially the provision of counterpart 
funds to internationally-supported projects, and radically devalued the salaries 
of government workers slowed Ministry activities to a crawl. In hindsight, 
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donors acknowledge that many assistance projects from the 1990s were poorly 
planned, over-ambitious, and lacking an appreciation of the human, 
management and technical capacity available in the Lao PDR at that time. 
As the new millennium approached, the Ministry of Health struggled 
with financing, staffing, improving education and training standards and 
placating the frustrations of its diverse group of donors. It had to instil an 
element of hope or desire in the international development assistance 
community to ensure continued support, and to cajole it to have faith in the 





CONCLUSION: THE ‘ANTI-HISTORY MACHINE’: 
LIMITED DOSES OF HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The past is an impediment, a history that must be transcended: 
The present is the platform for launching plans for a better future.1 
 
Introduction 
This study of the Lao health sector’s development trajectory concludes 
through the lens of international development assistance. Laos’ heavy reliance 
on external assistance and its long-term marginality in regard to the region, the 
wider international community, and its own rural areas, have left their imprints 
on the obstacles around which the Lao health sector has negotiated its progress. 
These obstacles have reconfigured in various historical periods: as colonial 
distance, post-colonial division and socialist doctrine and post-socialist donor 
deluge; but have imposed limitations on health sector development. Moreover, 
the path of the health sector is at times difficult to trace, partly because of the 
largely a-historical worldview and practices of the development sector. 
External assistance has exerted a powerful influence on modern Laos, 
and has played a formative role in shaping its health system. The long-term 
dependence on such assistance, and the diverse sources from which it has been 
provided, go a great way towards explaining the Lao health sector’s erratic 
development. Unpredictable cycles of financial and technical assistance have 
alternately strengthened and weakened the health network, staffing and 
                                                            
1 James Scott’s sardonic characterisation of the problematic place of history in developmental 
nation-states alludes to the ‘anti-history machine’ –style development discussed in this chapter. 
See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p.95. 
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healthcare service delivery beyond the control of national authorities, while at 
the same time adding layers of complexity, policy influence and reporting 
requirements. In many instances, donors and donor funding have determined 
which technical departments were established, which facilities were 
constructed and where, which scholarships were offered and which programs 
were implemented. In these circumstances, it is unsurprising that disruptions 
and conflicting priorities have disturbed the continuities within the Lao health 
sector. 
 
Limited doses of development assistance for modern Laos 
A development plan prepared for northern Laos by international 
advisers from the neighbouring Chinese province of Yunnan in 2008 observed, 
“The Lao government takes external cooperation very seriously”.2 And indeed 
it has done. External assistance was integral to modern Laos even before 
national independence, as the wealthier territories of French Indochina 
subsidised the Lao administration which collected almost no tax revenue of its 
own. In accordance with Kothari’s argument that the frameworks and practices 
of post-colonial international development were set in place during the 
colonial period,3 one sees that Laos’ dependence on external subsidies to fund 
its modernising bureaucracy and related technical services took shape prior to 
independence. Despite achieving lower-middle income status in 2011, Laos 
remains classified as a landlocked Least Developed Country.4 
                                                            
2 ‘2008-2020 Planning for Industrial Economic Development and Cooperation in Northern 
Part of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, aka ‘North Plan’, (Kunming: Northern Laos 
Industrial Economic Development and Cooperation Planning Preparation Group, 2008), p.8 
3 Kothari, ‘From Colonialism to Development’. 
4 http://unohrlls.org/about-lldcs/, accessed 19 November 2015. 
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Laos has received assistance from a wide and disparate range of donors 
since the 1950s, ostensibly transferring needed technical knowledge and skills. 
Some donors have jostled for political influence, others have addressed 
poverty reduction and national development more directly. Many, however, 
have been motivated by their own domestic issues or regional geo-political 
issues, as Viliam Phraxayavong has demonstrated.5 Development assistance 
received by Laos over at least five decades has been highly politicised, 
especially in the years prior to 1990 when it was overtly linked to the Cold 
War objectives of the major donors. Such assistance evokes Ferguson’s “anti-
politics machine’, a term coined to describe the de-politicised representations 
of international development’s highly politicised and/or politically influential 
interventions.6 At the end of the day, one can say that Laos has rarely received 
development assistance designed specifically for its own needs. 
Domestically, Laos’ reliance on external assistance has engendered a 
vulnerability to political forces that are much greater and, at times, seemingly 
opposed to its national interests, despite the often de-politicised and 
benevolent representation of assistance. Political objectives and economic 
abilities of the various donors have determined the waxing and waning of 
international assistance, exposing Laos’ national development aspirations to 
the fickle nature of international forces. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, 
and his half-brother, Souphanouvong, the leader of the NLHX, were well 
aware of the political dimensions of aid in the Cold War context. Souvanna 
Phouma investigated the possibility of seeking aid from communist China in 
1956, as a counter-weight to the US’s rapidly growing influence in Laos. 
                                                            
5 Viliam Phraxayavong, History of Aid. 
6 Ferguson, Anti-Politics Machine. 
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Several years later, Souphanouvong, in the role of Minister of Economy and 
Development in the second coalition government of the early 1960s, requested 
donors provide unconditional aid rather than assistance tied to the 
government’s foreign policy loyalty.7 Later, in the 1990s the Lao government 
struggled to coordinate and derive maximum benefit from the bilateral, 
multilateral and NGO donors that flooded into the country in the wake of the 
collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe. 
Successive Lao governments have grappled with the political and 
practical difficulties which have arisen from the high volatility and 
unpredictability of development aid. Aid volumes received by Laos have 
fluctuated over the period from 1950-2000, as have the sectors receiving 
support. McIllivray et al found in their 2012 study that development assistance 
to Laos was less predictable than that provided to all other developing nations 
in the period 1960-2008.8 Furthermore, Laos has at times resorted to asking 
many countries for similar assistance, unsure of which nation/s would oblige. 
While the political motivations and impacts of development assistance 
have been exposed, the a-historical framework in which such assistance has 
been provided and implemented has remained largely obscured and 
unexplored. In fact, the ‘anti-history machine’ would be as fitting a label for 
the international development sector as Ferguson’s ‘anti-politics machine’. 
Development assistance has been provided within an a-historical, 
decontextualised framework, often implementing efforts and initiatives that 
resemble those of previous or even concurrent donors in seeming oblivion. 
Moreover, a key ‘lesson learned’ by development agencies and recipients has 
                                                            
7 NARA, RG 59, Box 3323: ‘RLG’s principles of accepting foreign aid’, 12 April 1963. 
8 McIllivray et al, Evaluation Study, p.50. 
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been that meaningful, sustainable change takes time. Ironically, predictable, 
consistent support over decades has proved to be an element the development 
sector has been unable to guarantee. The lack of time and the unpredictability 
of international assistance have frequently resulted in the provision of limited 
doses rather than full courses of development assistance in the Lao context. 
 
Limited doses of health development for the Lao health system 
International development assistance has played an influential role in 
the development of the Lao health sector. This study has shown that Laos’ 
biomedical health system has developed over a period of more than one 
hundred years, in large part enabled by the provision of external support, 
initially from the French colonial administration and later from international 
development assistance donors. As in other socio-economic sectors of Laos, 
much of the external assistance to support health infrastructure, professional 
education and training and service delivery has been politically motivated, of 
unpredictable duration, highly diverse and/or poorly coordinated. This 
situation has resulted in health sector development proceeding in fits and starts, 
as funding and/or technical advisors became available, overlapping in some 
areas and entirely absent in others. Moreover, the various channels of 
assistance have not always been complementary, confusing and at times 
obstructing the limited development opportunities. 
The Lao health sector has contended with a number of issues limiting 
the effectiveness of the external assistance provided. Problems engendered by 
distance, division, doctrine and donor proliferation have accumulated, 
presenting Laos and its donors with additional challenges to the development 
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of its health infrastructure, personnel, and service delivery. Limitations of 
geographic, cultural and administrative distance were initial obstacles 
encountered in the colonial period. The rudimentary transportation and 
telecommunications networks effectively isolated Laos from the larger, more 
dynamic centres of French Indochina, as well as the rural population it was 
intended to serve, resulting in administrative decision-makers having a poor 
understanding of Laos’ development needs and capacities. Many French 
doctors working in Laos were frustrated to observe that the colonial 
framework of health and medical assistance was formulated with the 
Vietnamese territories or even France in mind, and was inappropriate in the 
Lao environment. 
Independence and a Vientiane-based national government did not 
resolve the problem of distance, even as transportation and 
telecommunications improved, and the cultural gap between colonial staff and 
local patients was removed. Decisions affecting the health sector and other 
sectors continued to be made outside Laos, or by Lao-based foreigners serving 
distant masters, as the nation was dependent on international assistance for its 
national development, as well as for support to the burgeoning war effort. 
The country’s involvement in the Second Indochina War effectively 
split its fledgling health service into three parallel civilian services: the RLG, 
the USAID-OB and the NLHX, and two military services, creating a 
debilitating technical division for such a young health system. Distance and 
division continued to dog the sector, even after the 1973 ceasefire. Division 
played one more decisive hand in the post-1975 reunification of the health 
sector, as many staff from the former RLG and USAID-OB health services 
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joined the refugee exodus. A further wave of staff left the sector although not 
the country in the early 1990s, in search of a living wage as government 
workers struggled to make ends meet. 
Doctrine, or ideology, emerged as an additional instrument of 
limitation in the early Lao PDR period, when the emphasis on political 
training and proficiency seemingly eclipsed the requirement for technical 
skills. Assistance from nations such as the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Cuba, 
bolstered Laos’ application of socialist doctrine, in particular its attempt to 
transform the newly re-united health service into a socialist system offering 
free healthcare nationwide, staffed by a workforce well-versed in socialist 
theoretical principles. 
The proliferation of international donors in the post-socialist 1990s is 
one of the more recent development limitations with which the Lao health 
sector has had to grapple. The volume of aid, and the diversity of donors, has 
added complexity and created a large burden of management and coordination 
for Ministry of Health staff, most of whom are doctors and not trained 
managers and administrators. The Ministry’s weak management capacity has 
resulted in slow, and sometimes poor, decision-making and weak oversight, 
causing lost opportunities and frustration among donors and Lao government 
staff alike. 
By 2000 the limitations of division and doctrine within the health 
sector had largely subsided, although they sometimes lurk beneath the surface. 
Healthcare is provided by civilian and military branches of the government 
health services, alongside a private sector of after-hours government health 
workers, and private services in neighbouring countries of Thailand, Vietnam 
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and China. The distraction of doctrine has yielded to a more pragmatic, 
market-oriented form of socialism. However, many decisions concerning 
financial and/or technical assistance to the Lao health sector continue to be 
made overseas in the headquarters of the main international donors. In this 
respect, securing international assistance has become recognised as an 
achievement in itself for Lao government staff. 
The political and financial dependency of the Lao health sector, 
reinforced by reliance on assistance from international donors, has been 
compounded by the a-historical approach of the development sector. Donors 
and technical advisors working in Laos in the pre-1975 period often displayed 
no acknowledgement of colonial health programs, or of the ways in which 
distance had operated to determine the latter’s success or sustainability in the 
medium to longer-term. Despite the colonial legacy of health facilities and 
staffing, donors often operated as if health development had begun in the 
1950s. A similar situation emerged post-1975, when health programs of the 
former regime were swept from view, unable to be acknowledged by the Lao 
PDR because they had been implemented by political opponents. This 
situation extends to the present day. Within Laos it remains awkward to 
discuss in an informed manner the efforts of the French colonial 
administration, or the RLG and USAID-OB health services, despite some 
senior Ministry staff being trained by those services. This reticence has 
produced a younger generation of Lao health workers uncertain of their 
professional heritage, many of whom feel it is wiser to accept the political 





Biomedical health services in Laos have undoubtedly developed since 
their modest origins in Luang Prabang in 1895. There is a nationwide network 
of central, provincial and district hospitals and village health centres 
(souksala). There is a cadre of trained health staff, ranging from medical 
specialists, doctors, pharmacists, dentists, midwives, nurses and other para-
medical professions. There is a University of Health Sciences (the former 
Royal School of Medicine, later the Faculty of Medicine), and a number of 
provincial health colleges training medical and health staff in-country. 
Numbers of health facilities, staff and patients have all increased, as have the 
sophistication of most facilities, and the training levels of most staff. There are 
government budget lines for the construction and maintenance of health 
facilities, the salaries for health staff and the partial funding of provision of 
health services to the Lao population (patients also pay fees towards the cost 
of medical care). 
However, the impermanent nature of international development 
assistance, and the limited doses in which it dispenses doses of technical 
transfer, has resulted in a national health sector that sports the structure but not 
necessarily the substance of a comprehensive system, and that remains reliant 
on external funding and support. The international development sector’s 
tendency towards decontextualisation and a-historicity has led to a situation 
where it is difficult to identify actual medium and longer-term developments 
as opposed to stagnation and/or backsliding, because each project is presented 
as a ‘new’ opportunity, and previous efforts are obscured or forgotten.  
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Let us finally return to the initial questions of this thesis. Why was the 
Lao health sector unable to help Am’s three infant children in Ta-Oy district in 
the late 2000s? The thesis argues that the answer lies in a combination of Laos’ 
colonial, international and even intra-country marginality, and its long-term, 
heavy reliance on diverse sources of external assistance. These two 
characteristics have created a complex web and distance, division, doctrine 
and donor deluge, factors which have been at times obscured by poverty, weak 
human resources, and lack of attention to Laos’ past, but also by the a-
historical and unpredictable characteristics of international development 
assistance. In Laos’ experience, assistance from all major donors, whether it 
be the French colonial administration, the US or the Soviet Union, has ended 
relatively abruptly as those nations disengaged with Laos or the wider 
Southeast Asian region, leaving Laos to find its development path with new 
partners. 
The international development sector has repeatedly emphasised the 
absence of strong foundations, staffing and standards in the Lao health sector, 
and the lack of progress and results desired by its various donors. It has side-
stepped the politicised nature, the unpredictability, and/or the incompleteness 
of previous support, and has rarely attempted to build on the existing albeit 
modest foundations of the Lao health sector. Nor has it offered explanations of 
the deeper limitations to development explored in this study. Instead, the 
international development sector has employed a narrative of perpetually 
unmet expectations and under-performance, adrift from time and devoid of 
any strong sense of place, which feeds its ‘anti-history machine’ and leaves the 
Lao health sector without context or explanation of why it struggles to develop. 
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An acknowledgement and understanding of Laos’ marginality and long-term 
dependence on external assistance over many decades helps make sense of the 
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